Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

641.74/12–2253

No. 1260
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) and the Secretary of State

top secret

Washington, December 22, 1953.

Participants:

• The Secretary
• Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
• Mr. Merchant—EUR

The British Ambassador called on the Secretary this afternoon at his own request. He opened the conversation by stating that he wanted to discuss the subject of the Egyptian negotiations in light of his own impressions of the situation in Great Britain based on his visit and also under instruction from Mr. Eden with whom he had discussed the subject at length.

First he said that he was convinced that Egypt was the most explosive current topic both in British domestic politics and potentially in the realm of US–UK relations. He went on then to transmit to the Secretary Mr. Eden’s personal assurance to the effect that the British government does in fact want an agreement. The Ambassador went on to say that he felt there was some real reason to believe that an agreement might be secured from the Egyptians in the next few weeks and that he hoped we would assist in giving the matter one final heave to put it over the top. In this connection he emphasized the importance from the British point of view of the US continuing to withhold economic aid.

The Secretary replied that on successive occasions we have held up at British request the granting of economic aid and that we could not hold off indefinitely, particularly in view of the fact that Congress would be reconvening in two or three weeks. Congress, he pointed out, had appropriated these funds and they would be asking a great many questions. The Secretary went on to say that he was not inclined to share the view that by granting economic aid in advance of an agreement between the UK and the Egyptians, the climate would be so improved as to accelerate the arrival at agreement. For his part the Secretary said that he inclined to view that it was desirable to hold the use of economic aid as ammunition with which Naguib might sell the agreement with the British to the Egyptian public. But there was a time limit which was rapidly expiring.

The Secretary then went after the Ambassador hard on the request he himself had made of Mr. Eden that the British put down on a piece of paper a draft heads of agreement which would include all the items which the British considered agreed with the Egyptians (At this point the Secretary noted his doubt as to whether in fact any precise meeting of minds between the Egyptians and the British had been reached on these points.) and also the British draft proposals on the two open items of availability and uniforms. The Secretary said we would then be prepared to back this up with the Egyptians if the British could assure us that these in fact represented the full extent of their requirements. When the Ambassador expressed some doubt as to whether the Egyptians would be willing to return to the conference table, the Secretary responded that he felt we would succeed in getting them back to the table.

There followed some discussion on the absence of a status of forces agreement and the Ambassador obviously was not aware of the Secretary’s conversation on this point in Paris with Mr. Eden, in which conversation it became clear that what Mr. Eden had in mind would not be satisfied by the NATO status of forces treaty, but a Libya formula.

The Secretary re-emphasized the importance of the British producing the memorandum as described and stated that if with our support the two parties were then prepared to initial such a document the US could start its economic aid and the UK resume normal relations with Egypt and begin withdrawal even though not required to do so until a treaty was concluded. The Secretary concluded the discussion of this topic by pointing out that if the negotiations broke down we should then consider whether it would not be in the common interest to use US economic aid to keep the situation in bounds. That, he said, was something that we could talk about with the British when the time comes.¹

The Ambassador closed with an expression of his belief that they were very close to an agreement with the Egyptians.

1. On Dec. 23, 1953, Secretary Dulles informed President Eisenhower, in a telephone conversation, of Ambassador Makins’ visit, saying that Makins had a telegram from Eden, the contents of which attempted to set matters straight and to make clear Eden’s unhappinesss that “things have been messed up”. Dulles went on to inform the President that he, Dulles, had told Makins that the United States “would be glad to support their [the British. position, but we had to know what that position is—we wanted it in black and white”. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Telephone Conversations”)