Office of the Historian

641.74/11–1253: Telegram

No. 1245
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1

secret
Washington, November 12, 1953—4:56 p.m.

2570. Following is possible language re Suez Base on “availability. and “uniforms” which .conforms to Secretary’s suggestions to UK Ambassador (Deptel 2521).2

Availability—UN clause to read “In the event of a recommendation by the UN that the base should be made available in the event of a threat to the peace or breach of the peace or an act of aggression by an outside power, and recognizing her responsibilities under the UN Charter and the Uniting-for-Peace resolution; Egypt will afford etc.” (Cairo’s 488). This retains UN action as criterion for availability and should dissipate possible Egyptian fear clause would be invoked in dispute between Arab States and Israel. Citing responsibilities under UN Charter and Uniting-for-Peace resolution as basis for clause might make it more palatable to Egyptians.

Uniforms—”Outside base area and when off duty within it British personnel will wear civilian clothes. When on duty, in base installations [Page 2164] or in transit between them they will normally wear distinctive civilian working dress. They may wear service uniforms when so directed by the Base Commander. The Base Commander shall so direct on appropriate occasions.” This is in accord our view UK should meet Egyptian position on uniforms. Problem does not arise until after British forces withdraw by which time popular feeling towards British should have materially altered. By this time probable Egyptians willing authorize use service uniform on ceremonial occasions when desired by British.

London requested discuss with Foreign Office. At same time Embassy should inquire when British plan make next approach to Egypt. Our understanding of last meeting is that British told Egyptians they would consider situation and communicate with Egyptians.

Dulles
  1. Repeated to Cairo as telegram 538.↩
  2. In telegram 2521 to London, Nov. 9, not printed, the Embassy was informed that on Nov. 3, the Secretary of State and the British Ambassador discussed the Suez Base negotiations. The Ambassador stated that availability was still the great obstacle, saying that the Egyptians had rejected language from the Uniting for Peace Resolution because they suspected it might be invoked in the Arab-Israeli dispute. The Secretary of State suggested that some formula under which United Nations action could still be used should be found with the qualification that the Arab-Israel conflict should be excluded. (641.74/11–953)↩