Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

641.74/12–1453: Telegram

No. 1254
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Butterworth) to the Department of State¹

secret

London, December 14, 1953—4 p.m.

2603. Deptel 3133 December 12² and Embtel 2585.³ Embassy officers discussed Suez negotiations with R. Allen today in attempt elicit as much information as possible without specifically mentioning plan outlined Department reference telegram. Following is substance Allen’s comments.

British envisage present talks as concluding in agreed written heads of agreement which would immediately be made public and would be followed promptly by formal negotiations on definitive agreement. Sole important subjects, in addition to those covered in heads of agreement, that would be included in definitive agreement are status of forces and financial arrangements. British have no intention introducing these topics into present heads of agreement discussions as they fully realize negotiations on definitive agreement for them would be extended and difficult. Allen, however, volunteered comment that it would be easy for UK to raise status of forces or some such other question if it should decide not to attempt reach immediate agreement. He was disturbed over Bevan’s articles in Egyptian paper which he said were stimulating renewed labor agitation to “stay in Egypt”. Allen appeared to be concerned that Churchill might suddenly decide to reverse government policy and side with Tory rebels.

Allen said following heads of agreement topics not fully agreed, in addition to availability and uniforms: (1) British have offered troop withdrawal within 15 months from signature definitive agreement, Egyptians are asking that 15 month period start with signature heads of agreement; (2) run down schedule for technicians not fully agreed; (3) definitive agreement to be of seven year duration with provision for consultation on future arrangements at some period, which Allen said would be one year, before expiration; Egyptians have made counter-proposal; (4) terms of RAF staging facilities still to be determined.

Re withdrawal, Allen said British willing give oral assurances to Egyptians that they would start withdrawing troops as soon as heads of agreement signed provided situation in Canal Zone at that time should permit this. Allen declared, however, present situation would not so permit as Egyptians would have to cooperate in suppression incidents such as have been recently occurring and in general “improve atmosphere”.

Allen states that points (1) and (4) above are essential to British: (4) because of need for facilities and (1) because if British committed to evacuation 15 months from signature heads of agreement, Egyptians would be free to stall on definitive agreement and thus obligate British troop evacuation without signing definitive agreement. British also attach considerable importance to points (2) and (3) but anticipate they could be agreed with Egyptians without too much difficulty.

Allen regards above four numbered points in different category from availability and uniforms, as Egyptians have definitely said no on latter but have refused to say either yes or no on former. British could draft heads of agreement document they would be willing to sign but have not done so because of Egyptian unwillingness to discuss above four numbered topics on which British feel Egyptians are holding out for bargaining purposes, before agreement reached on availability and uniforms (Cairo’s 516, October 28).⁴

Butterworth

1. Repeated to Cairo as telegram 66 and to Paris as telegram 390 for the Secretary of State.
2. Printed as telegram 656 to Cairo, Document 1252.
3. In telegram 2585 from London, Dec. 13, not printed, Ambassador Aldrich reported that the British position was that the negotiations had not reached an impasse, and that they hoped the United States would not give aid to the Egyptians until they had another opportunity to come to a final agreement with the Egyptians. Moreover, Aldrich expressed doubt about the feasibility of the procedure outlined in telegram 656 to Cairo, Document 1252, but suggested that it could be explored further by the Secretary of State with Eden in Paris. Aldrich hoped, however, that no definite action would be taken until he had an opportunity to discuss the question with Byroade and the Secretary of State. (641.74/12–1353)
4. Ambassador Caffery reported in telegram 516 from Cairo, Oct. 28, not printed, that the British in Cairo had received instructions to stand fast on their bargaining position with the Egyptians. (641.74/10–2853)