Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

684A.85/7–3054: Telegram

No. 846
The Chargé in Israel (Russell) to the Department of State¹

confidential

Tel Aviv, July 30, 1954—1 p.m.

107. Deptel 862,² Jerusalem telegram 151.³ Embassy has received following note from Foreign Ministry dated July 29, Jerusalem:

“Ministry Foreign Affairs transmits following comments of IG on proposals contained in Embassy’s aide-mémoire 19 June:

2. Government of Israel appreciates concern of US Government at security situation in border zones between Israel and Arab States and its attempt, in concert with Governments United Kingdom and France, to devise proposals for reduction of tension.

3. Government of Israel desires to assure US Government that it is ready, as always, to lend most earnest consideration to any suggestion likely to advance cause of peace and reduce tension. From prolonged unhappy experience, it is convinced that root of difficulty—and source of permanent danger—are determination of Arab world to maintain a state of war, and its relentless campaign of economic warfare and hostile propaganda and incitement, breaking out in acts of violence. Under these circumstances, efforts should be directed at removing root of trouble. Parties to armistice agreements must desist from pursuance active hostility and belligerent practices, cooperate genuinely in implementing agreed measures for strengthening border security, and adopt policy of faithful and integral fulfillment all provisions agreements.

4. Government of Israel takes it for granted that US Government continues, as before, to regard scrupulous fulfillment of armistice agreements as indispensable basis, under present conditions, of peace and stability in area. If any new effort aimed at strengthening border security is to succeed, it must be preceded by reaffirmation, on part of states concerned, of their whole-hearted resolve to adhere in future to terms of agreements in their entirety. Israel, for its part, is ready to make such reaffirmation.

5. Any proposal for improvement of inter-state security, based as it must be on armistice system, should in first instance be examined in relation to theory and practice of armistice agreements, which were concluded by direct negotiation and provide for direct contact and consultation as only means ensuring their implementation and, if necessary, their own amendment. US Government is aware that Jordan has failed to honor Article VIII of General Armistice Agreement, that it has repudiated its obligation under Article XII, and that it has, more recently, refused pledge itself to settlement its disputes with Israel by peaceful means, as enjoined by Charter of UN and implicit in General Armistice Agreement. This practice of selective implementation, if acquiesced in internationally, is liable to lead to imitation and inevitably undermines structure and authority of armistice regime in whole area.

6. Since acceptance of some of proposals now put forward would entail amendment or modification of Israel–Jordan General Armistice Agreement, only way of investing them with binding character would be for parties to agree on them in conference. It was, indeed, precisely in order to review operation of agreement that Israel, under Article XII, asked Secretary-General of UN to invite Jordan to a conference—an initiative which failed owing to Jordan’s refusal to attend. Israel is bound to ask itself whether it is at all worthwhile to seek new commitments from Jordan while its former pledges are repudiated.

7. Government of Israel, in examining proposals under reference, finds to its disappointment that not many of them are in fact preventive in character. It notes, moreover, that number of proposals imply radical change in status and function of UN machinery. While armistice agreements, and established practice of their implementation, assign to UN observer staff only such tasks as derive from their freely negotiated provisions, some of present proposals would invest this staff with independent authority. Government doubts whether such a reform extremely problematical in itself, can outweigh decisive drawback of introducing an organic change into legal structure of armistice agreements. Recent failures of UN staff to fix responsibility for violations of the peace do not justify assumption that their efficacy would be enhanced by an increase in their numbers or widening of their powers. In any case, detailed consideration of specific proposals could usefully be conducted only between parties directly concerned, who must see themselves jointly responsible for conclusions reached.

8. Government welcomes suggestion that all borders be clearly demarcated. It has itself long advocated this expedient. It assumes that operation will entail liquidation of pockets of no-man’s-land which have given rise to so much confusion and avoidable conflict. Government takes it for granted that, helpful as UN observers can be in process, actual fixing of border lines, if it is to be lastingly valid and effective, must rest on agreement between parties.

9. Government likewise endorses suggestion that physical obstacles be erected at suitable points along frontiers to serve as an impediment to unlawful crossings and as points of vantage for their prevention. To enable these obstacles effectively to serve their purpose, parties would have to undertake their erection and the charge of preserving them intact.

10. As for suggestion to permit movement of Arabs from Gaza strip across Israel territory, government is ready to discuss an arrangement, to be put into effect for an experimental period of fixed duration, whereby it would allow groups of Arabs now in Gaza strip and wishing settle in Jordan to cross Israel territory on understanding they go to Jordan for good. Government could not agree to open its territory to free crossings by any number of people on basis permits issued by an outside authority.

11. Government is in no doubt that consultation and discussion between parties to armistice agreements would lead to agreement on additional preventive measures which could be carried into effect by cooperation between them.

12. In conclusion, Government of Israel would restate its conviction that remedy for present situation lies in total fulfillment of armistice agreements, in their letter and spirit. It would be most grateful if US Government could use its influence with Kingdom of Jordan to impress on it imperative necessity of restoring full effective validity of General Armistice Agreement to which it is signatory and of proceeding faithfully to discharge its obligations under it.”

Russell

1. Repeated to London, Paris, and Amman; sent by pouch to Jerusalem.
2. Not printed, but see footnote 1, Document 836.
3. Not printed.