Office of the Historian

774.00/2–2854: Telegram

No. 1293
The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State1

confidential
priority
Cairo, February 28, 1954—8 p.m.

1002. Following roundup my preliminary impressions re events past 48 hours.

1.
RCC appears to have badly underestimated Naguib’s nationwide popularity and overestimated extent their own supporters not only among general public but also within army. RCC belief that it had full control of latter through free officers has not been justified by events and it seems clear that at this moment there are factions not only among free officers but also among RCC members whose [Page 2225] monolithic front is no longer intact. Plain fact is reaction in army and general public forced RCC to restore Naguib.
2.
Naguib comes back as President of “parliamentary Republic of Egypt” with Nasir in role of Prime Minister. Naguib is man of the hour who has just received national acclaim in the nature of an overwhelming plebiscite. He is obviously in a stronger position vis-à-vis RCC.
3.
Some changes soon in RCC seem almost certain: The pro-Naguib crowds shouted against some RCC members by name and it is doubtful Naguib can long work in real harmony with Salah Salim who voiced RCC grievances against him. Spotlight is currently on leftist RCC member Khaled Muhieddin who enjoys support junior cavalry officers (Embassy’s 986). Naguib’s gratitude for efforts his behalf of this group places it in strategic position which could be exploited by leftist elements.
4.
Many leading Egyptians, civilian and army, see in cavalry officers move plot by Communists and/or Ikhwan to break power of RCC which indeed has been weakened. Evidence cited for this is that:
(a)
Salah Ashmawi and another prominent Ikhwan leader appeared on balcony with Naguib this morning;
(b)
Among student demonstrators number of Ikhwani and Communist organizers were seen (Embtel 1001).2 Only hard fact is that until new situation settled into firmer pattern both Ikhwani and Communists will do their best to make headway and both will try to persuade Naguib (consciously or unconsciously) to advance their ideas.
5.
Naguib’s ostentatious display of solidarity with Nasir and Salah Salim and order banning further demonstrations indicate situation returning normal. Even if recently aired differences are composed publicly, it is possible that subsurface rifts will persist for some time.
6.
Promise of immediate steps toward restoration parliamentary regime is only solid new political development and one which may have hopeful potentialities.
Caffery
  1. Repeated to London as telegram 327, as 37 to Baghdad, as 71 to Beirut, as 28 to Damascus, as 66 to Amman, as 24 to Jidda, as 49 to Tel Aviv, and unnumbered to Paris and Rome.↩
  2. Not printed.↩