Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

774.5/1–353: Telegram

No. 1064
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

London, January 3, 1953—noon.

3635. There follows summary of two meetings held so far with British on Egypt. British delegation headed by Bowker with services group headed by Air Chief Marshal Baker, Vice Chief Air Staff.

First meeting December 31 was on UK memo on defense negotiations with Egypt.² Byroade expressed general agreement with paper although doubted whether case A could in fact be obtained.³ Following points of detail discussed:

1. Technicians

British said command of Canal Zone base and responsibility for its maintenance could be in Egyptian hands but if to be fully operative at opening of hostilities would be necessary to have foreign technicians and supervisors. Neither supervisors or technicians would have command of functions. British also suggested possibility other allied powers providing technicians. They thought it extremely important to impress upon Egyptians the idea that even if they possessed all necessary equipment some foreign technicians still be needed on continuing basis in view of rapid technical changes. Byroade stated he considered it important psychologically to get across to the Egyptians at least in principle that non-Egypt technicians were there to train Egyptians to eventually handle all functions themselves. Said we should do everything possible to make Egyptians feel equal to us. British agreed that paper should be more precise regarding technicians and agreed elaborate principles underlying technical aid concept in separate papers.

2. Redeployment of troops

British explained that total evacuation of Canal Zone would take approximately eighteen months. First troops to leave and their withdrawal could start immediately after agreement reached—were non-garrison troops brought in since crisis last November. These probably be redeployed to UK. Main redeployment difficulty concerned garrison troops, both from standpoint of locating base for them and providing accommodations. At present their redeployment be confined to Cyprus and Libya. Before withdrawal from Canal Zone reached an advanced stage, British hoped to have agreement with Libya permitting stationing there of additional British troops. Headquarters would be probably moved to Cyprus. Gaza strip as redeployment area been for moment abandoned due to tremendous cost of constructing base there and political complications involved (i.e. refugees, etc).

3. “Integrated Anglo-Egyptian air defense organ”

British stress creation this or similar organ vital as defense of area depended adequate air defense for Canal Zone base at outbreak of war. Explained air force currently staging fighter-bomber exercises and of utmost importance from defense standpoint that such exercises be continued. As Egyptians had no modern bomber squadron and as they not sufficently proficient in fighter tactics British saw no alternative to British having de facto responsibility for air defense of Egypt although probably have to grant Egyptians have nominal responsibilities. At least in initial stages hoped to have British squadrons stationed Egypt. It was recognized that Egypt acceptance such air defense scheme would depend in large measure on its presentation which would have to stress Egypt responsibilities and UK technical and operational assistance.

4. Approach

British believe it inadvisable approach Egyptians on specific points outlined British paper. They thought it preferable explain that proposals constitute package including evacuation British troops, MEDO and military and economic assistance. Their target would be to come as close as possible to case A but realized case A would probably prove unacceptable to Egypt. They hoped that if they made clear to Egypt their strategic requirements, problems operating base etc., it might be possible arrive at figure supervisory and technical personnel which would in fact give British necessary protection their interest.

US–UK meeting on British draft MEDO paper (Embtel 3605, December 31)⁴ and draft paper on military assistance (Embtel 3610 January 1)⁵ took place morning January 2.

Regarding MEDO paper US said they did not believe we should try establish MEDO in manner British paper envisaged. We believe that most it would be possible to obtain initially from Egypt in return for British agreement on evacuation would be Egypt acceptance in principle to common defense planning. We felt it essential that we work towards public statement by Egypt accepting this principle which would be made at same time UK announcement evacuation. Following such acceptance negotiation would then proceed with Egypt re nature and scope its participation.

US also believed that as soon as negotiations with Egypt on MEDO had reached suitable point, approaches should then be made to other Arab states. British argued that unless they had adequate assurances about Egyptian participation in MEDO, it is not possible to agree to evacuation since if Egypt refused common defense planning, defense vacuum would be created. US side considered that Egypt could be brought to discuss form of MEDO and extent their participation before evacuation had progressed very far but believed that evacuation would have to start prior to negotiations on form of MEDO itself. British agreed that MEDO could not be established until negotiations with Egypt and other Arab states on form had been undertaken and indicated they would redraft for discussion at subsequent meeting. Re British paper phrasing military assistance to progress in negotiations (Embtel 3610 Jan 1), Byroade expressed concern at this procedure as philosophy of “little steps for little people”. He emphasized our approach somewhat different. We felt that stakes in Egypt are such that we must be prepared take risks and give concrete evidence of our good faith to present Egyptian regime. This all more important because of military character that regime. Egyptians some time ago presented us with list arms and equipment they required. Thus far, we have failed respond their appeal. As condition precedent establishment proper atmosphere for productive negotiations, we have been examining possibility interim military assistance of magnitude of approximately $10,000,000 of which part might be grant assistance. Our inability thus far extend substantial economic aid gives added importance our being forthcoming military assistance.

British reacted strongly to this suggestion. They argued supply of arms now would (1) reduce bargaining effect of arms assistance in negotiations, (2) stimulate supply of arms to Egypt from other countries, (3) have bad psychological effect on UK troops in Canal Zone, (4) present difficulties with Parliament, (5) cause difficulties with Israel, and (6) past experience (release of jets and sterling) indicated such attempt improve atmosphere unrewarding.

Byroade emphasized that risks involved offset by facts (1) deliveries would be slow and (2) if the Egyptians prove uncooperative supply of arms could be cut off at any time.

Bowker said Eden had strong views this point and matter would have to be further explored. British military appeared take less concerned view this problem than FonOff, although military wish know what types equipment US had in mind.

Gifford

1. Repeated to Cairo as telegram 183 and unnumbered to Khartoum.
2. See telegram 1524 from Cairo, Document 1056.
3. For the text of Case A as agreed to by both sides in Appendix D of the “United Kingdom Memorandum on Defence Negotiations with Egypt”, see Document 1061.
4. For text, see Document 113. The British draft paper on the Middle East Defense Organization and Egyptian participation in it, not printed here, was Appendix A of the “Agreed Record” of the United States–United Kingdom Talks on Egypt. (774.5/1–1453) It subsequently became “Agreed Paper No. 2” of the United States–United Kingdom Talks.
5. Document 1062.