684A.86/5–1254
No. 822
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Hart)
Subject:
- Developing Seriousness of Arab–Israel Tensions.
Participants:
- Mr. Jacob Blaustein, President of the American
- Jewish Committee
- John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
- Parker T. Hart, Director, NE
Mr. Blaustein introduced himself to the Secretary as a non-Zionist who has helped Israel, President of the American Jewish Committee and head of Amoco (oil company). He wished the Secretary to know that he had had a talk with the President and that it was the President’s suggestion that he call on the Secretary. Normally, he would not have requested such an interview without first consulting Mr. Byroade, now at Istanbul. He had been a strong supporter of the Administration’s policy in the Near East but he wished to express his apprehension that the “impartial policy” was going a little far in certain respects. The Secretary had himself sought peace between Israel and the Arab states during his last year’s visit to the Near East and had discovered that this could not be brought about at that time. However, he hoped that the U.S. Government would not play down the concept of peace but unremittingly seek it by every means, since he felt that the tensions between Israel and the Arab states were now greater than ever before. He did not agree with the Israel reaction to Mr. Byroade’s recent speeches and had so informed the Israel Embassy. The Israelis were prone to find fault with an entire address which contained five good points but also one which they did not like. Nevertheless, Mr. Blaustein was concerned that our arms aid to Iraq, plus the tenor of recent statements by the Administration, were giving rise to a cocksureness and intransigence among the Arab countries. He felt that he knew the Arabs well enough to be sure that you could not afford to give them too much encouragement. Arms to Iraq, he felt sure, would encourage Arab intransigence and it was more likely that these arms would be used against Israel, or even ultimately [Page 1556] against the United States, than that they would be used in effective defense against a Soviet threat. Furthermore, this policy was making Sharett’s position very difficult with his own people and government. Sharett was a moderate and we needed “to hold his hand”.
The Secretary replied that we were not yet fully committed to furnish specific weapons to Iraq. A military team would have to pass on Iraqi requirements and we would have plenty of time to take “second looks” at the situation as we went along. There was more in this Iraq picture than met the eye. Leading Mr. Blaustein to the illuminated globe in his office, the Secretary set forth his concept of defense of the “northern tier”, into which he hoped Iraq would some day fit. This was for Mr. Blaustein’s information and not to be repeated. He realized that Mr. Sharett was in a difficult position because the United States could not furnish him the information required to enable him to make a satisfactory explanation of this concept to the Israeli people. However, the concept was definitely in Israel’s interest as well as in the interest of the United States. In developing Middle East defense and reducing tensions between Israel and the Arab states, we might follow “the Trieste formula” of talking individually and secretly to both sides in order to find the bases for some settlement. Mr. Byroade was now in Istanbul obtaining impressions from our Chiefs of Mission in the area regarding the inner currents of political feeling and he was looking forward to hearing his report.
Mr. Blaustein emphasized his high respect for Mr. Byroade, whom he regarded as scrupulously honest and extremely diligent in attempting to find a solution for the Arab–Israel quarrel. However, everyone could make mistakes and he again implored the Secretary to send no arms to Iraq. The Secretary again responded that we were not yet fully committed and could take repeated looks at the situation as we went along.
Note: Following the meeting, Mr. Blaustein indicated his desire to confer with Mr. Byroade as soon as possible after the latter’s return from Istanbul in order to exchange views respecting Arab–Israel tensions.