641.74/9–953: Telegram

No. 1218
The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State1

secret

302. 1. It now appears that possibility Anglo-Egyptian settlement near future largely depends upon reconciliation of differences between what two groups of politicians (British and Egyptian. consider they “can get away with” vis-à-vis their public opinions on duration question.

2. I am not in a position to comment re what British Government can accept politically: As Egyptians know it, UK suggestion is agreement for 10 years and technicians for 5 years (with tapering off of technicians after fifth year), agreement to start from completion British evacuation. In effect, making allowance for 2–year evacuation period, British formula is 12–7 years.

3. Egyptians have offered UK as “maximum Egyptian public opinion will accept” agreement for 5 years from date of signature with techicians for 3 years. Adding important Egyptian concessions I obtained and reported in my 292, Egyptians, “in order achieve quick settlement”, are now prepared to go to formula which amounts in effect to 6 years for agreement and evacuation (1 year) combined-technicians in some guise for entire period.

4. Considering past and present difficulties, I am surprised RCC has felt able to go as far as it has to meet UK re duration. Nasir, himself, has said that while he could sign agreement for 10 years this would not mean anything because it would be violently and effectively rejected by Egyptian public. Important element in RCC decision as to maximum it can “get away with” is widely held idea that under treaty British will have to get out anyway in 1956. This idea clearly militates against acceptance British suggestion that RCC should sign up until 1963. As it is, RCC is taking big political risk in offering agreement running to 1959. Aside from Wafd, Moslem Brothers and Communists even the Pashas would come into the open against RCC if 10 years accepted. It is just too long for any class of Egyptian to accept.

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5. I regret duration looms so large at this juncture because it seems to me that any terminal date is likely mean very little in practice.

6. Prerequisite for enhancing security this part of world is Anglo-Egyptian settlement which will open door to permanent good will and “equal to equal” collaboration with Egyptian area defense. Short range, evacuation British forces from Suez base represents security risk but this risk will be same under Egyptian 6–year offer as under British 10–year suggestion. We should all know well before end 5 years whether our hopes for fruitful collaboration with Egypt are realizable. If they are, well before that time we will wish to replace Anglo-Egyptian settlement with a broader-based and more satisfactory arrangement.

7. After due reflection I conclude that RCC offer (as amended to me by Foreign Minister (Embtel 292)) is so close to being maximum politically feasible that it should be accepted as just that. I believe also that unless agreement is reached in principle between now and early October (when universities open) it is doubtful RCC will be able to maintain its offer amounting to 6 years. While British Government may be attached to idea poker game in which Egyptians likely raise their bid again (Embassy’s 291)2 I think this concept may be dangerous over-simplification which does not take into account extent opposition which Egyptian Government will have to face as result of making any agreement with UK.

8. Having in mind my telegram 293 September 6, I suggest that Department bring these latest suggestions to attention of British and counsel British to accept them.

Caffery
  1. Repeated to London as telegram 105 and unnumbered to Paris for Reinhardt, to Rome for Maffitt, to Moscow, Ankara, Tel Aviv, and the Arab capitals.
  2. Not printed.