Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

745W.00/12–1852: Telegram

No. 1052
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Department of State¹

secret

London, December 18, 1952—5 p.m.

3406. Embassy yesterday discussed Sudan negotiations with FonOff against background Cairo’s 1433, Dec 13 and Deptel 4054, Dec 16.²

FonOff official maintained formula which Sabri and Salem had indicated Egypt had accepted was open to major objection that Governor General’s broad powers to prevent discrimination against any area or segment of Sudanese people would still be subject in last respect to overriding control of advisory commission. FonOff says Egyptians have been adamant on this point, which is real heart of UK–Egyptian differences over South Sudan. Of somewhat lesser magnitude, but still of importance, is UK feeling that south should be specifically mentioned in any formula. Words “any area or segment” so vague in themselves as not to provide any reassurance to south that term applies to that area. To make it clear, it would be necessary to make some kind of supplementary public statement and this procedure would seem to have no advantage over specific reference in constitution to Governor General’s responsibilities for south.

FonOff official emphasized throughout conversation that feeling in south is such that it must be made clear to southerners that Governor General will, in fact, exercise special responsibilities with respect to region. Separate secret understanding with Egyptians along lines suggested Deptel 4054, Dec 16 would not fulfill that criterion. Moreover, FonOff opposed in principle to secret understanding of this kind and leery of vague formulas capable of different interpretations which might subsequently arise to plague both parties in same way as Bevin–Sidky agreement. On other hand, UK willing agree formula which would reassure Egyptians that no intention split off South Sudan.

FonOff points out that there have recently been indications that Egyptians less concerned about specific mention of south than about relationship between Governor General and his advisory council on this problem. FonOff showed us recent telegram from British Embassy Cairo reporting approach which Creswell had made to Major Salem urging more flexible Egyptian approach. Salem indicated Egypt was willing take new approach to problem and agreed on importance avoiding legal quibbles. He stressed importance early solution Sudan problem and expressed opinion that agreement to different arrangements for south would result in boycott of election by unity and Umma Parties.

Creswell doubted Umma’s attitude clear on this point and felt Egypt could handle unity parties. He went on to suggest that question might be dealt with by inclusion of paragraph stating it is declared policy of two govts to maintain unity of Sudan as single territory and that Governor General’s special powers not be exercised in manner which would conflict with this policy; and also by redrafting definition of Governor General’s powers in Article 100 in less autocratic way.

Salem pointed out there are three main issues in Article 100: (1) existence of Governor General’s special responsibilities; (2) Governor General’s right to withhold assent to legislation; (3) Governor General’s right to issue administrative orders regarding south. Of these three issues, Egypt’s greatest concern is implied diminution in authority of Sudan Cabinet and Parliament represented by (2) without provision for subsequent action, and point (3).

In reporting foregoing, Stevenson has suggested to FonOff possible compromise whereby in case of Governor General using powers to suspend legislation, issue would then be reconsidered by Sudan Cabinet on directive of Governor General who would, in drawing up directive, obtain advice of commission in purely consultative capacity.

FonOff somewhat encouraged by foregoing conversations between Creswell and Salem, although it recognizes that latter often much more reasonable in his approach to Sudan problem than other members of military junta. It is, nevertheless, considering Stevenson’s suggested formula to which its first reaction appears favorable.

Gifford

1. Repeated to Cairo as telegram 170 and to Khartoum as telegram 8.
2. In telegram 4054 to London, Dec. 16, not printed, the Department suggested that the Embassy in London give the Foreign Office the substance of telegram 1433 from Cairo and advanced the idea of suggesting to the Foreign Office that the British and Egyptian Governments should exchange secret communications accepting the British interpretation of the Governor General’s powers in the Southern Sudan at the time a British-Egyptian-Sudanese agreement was signed. Such an exchange would possibly satisfy the British concern that the south be protected and would also satisfy Egypt’s concern regarding publicity. (745W.00/12–1652)