Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

741.56374/1–1854: Telegram

No. 1272
The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State¹

top secret

Cairo, January 18, 1954—3 p.m.

808. Noforn. Re my telegram 792.² After careful review with British Embassy of text draft heads of agreement (Deptel 765 and annexes I and II), it is our understanding that these generally agreed to subject to following exceptions:

1. Paragraphs 4–c (unavailability clause) and 10 (uniforms. are British positions which have been rejected by Egyptians.

2. No firm agreement has been reached on timetable for reducing technicians (paragraph 9) but serious difficulty on this score is not expected.

3. Present wording of paragraph 11 unacceptable to Egyptians. British have orally insisted they are not seeking “open-end. agreement (Embassy 716 December 28) and mutually acceptable redraft should therefore be achievable if London backs up categoric oral statement to this effect made by Stevenson to Egyptians.

It is not clear what is meant by including “defense of the base. among questions, enumerated in paragraph 14, on which detailed agreement remains to be reached (according British Embassy, which not informed on this point, phrase originated with British military).

Re annex I,³ Egyptians reject title “assistant base commander” because of its military implications and have suggested something like “chief British technician”. Egyptians also asked right to approve British appointee. Present reference to mutual consultation is counterproposal of British. Egyptians also refuse accord British right to inspect installations maintained by Egyptians (paragraph 3–b) (British say inspection necessary to assure power stations and filtration plants adequately run).

Although Egyptians have never said anything contrary substance annex II,⁴ (aid) they deny any need for such an annex, or even any reference to air facilities in heads of agreement on grounds that British requirements will be met by most favored nation rights. To sign anything on this score, Egyptians say, would be to raise spectre of “British air base”.

Department will note that while considerable area agreement achieved, points set out above which not agreed are of such substance that more than form of words involved. Both sides will have to yield some substance if an agreement is to be achieved.

All of the points listed above on which Egyptians are holding out have their roots in Eygptian pre-occupation regarding infringements of their national sovereignty. It is this attitude (and not neutralism) which accounts for their refusal to extend commitment on automatic availability beyond case of attack on Arab states, in other cases they insist on sovereign Egypt being consulted in existing circumstances. Same holds true for refusals formally accord British rights to inspect Egyptian-run base installations or accord UK what would appear to Egyptians as “special treatment” in matter of air rights.

A particularly difficult aspect of this problem is question of status of technicians (including of course both question of uniforms and title of “assistant base commander”). British insist technicians must be recognized as British military personnel.

To this Egyptians reply in effect:

“We agree that you may assign British military personnel as technicians, that for purposes of identification and control they may wear a uniform type of dress, that they may carry pistols for their personal protection, and that as regards administration and discipline they will be under British control. We are willing to accord to the technicians and their families personal status comparable to that enjoyed by foreign diplomats. We cannot agree that these men shall have the status in Egypt of British military personnel”.

If it is adequate protection of their personnel which concerns British, I do not think problem is too difficult. I do not however, believe Egyptians will give way on principle involved. To them it entails crucial issue of “complete military evacuation”.

It is plain that any attempt on our part to sell the Egyptians current British draft based on October 21 position would seriously damage our position and future usefulness. It is therefore, my recommendation that Department counsel British to prepare more realistic draft. If new British draft looked good enough to stand a chance, I might then, without emphasizing its origin, take it to the Egyptians as our own considered view of maximum they could hope to obtain from UK. As Egyptians sincerely desire agreement they might feel that new element introduced into stalemate under US aegis offered them honorable basis for resumption serious negotiations.

If however, London persists in standing pat on present position, playing the very remote possibility that Egyptians will eventually be forced to come around to accepting British terms, US should take a new look.

Caffery

1. Repeated to London as telegram 276.
2. In telegram 792 from Cairo, Jan. 16, 1954, not printed, Caffery reported that British Embassy officials in Cairo were unhappy with the draft Heads of Agreement because it did not take into account the evolution of substantive issues since Oct. 21, 1953; that the British Cabinet seemingly had decided to reaffirm its position of the previous October; and Caffery believed that as long as London was insisting on standing pat on its October position, there was little the United States could do. (741.56374/1–1654)
3. See footnote 3, Document 1270.
4. See footnote 4, ibid.