774.56/1–2153: Telegram

No. 1084
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State1

secret

4001. While I appreciate factors in Egyptian situation which led Department to conclusion that we should proceed with interim arms program in Egypt (Deptel 4805, January 19) I feel that I must nevertheless express my strong doubts re wisdom of our making this move over British objections.

I have understood that it is our policy that United Kingdom has primary military responsibility in area. I entirely recognize that United Kingdom capabilities for discharging this responsibility are severely handicapped by existence of Anglo-Egyptian dispute and I approve our desire to do everything possible to promote a settlement. I feel it highly important, however, that our efforts in this direction should be within the framework of our overall obligations to British as an ally. It seems to me that when we decide on course of action over British objections which will have profound effect on security of their armed forces, we are imposing strain on alliance which exposes us to justifiable criticism. British public opinion would react as strongly as would American opinion were the situations reversed. I do not mean to say that concept of interim arms assistance is wrong, I merely mean to say that it is wrong to proceed with it over objections of our ally.

[Page 1969]

I appreciate importance of our responding affirmatively to Naguib’s request for aid from West. At time of recent US–United Kingdom conversations on forthcoming defense negotiations with Egypt, I understood that one reason why Department felt it necessary that this response would take form of arms assistance was that we had not found it possible to be forthcoming with economic assistance. Apparently, however, that difficulty has now been overcome, since I now note from Deptel 4762, January 172 that we are in a position to render $10 million worth of economic aid to Egypt. It seems to me that this constitutes a not inconsiderable response to Naguib’s appeal and I would sincerely hope that a re-examination of this whole question would result, in view of the strong British feelings about arms assistance, in our regarding economic as a sufficient initial response in itself.

I should add that Eden spoke to me again yesterday (prior to the receipt of Deptel 4805) of his concern over this question and of his hope that we could extend any interim assistance in the form of economic rather than military aid.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, I am refraining from acting on Deptels 4805 and 48063 pending the Department’s further instructions.

Gifford
  1. Repeated to Cairo as telegram 212.
  2. Printed as telegram 1434, Document 1080.
  3. See footnote 2, supra.