Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

684A.86/8–2454: Telegram

No. 870
The Ambassador in Lebanon (Hare) to the Department of State¹

top secret

Beirut, August 24, 1954—2 p.m.

182. For my general views on Department circular 108, August 21, please see Embtel 171 same date, which sent prior receipt Department’s message. Following are supplemental observations of specific points raised:

(1) Agree would be futile to base policy on balancing Israeli and Arab strength. It is inevitable that in due course total military strength of Arab States will, and should, exceed that of Israel if area as whole is going to have degree of strength required for even minimum reinforcement against Soviet penetration. Balancing factor should not be material strength but adoption of policies of restraint by both Arabs and Israelis; gradual development of mutual confidence; and clear indication that US or US in concert with tripartite powers would not permit situation getting out of hand.

(2) Regarding reasons for assurances to Israel cited in third paragraph of Deptel 108, suggest:

(a) It would be illogical to seem to adopt a policy of appeasement of Israel in order to prevent its launching a preventive war. We have steadfastly refused to follow such a policy elsewhere; i.e., the Far East, and no reason seen why we should act otherwise in this case. If we are really convinced that Israelis considering a preventive war, our action should take the form of a warning—not placation. If we are not so convinced, then reason for action removed.

(b) As indicated in Embtel 171, I believe we should sympathetically consider any feeling of isolation in Israel but that, in so doing, we should take care to distinguish between real sentiment and political maneuvering. Moreover, irrational Israeli fears should not impel us to take irrational remedial action.

(c) Re encouraging acquiescence in our policies, this point is hardly appropriate for field comment other than to express hope that we shall not have to jettison good policies in order to gain such acquiescence.

(3) Re two approaches suggested:

(a) Idea of exchange of notes with Israel would bear consideration but discussion in circular 108 itself constitutes illustration of difficulty of determining form such communication might take. If we should desire to talk in terms of sanctions, question of timing is important. As matters stand, only immediate threat would seem to be from Israel side in form possible “preventive war” and, if we regard this situation as sufficiently serious, a warning to Israel in terms of economic sanctions would be justified, accompanied presumably by statement that same would apply to Arabs if they became menacing. However, to announce such policy apropos of nothing in particular could have effect of shooting off blank cartridge and scaring no one. In circumstances it is difficult to see how note to Israel could be framed at this time which would achieve desired result of reassuring Israel and still be in the context of actual events.

(b) As regards possible Israeli-United States treaty I can envisage such a step in existing circumstances only with extreme apprehension. It is obvious that ground has not been prepared for such a move and that it would inevitably be interpreted merely as a device to get us by a moment of temporary embarrassment. Repeatedly we have taken the position that we could not undertake formal security commitments in this area (personally I believe the wisdom of that policy to have been questionable in view of the practical commitments which we have actually assumed; e.g. Greece, Turkey, and Iran). The question, however, is too big and the implications too great to permit of piecemeal and hastily improvised action. If we intend making a policy change, we should restudy our whole relationship with the Near East, not only with the Arabs and Israel, but others as well. Then we must prepare the ground with all concerned. By so doing the conclusion of security treaties with both Israel and the Arab States might work out satisfactorily, but the job should be approached as a whole and adequate time and preparation allowed. A quick decision involving Israel only would certainly present a relations problem with the Arab States of the most difficult and ominous sort. Not infrequently we undertake, and with good reason, to chide the Arabs for being obsessed by the secondary problem of Israel and forgetting the major Soviet threat. Similarly, it is suggested that we should eschew making a policy decision on one aspect of the Near East which could prejudice larger considerations in the area as a whole.

In conclusion, I would venture reiterate recommendation in Embassy telegram 171 that, having adopted the policy of impartiality and having seen it produce results, we should do our best to remain on that good road. In so recommending I realize full well the difficulties currently confronting the Department. On the other hand I also foresee that deviation from that policy for short term reasons would do grievous injury to the prestige and confidence which has been painstakingly built up during the past year and a half.

Hare

1. Transmitted in two sections; repeated to Tel Aviv, Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, and Jidda.