Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, “Eisenhower Correspondence with Churchill”
No. 1157
President Eisenhower to
Prime Minister Churchill
Dear Winston:
[Here follow the President’s remarks about Churchill’s possible visit to the Soviet Union, the situation in Korea and in Southeast Asia, and British Chancellor of the Exchequer Butler’s rebuff of a possible new solution of the Iranian oil crises.]
Foster showed me your communication about the Egyptian affair.1 It is possible that I have not thoroughly understood the background in which should be viewed the existing impasse. I was told that some very protracted negotiations between the Egyptians and ourselves, looking toward the supply to them, by us, of a meager quantity of arms, had been held up for a long time pending a satisfactory solution of the Sudan problem.
I had understood that by agreement with your Government, we were to proceed with the transfer of a small amount of equipment [Page 2062] (finally reduced to about five million dollars worth) upon the satisfactory completion of that agreement. It is my impression that the Egyptians knew of this general intention on our part.
Later, when there began to appear in press reports some intemperate remarks—even threats—by the Egyptian authorities against our British friends, we began to drag our feet on fulfilling our part of the bargain. The Egyptians, of course, have pressed us again and again on the matter, and we get a bit embarrassed because of their right to charge us with failure to carry out an agreement. We can, of course, adopt the attitude that, because of some of their extraordinary and threatening statements, we are compelled to make certain that they do not intend to use these arms against our friends. In fact, it is my impression that we have long since done this. It is, however, quite difficult to refuse even to talk about the matter or to go so far, for example, as to decline to allow the Egyptian officials to see a list of the kind of articles that would be available. I believe that the initial items to be transferred involved only such things as helmets and jeeps.
Now, of course, we can continue to drag our feet for a while. But I do most deeply deplore having gotten into a position where we can be made to feel like we are breaking faith with another government. It is possible that some years ago we may have been too hasty in promising to include Egypt among those countries to whom we would give some help in preparing necessary defense forces, but that is water long over the dam.
With respect to this particular item, we will at least do nothing further until after Foster has had his talk with Naguib. While it is possible that some hopeful break will develop out of that meeting, I must say that I am extremely doubtful.
As of this moment I still think that we have no recourse except to continue the steady buildup of Western morale and of Western economic and military strength. This is the great “must” that confronts us all, but whenever you have an idea—even a piece of one—that might suggest a possibility of us diminishing the burdens that we are compelled to lay upon our collective peoples, please let me know about it. I should certainly like to ponder it.
I hope my comments do not offend—I assure you again I welcome yours.
Won’t you please convey to Anthony my very best wishes and the earnest hope that he will soon be returned to full health?
With warm regard to your good self,
As ever,2