641.74/9–1953: Telegram
No. 1221
The Acting
Secretary of State to the Embassy
in Egypt1
niact
324. Selwyn Lloyd in New York and British Ambassador here have presented latest British position on Egypt to the Secretary and Department. They state this to be their final position as worked out by the Cabinet after extensive deliberations. They request our full support, indicating their belief that with our support their offer would be accepted. Their position as follows:
Duration to be total of 7 years after conclusion of agreement (British Ambassador uncertain whether this means signature or [Page 2137] ratification). British time table as follows: 1.5 years for evacuation; 3 years with 4,000 technicians; 2.5 years for reduced number of combined technicians-inspectors.
Formulae for availability as follows:
“In the event of United Nations action to resist an act of aggression or an attack by an outside power on Egypt; or An attack by an outside power on any country which is a party to the Arab Mutual Security Pact; Egypt will afford to the United Kingdom all such facilities as may be necessary to place the base on a war footing and to operate it efficiently for the benefit of Her Majesty’s forces and other friendly forces. These facilities will include the use of Egyptian ports by Her Majesty’s Naval forces and merchant shipping.
2. In the event of an attack on Turkey or Persia or in the event of a threat of an attack on any of the above mentioned countries there shall be immediate consultation between the U.K. and Egypt.”
British also insist upon clause in the preamble of the agreement regarding freedom of transit of the Suez Canal. Text to be as follows:
“Recognizing the economic, commercial and strategic importance of the Suez Canal as an international waterway and being agreed on the necessity of preserving and upholding the principles of freedom of navigation set forth in the international convention at present governing the use of the Canal.”
British also want article of the agreement itself to cover the above point on Suez Canal. British Ambassador did not know nature of article, apparently to be left for later drafting stage, but assumed it would go no further than the above preamble clause. He was reminded that in recent Suez Canal talks here British had wished phraseology which would in effect give to UK enforcement rights in connection with freedom of transit. Makins stated he believed that position had been changed and that article could be along general lines of preamble clause.
General Smith expressed keen disappointment British desire interject new problem of Suez Canal in Base negotiations at this late stage. Also disappointment British prepared stand on 7 year duration as our information indicated 6 years was as high as Egyptians would go. Makins said London believed 7 years obtainable. Apparently Nuri Said gave them this impression. Smith replied that we would of course be delighted if Egyptians would in fact accept 7 years and Suez Canal addition as well. We did not disagree with desirability of either. This purely question of tactics as to what in fact was obtainable and question of whether, now that agreement so close, talks should be allowed to fail.
[Page 2138]Believe pressure from us will not cause British make substantial change their latest proposals. Desire you do utmost assist them unless you perceive part of package which you convinced not obtainable even with your support, and which will inevitably lead to break. Impossible judge here extent of Egyptian reaction Suez Canal clause which in itself fairly logical and innocuous. Request your earliest views including recommendations as to how Suez Canal issue might be handled.2
- Repeated priority to London as telegram 1481 and priority to the Secretary of State in New York as telegram 132. Drafted and approved by Byroade after the substance of the last paragraph had been cleared with Under Secretary Smith.↩
- The Department informed the Embassy in Cairo in telegram 328 on Sept. 21, not printed, that Lord Salisbury wished to clarify two points that arose during the Smith–Makins talks reported in telegram 324. The first was that the article in the Base Agreement itself regarding freedom of transit of the Suez Canal was not really a sticking point, and that General Robertson was to try to obtain agreement for the article, but if he could not, he could accept merely the clause in the preamble. The second point was that General Robertson had considerable latitude in his handling of the rest of the base negotiations. (641.74/9–2153)↩