Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file, International file
No. 1137
The British Foreign Secretary
(Eden) to
President Eisenhower
Dear Mr. President: Thank you for your personal letter to me about Egypt dated the 16th March, which Winthrop delivered to me on the 23rd March.1 Let me say at once how much encouraged I am by the assumption, which it seems to me underlies everything you say, that you and we must maintain co-operation in these as in all other matters.
As of course you know, our representatives in Cairo have now made futher separate approaches to try to get the Egyptian Government to open discussions with us, and we have given the Egyptians a note of the five points in the package proposal, and told them that we are ready to start talks on the basis of these five points, and that we do not seek to fix beforehand the order in which the points are discussed. At the same time we have made it clear that no final or binding agreement would be signed upon any single point until satisfactory understandings had been reached on all the points, which in our view are inseparably bound together. It does seem to me that it would be unreasonable of the Egyptians to refuse to start talks with us on this basis, and we would hope that, once talks had begun, we should be able to convince them of the [Page 2041] justice and practical need of our reaching a settlement on all the different points.
I am particularly glad to see from your letter that you yourself feel that no justifiable criticism of our plan can be made; and I carried away from my talks with you the clear impression that you agreed with us on the need for sound arrangements to maintain in being our Middle East base.
I also understand what you say in your letter about the need to avoid the appearance of our attempting to dominate together the councils of the free world. As you know, we certainly do recognize the rights of Egypt, and we are fully ready to negotiate with her as with an equal. In return, we must expect that the Egyptian Government should face the facts of life. After all, we are being asked to give up something of real value; it is something which we have created as a result of the experience which we gained in the last war at the cost of so many lives and so much expenditure of effort, time and money. We are being asked to substitute for this, which we now hold, an agreement which must be in part an act of faith in Egypt. And on this agreement will rest an essential element in the defence of the free world against aggression. That is why your help is so necessary.
I am sure that neither of us have any illusions about the people we are dealing with. Of course they are out for their own ends, but we have got somehow to try to lead them to see that those ends must and can be reconciled with the wider interests involved. I do not believe that the process will be an easy one, and I am quite sure that the Egyptians will take every opportunity to exploit any real or even imaginary difference between you and us. If they think that they can get better terms by appealing to you to use your influence with us, they will not hesitate to do so.
You and we have agreed broadly on what we think is the minimum which we can accept if we are to maintain our ability to defend the Middle East. We cannot, for the sake of avoiding unpleasantness, allow that minimum to be whittled away. And if it is not to be whittled away, you and we will need to stand together and present a united front. If we allow the Egyptians to imagine, by any differences in our methods of approach to them, that in the last resort they can rely upon you to rescue them from the unpleasant consequences of their own obstinate refusal to face facts, then I believe we shall fail to secure any satisfactory and lasting agreement. Together, we cannot help wielding immense influence, and there is no question of domination here; but if the Egyptians think we can be divided, they will go on trying to play us off against one another until in the end they lose all control of a situation which they themselves will have created. I am sure that we [Page 2042] are agreed upon fundamentals, but it is important also that we agree upon tactics, since our experience shows that the Egyptians are only too ready to mistake any divergence in tactics for disagreement on our basic aims.
I hope you will forgive me for having written at such length. I have done so because I believe that Egypt is a test case. If we can get a settlement there, which the world will see has been achieved by our united efforts, the benefits both in the Middle East and elsewhere may spread out like ripples on a pond. I hope we can achieve it, but I am sure it will be a tough job.
Yours ever,