774.00/9–1852: Telegram
No. 1010
The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the
Department of State1
730. Lt. Col. Amin came to me today with msg from Gen Naguib and mil group running Egypt. Msg was as fols:
- 1.
- After eight weeks concentration on domestic issues mil now believe time has come to move into next stage of revolution and consider Egypt’s internatl position.
- 2.
- They are completely on side of US and unalterably opposed to Communism.
- 3.
- Their first problem is “selling US to Egypt public” and educating average Egypt on dangers of Communism.
- 4.
- To sell US to Egypt public they need “mil supplies and fin assistance from US”.
- 5.
- In exchange they are prepared give in secret certain commitments concerning long-term objectives of movement including MEDO and/or partnership with US.
- 6.
- They believe giving commitments openly at this time wld destroy chance of achieving objectives, but want to work as rapidly as poss toward open commitments.
Col. Amin said mil’s questions were:
- (1)
- Wld US be interested in such coop?
- (2)
- What sort of secret commitments wld US want and wld Naguib be acceptable as their author?
Group had obviously not worked out definitions of “fin and mil assistance” as this was a “feeler” conversation on principles involved. Amin had in mind “Cld you perhaps buy our cotton?” on financial side and “tank parts, armoured cars, gun tubes, small ammunition and radio sets” on mil side. He reiterated again and [Page 1861] again Egypt had no intention renewal hostilities with Israel or Brit, and that ample guarantees wld be provided re use of material. He said also Egypt wld accept help from Brit.
I expressed appreciation group’s sympathy for US and said it was reciprocal. Re specific program, I suggested mil give thorough consideration to type of commitments they wld be prepared to undertake and concomitantly prepare tentative list exact assistance they require. Meanwhile, I assured Amin I wld report approach to Dept and wld recommend its careful and sympathetic consideration “in principle.” Amin was pleased with this response.
Speaking as “one friend to another” Amin referred to highly satis daily working relations entire group now had with my Emb and asked me if in my personal opinion time had come when they shld establish some sort of relation with Brit, even though they cld admittedly never be so close. I said time had come and agreed to suggest to Stevenson that member of his Emb be assigned as liaison with mil. This is important step forward from only two weeks ago when mil responded to similar suggestion from US by saying “Not yet.”
I once again made it clear to Amin that our ultimate objective is realization of MEDO and that this cld not be accomplished without Brit participation. He made noises about “evacuation” but in essence agreed.
I made no promises about an immed reply from Dept and suggest Dept may wish discuss whole matter with Stabler after his return to Wash 23.2 He has participated deliberations here and knows men involved.