774.56/6–2953: Telegram
No. 1193
The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the
Department of State
2651. Abd Al Nasir and Hakim Amir on Saturday said Egyptian Government now desires complete interim arms purchase (Deptel 2138, May 5 and previous). When Embassy Officer pointed out that Secretary had taken position with Naguib that “US cannot equip Egyptians to fight British” (Cairo telegram 2417, May 12, paragraph 14) Nasir and Amir registered great disappointment and said Prime Minister had not mentioned Secretary’s statement to them. (Naguib was probably not conversant with details of interim arms program and may have failed grasp full import of Secretary’s remark.)
[Page 2105]In ensuing discussion Embassy Officer reviewed background of Secretary’s position (breaking-off of negotiations, mounting of tension, British concern, et cetera).
Egyptians replied they are not asking for small arms of which they have “plenty” but are interested in tanks and armored cars and ancillary equipment. They said “we are ready to give full assurance that any arms received from you will never be used against the British. In any case we are not fools enough to try to use tanks and armored cars against the British”.
Nasir said frankly their current interest is in some showy items to boost army morale and strengthen Amir’s position as newly appointed Commander in Chief. He pointed out that if US position remains unchanged he will have no alternative but to explain to army officers that US and other western countries are withholding arms under pressure from British.
Nasir added this was last thing he wished do as he is anxious build pro-American sentiment in army in preparation for future cooperation. For this reason he particularly desired that first arms should come from US. He reiterated his interest in proposed US tour for staff college graduates as another means of working in desired direction (Embdesp 2855, June 23 and letter to Hart of June 26).1
In view of (1) GOE’s demonstrated good faith and ability to maintain calm in response to Secretary’s request; (2) Churchill’s negative reaction to President’s message; and (3) indefinite postponement of Bermuda conference,2 I make recommendation that US now reconsider decision to withhold major items on interim arms list (which as Department will recall has been under intermittent discussion for more than six months).
Prompt action on Egyptian request at this juncture would have highly desirable effect of (a) strengthening regime internally in most vital area (Army), (b) encouraging pro-American and thus pro-western orientation of Egypt and (c) avoiding disillusionment at moment when lingering hope of American intervention is virtually only factor forestalling an even more adamant Egyptian stand on issue of British evacuation of Suez base (see my next following telegram).
- Neither printed.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 1179.↩