Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 2

774.00/9–1852: Telegram

No. 1012
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

secret
priority

Washington, September 30, 1952—6:51 p.m.

678. Fol are draft instrns² refd immed preceding Deptel:³

• “1. Dept, Def and DMS have given careful consideration to Gen Naguib’s msg Sept 18 (Embtel 730). We have also studied joint appreciation Sept 16 prepared by you and Stevenson.⁴
• 2. We agree that material as well as moral support present Egypt regime is policy best calculated to lead toward attainment US and West objectives vis-à-vis Egypt, i.e., generally closer identification Egypt and West interests and specifically: a) Egypt participation in common def planning, b) settlement Anglo-Egypt controversy and c) peace with Israel.
• 3. We also believe that if our support is to be effective, it will have to be given without delay since demonstrable progress is important plank in new regime’s platform.
• 4. At same time regime’s somewhat sudden disposition to consider internatl questions, generality and vagueness approach as well as question marks which normally arise from nature and origin this type movement clearly indicate that we must make certain as we proceed that precision and detail take the place of vagueness and generality. We recognize it is important our insistence on precision shld not be misconstrued as lack of confidence.
• 5. We wld be willing to accept secret commitments and/or assurances if stated with some precision as satis basis for policy of coop and material support. We wld expect that objective wld be to work toward open commitments and we wld naturally carefully assay performance. While we wld expect commitments and/or assurances to be in writing, we recognize that insistence on such form might be considered lack of faith and might pose difficulties for Naguib with Cab, etc. We wld therefore be prepared consider alternatives including possibility oral commitments and/or assurances.
• 6. We believe that in addition to secret commitments Egypt for its part shld undertake certain gestures which wld be reassuring to public opinion this country and elsewhere, such as support UN action in Korea, compensation to countries concerned for Jan 26 deaths, etc. These gestures, which shld not in themselves be too difficult for regime, wld be additional public evidence that new regime is in fact “new broom. and has broken with past. We are certain that effect on public opinion here and UK wld be most important in connection efforts to help Egypt.
• 7. In light above comments, ur reply Naguib’s msg shld be along fol lines:

  Begins: a. USG has given careful and sympathetic consideration to msg from Gen Naguib and wishes reaffirm that its attitude towards the present regime remains as stated by the Secy of State on Sept 3.⁵

  b. The US fully reciprocates the desire of Egypt for coop and will be glad to enter into discussions immed with PriMin Naguib and Egypt Govt with view to determining the scope and nature of such coop.

  c. Progress toward this end wld be accelerated if Egypt Govt wld define more clearly its views with respect to both mil and econ assistance. The USG will consider such views with utmost care taking into acct the many factors involved in building the def of the free world and limitation on available supplies of equipment and funds and the numerous other demands upon the US.

  d. It is noted that it is proposed that Egypt give certain secret commitments concerning the long-term objectives of the new regime. In this connection we believe that Egypt shld consider whether it wld be prepared to give commitments and/or assurances to the effect that one of the ultimate objectives of its policy is participation with the US, UK and other free-world powers in planning for the common def of the area. Additionally, and since settlement of the Anglo-Egypt problem is closely related to ME def, we believe that Egypt shld consider whether it wld also be prepared to state as another of its objectives the settlement of the Anglo-Egypt problem with respect to the CZ on the basis that strategic facilities in CZ wld be maintained with assistance to the extent required to insure that they cld be speedily and effectively used in event of a threat to security of the area.

  e. While the US is desirous of assisting Egypt within the limits of its ability, it is not in a position in view of its world commitments to undertake a purely bilateral program of coop. It wld therefore hope that Egypt wld continue also to look to its habitual sources of supply.

  f. Finally we believe the Egypt Govt wld wish to consider whether it might not undertake certain public gestures aimed at creating an atmosphere of public opinion abroad conducive to the implementation of a program of coop. Ends.

• 8. FYI furnishing of arms to Egypt armed forces prior to peace settlement with Israel will raise nr difficult questions domestically. We fully understand delicacy of discussing Israel question with regime, but believe that no doubt shld be permitted linger re our views on validity armistice agreement and Tripartite Declaration.⁶ We wld hope that at some time regime wld find it possible to make public declaration re nonaggressive intentions generally, or better, specifically.”⁷

Acheson

1. Also sent priority to London as telegram 2293. Drafted by Stabler and approved by Byroade after being cleared by Byroade; by G. Hayden Raynor, Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs; by James C. H. Bonbright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; by Edwin M. Martin, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Mutual Security Affairs; by W. Averell Harriman, Director of the Mutual Security Agency; by William C Foster, the Deputy Secretary of Defense; and by Paul H. Nitze, Director of the Policy Planning Staff.
2. Prior to the transmission of these draft instructions, Secretary Acheson sent President Truman a copy on Sept. 30. Acheson said that he believed these orders were in harmony with previous instructions and invited the President to make additional comments and suggestions. (774.00/9–1852)
3. In telegram 2292 to London, repeated to Cairo as telegram 677, not printed, the two Embassies were informed that Secretary Acheson had given the British Ambassador the text of the draft instructions which the Department was sending to Ambassador Caffery for his possible use in replying to General Naguib’s message of Sept. 18. The two Embassies were also told that the Secretary of State had requested that the British provide comments regarding this draft as soon as possible, and that the Embassies were to provide their observations as well. (641.74/9–3052)

4. Not printed; the Embassy in Cairo transmitted a copy of the joint appreciation to the Department in despatch 477, Sept. 19. (774.5/9–1952) Prior to sending this despatch, Ambassador Caffery presented the Department with the conclusions reached in this paper in telegram 734, Sept. 19, not printed. The text is as follows:

   “The Embs conclude from the foregoing analysis that support of the Naguib regime is called for. On the purely negative side the paper has shown that no prospect exists of any other govt assuming control of Egypt which wld not be likely to produce a state of anarchy in the country. On the positive side altho risks are endemic in any Egypt sit there is a poss that more forthcoming policies in London and Wash incl a decision to grant reasonable material assist wld be conducive to the maintenance of stability in Egypt and wld favor the devel of a more reasonable attitude in fon affs.” (774.00/9–1952)

5. See footnote 2, Document 1005.
6. See footnote 2, Document 1017.

7. Ambassador Gifford in London responded to this telegram in telegram 1925, Oct. 2, not printed, saying that the Embassy considered these draft instructions “to be well drafted document and right initial approach to problem.” (774.00/10–252)

   Ambassador Caffery in Cairo remarked in telegram 834, Oct. 2, not printed, that “I believe Dept’s well-formulated proposed msg to Naguib is excellent initial response to his inquiry.” (774.00/10–252)