Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

641.74/10–2253: Telegram

No. 1233
The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Cairo, October 22, 1953—2 p.m.

488. Following British Embassy account Anglo-Egyptian meeting yesterday.

1. In carefully worded opening statement Robertson outlined British position as follows and tabled four formulae on key points.

a. Suez. As part general settlement UK accepts reference in preamble already discussed with Egyptians. (Formula: “Egypt and UK recognize Suez maritime canal is integral part of Egypt and a waterway economically, commercially and strategically of international importance; and being determined to uphold the 1888 convention guaranteeing freedom of navigation of canal”).

b. Duration. Seven years.

c. Withdrawal. As “new concession” 15 months from day agreement comes into force. Robertson informed Egyptians that as soon as agreement on principles reached UK planned on own initiative start important withdrawals.

d. Number technicians: 4000 for 4½ years (Phase one); prepared discuss members [numbers] Phase 2.

e. Uniforms. Robertson said this problem has received exaggerated public attention; it was obviously one susceptible solution by application common sense. UK prepared have technicians off duty wear normal civilian clothes; on duty wear working dress similar to that civilian firms. However, because British public would not understand UK could not accept formal denial right British soldiers wear British uniform. Robertson pointed out problem does not arise until after British forces withdraw by which time Egyptians had said popular attitude toward British would have materially altered. Common sense would obviously be applied in deciding when uniforms should be worn. (British formula: “Outside base area and when off duty within it British personnel will wear civilian clothes. When on duty in base in installations or in transit between them they will normally wear working dress. However, Egyptian Government accepts in principle that they may wear service uniform and that they will do so when so directed. They may carry a weapon for their personal protection”.) See paragraph 2e below. Note: Egyptians asked “directed by whom?” Reply was “by responsible British officer”.

f. Consultation. UK wished agreement to contain clause covering what will happen at end agreement. (British formula: “Parties will consult together at end of period specified for duration of agreement to decide what agreements are necessary to provide for continued maintenance of base thereafter”.)

g. Availability. Egyptians had already received UK’s final concession on this point. (British formula: “(1) In the event of (a) an attack by an outside power on Egypt; or (b) an attack by an outside power on any country which is a party to the Arab mutual security pact; (c) a recommendation by the UN that the base should be made available in the event of a threat to the peace or breach of peace or an act of aggression; Egypt will afford to the UK all such facilities as may be necessary to place base on war footing and operate it efficiently. These facilities will include the use within the limits strictly indispensable for the above mentioned purposes of Egyptian ports by British forces.

“(2) In the event of a threat of an attack on any of the members of the Arab mutual security pact Iran or Turkey there shall be immediate consultation between the UK and Egypt”.)

h. Air facilities. UK agreed to text as discussed October 10.

i. Organization base. Prepared settle this issue at once in light Egyptian comments.

2. After 1½ hour recess Egyptians returned and stated their position as follows:

a. Agreed Suez formula.

b. Agreed 7 year duration provided “7 years means 7 years only”.

c. Agreed 15 month withdrawal.

d. Technicians. Agreed 4000 technicians 4½ years; suggested 1000 technicians one year and 500 technicians final 1½ years.

e. Uniforms. Principle contained third sentence British formula (paragraph 1e above) entirely unacceptable: Offered following new wording “on duty at installations and in transit between them they will wear a unified civilian dress to be agreed upon”. Egyptians explained “unified civilian dress” (on which they agreed badges of rank could be worn) as being something like cork helmets, overalls or shorts and shirts (not khaki).

f. Consultation. Egyptians proposed consultation two years before end of agreement; if no agreement reached British to spend remaining period of agreement “withdrawing or otherwise disposing of remaining British owned property”.

Note: According British Embassy this proposal in effect limits agreement to 5 years since maintenance effective base impossible while in liquidation.

g. Availability. Agreed British formula with exception [(1)(c)] but offered no substitute (see Embtel 486 paragraph 7).²

h. Air facilities. Assured UK MFN treatment and “satisfaction” but avoided mention October 10 formula.

3. Robertson said Egypt response major British effort meet their requirements extremely disappointing: Main issues remained availability and uniforms. On former, UK thought its offer so good Egyptians could not refuse it. In any case this offer UK’s final word as was UK offer re uniforms. Formal denial right wear uniforms would not be understood in UK. UK prepared discuss number technicians Phase 2 but Egypt figures “too low”.

4. Foreign Minister Fawzi said, stage obviously reached when both sides must report: Said Egypt had nothing more offer re availability.

5. When publicity discussed, Salah Salim wanted statement saying only no agreement reached. “His colleagues suppressed him firmly and Egyptian delegation accepted text suggested by UK including reference to another meeting”.

6. Robertson reported to London that throughout meeting Egyptians “showed no disposition to precipitate a break”. British Embassy representative describes atmosphere meeting as friendly “and almost genial”. British Embassy representative was left with impression that Egyptians genuinely want agreement that they “have no present intention of turning loose the commandos”.

Comment: We urged RCC Tuesday night to be “friendly” with British during next days meeting and to avoid break.

Caffery

1. Repeated to London as telegram 197.

2. Paragraph 7 of telegram 486 from London, Oct. 21, not printed, reads as follows:

   “7. Agreement was not reached on availability. Egyptians agreed to make base available in event attack on Egypt or attack on any member ALCSP and consultation in event of threat of attack on Turkey and Iran. Furthermore, they are willing to include a provision which sets out that Egypt “fully recognizes” her responsibilities under UN Charter and uniting for peace resolution.” (641.74/10–2153)