Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

674.84A/8–1854: Telegram

No. 863
The Chargé in Israel (Russell) to the Department of State

secret

Tel Aviv, August 18, 1954—6 p.m.

179. Line of thought I advanced with Prime Minister (Embtel 150)¹ and have been pressing upon others as occasion offered seems to be receiving serious examination. Difficult to estimate which of three general attitudes currently being taken will emerge as official position:

(1) Foreign Ministry, while it decries Egyptian development, feels nevertheless situation might be made to offer prospect of improvement in Israel-Arab relations; that at least IG should not put itself in position of blocking US effort to induce Egypt take steps toward normalizing its relations with Israel. Varying degrees of skepticism, however, expressed over prospects of success. In addition to Prime Minister’s statement (Embtel 150), Eytan, Rafael, and Herzog last evening all expressed interest.

(2) Eban last evening commented US may have acquired position enabling it exert some influence on Egypt to move toward peace but in the process had lost its ability to influence Israel to cooperate and could only re-acquire it by substantial proof friendship, such as immediate grant of arms aid.

(3) Minister of Defense Lavon at dinner night before last took position US definitely and hopelessly pro-Arab and my suggestion merely effort to give favorable interpretation to anti-Israel policy.

In my discussion with Eytan and Eban I expressed hope Israel would not make any statements which would put Egypt in position, with Egyptian public and Arab world generally, of appearing to submit to Israel “demands” if it should move toward peace. What Egypt might be willing to do on its own, or as result of UN, US, or tripartite suggestions, it might be unable to do under Israel pressure. I said I thought some of Israel’s public demands upon Jordan had resulted not only in increased Jordan intransigeance but in inability of Britain, ourselves or even UN to exert helpful and friendly influence upon Jordan. Also said I thought situation was not one that lent itself to formalizing of US position; but was rather one of Israel basing its actions and statements upon criterion of whether it would produce atmosphere most conducive to our efforts to induce Egypt to take gradual steps toward peace. While peace could not be achieved in next six months, it would be shown during that time, by tenor of GOE’s public statements and trend of its canal policy, whether it was moving in right direction or not.

I told Eytan and Eban, in reply their question, I was not in position discuss possible reaffirmation and strengthening of tripartite declaration (Deptel 89).² I gathered, however, from Eytan that his present position on desirability of such a step is more positive than indicated in his radio talk of July 25 (Embtel 88).² He said that Cabinet at its meeting on August 22 would discuss Eban’s report of his discussions with Secretary and any further light I might shed on question prior to that meeting would be most useful. (British Ambassador this noon informed me he was thinking seriously of recommending to Foreign Office that Britain enter into “treaty of guarantee” with Israel similar to that which it has with Jordan as means of allaying Israel insecurity.)

Recent discussions Washington and here have had effect, temporarily at least, of creating divided counsels in IG re policy toward US, in light of previous exclusive concentration on denouncing US policies.

Eytan said he had met with Bennike and Vigier yesterday morning to discuss possible agreement on series of border proposals UNTSO had put forward recently (paragraph 1 Embtel 157)³ but that meeting came to nothing.

Eban said Dayan was given most courteous reception wherever he went in US; that his trip was from IG point of view most useful and successful. I urged that Dayan upon return make statement to that effect, correcting opposite impression created by local press.⁴

Russell

1. Document 858.
2. Not printed.
2. Not printed.
3. Paragraph 1 of telegram 157 from Tel Aviv, Aug. 12, contained a report of an unofficial luncheon at which Eytan and Tekoah were said to have urged that the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization should proceed as soon as possible with an effort to bring about implementation of the recent border proposals. (674.84A/8–1254)
4. On Aug. 20, the Department acknowledged telegram 179 from Tel Aviv, stating that it was still formulating a position with respect to a possible formal assurance to Israel and was unable to communicate its views in time for the Embassy’s use prior to the Aug. 22 cabinet meeting. (Telegram 101 to Tel Aviv, Aug. 20; 674.84A/8–1854)