Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

684A.86/4–2854: Circular airgram

No. 811
The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices¹

secret
CA–6175

Washington, April 28, 1954.

Subject:

• Discussions With UK on Arab-Israeli Border Situation

The Department initiated on April 26 discussions with representatives of the British Embassy on means to bring about in the short term period improvements in the present situation on the Israel-Jordan border. The British representatives were given a copy of the attached paper which sets forth the rationale for the talks and the possible measures which might be taken. It was made clear to the British that the paper is a working level document and does not represent a firm Department position. The points given under Section III(B) were taken from the useful suggestions received from the Field to which were added thoughts developed in the Department.

The British presented a paper containing suggestions from the Foreign Office based in turn on comments from British posts. Although differing in wording and emphasis, the British proposals correspond to points 2, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11 and 13 of Section III(B) of the enclosure. . . .

The British informed the Department that their suggestions had been made available to the French, who expressed no objection in principle except to the provision for frontier rectification.

The objective of the present discussions is to obtain agreement between the Three Powers on measures which might be taken. Until the course of the discussions in the Security Council becomes clearer, it is not feasible to determine definitely how the proposals could be presented most effectively to the parties. Direct diplomatic action by the Three Powers in Amman–Tel Aviv could complement and support any work of the Security Council.

The Department recognizes that implementation of the various measures may involve a considerable financial outlay which, in turn, would affect the United Nations budget. Therefore, it will be necessary to consider the budgetary situation in determining which measures should be adopted and their order of priority.

Action required: The Missions in the Arab Capitals, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv are requested to submit as soon as possible their comments on the feasibility and usefulness of the different points listed under Section III(B). Any additional suggestions also would be welcomed.

Smith

Enclosure

Subject:

• Arab–Israel Border Situation

Problem:

• To bring about in the short term period improvements in the present dangerous situation on the Israel–Jordan border.

I. Existing Situation

A. Israel apparently has embarked upon a policy of aggravating the border situation in the belief that, at the risk of open warfare, she can force the replacement of the Armistice by a peace settlement. The use of force and retaliatory raids appear to be deliberate Government policy. Although the problem caused for Israel by Arab infiltration should not be minimized, the evidence indicates only individuals or small groups are responsible. Jordan has made a determined effort within its capabilities to stamp out this practice.

B. Israel has been campaigning for a high-level meeting over an extended period. She wishes as broad a discussion as possible, including what would amount to peace talks. However, according to Shiloah, she is prepared to accept a fixed agenda, limited to consideration of measures to improve the operation of the Armistice Agreement. Israel has withdrawn from participation in local commanders’ meetings in retaliation for alleged Jordanian failure to curb infiltration.

C. Jordan has refused to attend a high-level meeting or to honor her obligations under Article XII. She apparently feels such talks would lead to discussions of a permanent peace with Israel. In her refusal, she has been supported by the Arab League.

D. USSR and Arab obstructionism has fettered efforts of the Security Council to take effective action on the Palestine questions.

II. Procedures

The problem may be approached through three different mechanisms:

A. Through a procedural Security Council resolution designating a rapporteur and asking him to consider with the parties and UN representatives concerned means to improve the border situation. The US and UK are now supporting Security Council action, although they have differences of opinion over how discussions with the parties should be carried out. The British have favored establishment of a subcommittee.

B. If efforts in the Security Council prove fruitless, a meeting between Jordan and Israel might be secured through direct diplomatic action by the Western Powers in Amman and Tel Aviv, using the Tripartite Declaration as a point of departure.

C. Endeavor to secure separately Israel’s and Jordan’s agreement to concrete measures to improve the border situation. The Tripartite Powers would “shuttle” between Amman and Tel Aviv for the purpose. Eden intends to propose this approach to the Secretary in Paris on April 24. We have telegraphed the Secretary that we approve the proposal, but believe the timing of the first approach should be decided after the course of the Security Council discussion becomes clearer.

D. Considering Soviet obstructionism in the Security Council and probable Jordanian refusal to attend a meeting, “C” appears to offer the only prospects.

E. In considering procedure, account should be taken of the following:

1. The Armistice Agreement, which forms the legal basis for the existing situation, may be modified only by the parties. The same is true of the MAC rules of procedure. Thus, agreement between the parties to any changes appears essential.

2. Under existing circumstances, the MACs and UNTSO do not provide an adequate forum to cope with the situation.

3. The UN and particularly the UNTSO should be represented at any meeting in view of its importance in the Palestine problem and the danger to its prestige which would result from exclusion.

4. Jordanian fears of a meeting could be eased by spelling out the agenda in advance, making clear the discussions would be within the context of the armistice agreements and would not involve “peace talks.”

5. Because the Arabs become so intractable when in a group, Syrian, Egyptian and Lebanese participation along with Jordan at any meeting should be avoided if possible.

III. Substance

The parties themselves are responsible for enforcement of the Armistice and, therefore, for preventing border incidents. The UNTSO has no enforcement authority; its role is to observe and report. Consequently, the essential ingredient is cooperation between the parties and a desire by the parties that the frontier should remain quiet. (The importance of this point is stressed by all comments from the Field.)

Two possibilities may be considered:

A. Assumption by the UN or the Western Powers of direct responsibility for border security, involving, in effect, discarding as unworkable enforcement by the parties of the Armistice Agreement.

1. The course would involve a heavy commitment, including willingness to use force to prevent violation of the frontier. The force could take the form of troops provided by the UN or Western Powers.

2. The procedure would be warranted only if the conclusion is reached that cooperation between the parties cannot be induced and, therefore, that no amount of tinkering will render the Armistice Agreement workable.

3. The present situation does not appear to demand such drastic measures. They would be required at the end of any outbreak of open fighting.

B. Revamping and strengthening the armistice agreements in letter and in spirit. The essential prerequisite is cooperation by the parties between themselves and with the UNTSO. Assuming this cooperation, the following measures could be considered:

1. Appointment of a new Chief of Staff, preferably a figure of world stature (for example, General Bradley or General Van Fleet), whom the parties would be forced to respect. The timing and manner of any change would be of the utmost importance to avoid damage to our relations with the Arabs, who regard General Bennike as their friend. The approval of the Secretary General of the United Nations would be required, and General Bennike’s retirement would have to be presented as voluntary.

Appointment of higher-ranking officers of outstanding ability as chairmen of the MACs.

2. Increase number of observers, recruiting with special attention to quality and impartiality. The period of service of the observers, except for the Chief of Staff and MAC chairmen, could be shortened since old timers appear to develop localitis. If the term of service is relatively short, the observers could be expected to live in frontier villages near the usual trouble spots. At present the tendency of the observers is to live on the Arab side of the lines. They should be required to divide their time between the two sides and should be provided an increased cost-of-living allowance to meet the higher costs on the Israel side.

3. Assignment on a consultation basis of experts from the United States-Mexican border service and of special police officers. Such officials might be expected to have worth-while suggestions for controlling infiltration and investigating crimes. The British military and colonial services might provide officers with similar experience.

4. Assignment of United Nations translators, and politico-legal advisers to each MAC.

5. Recognition in practice by the parties that the observers have freedom of movement and investigation, including the unquestioned right to cross the frontiers at any point the observers deem advisable.

6. Adoption of new rules of procedure in the MACs. An objective would be to speed up the process of investigation and of handling of complaints in the MAC. Specifically, the chairman should be permitted to introduce resolutions and to initiate investigation.

7. Prompt and continuing publicity by the United Nations of MAC decisions and of conditions on the border and responsibility therefore.

8. Improved equipment for the observers. This might include assignment of helicopters, which might have special moral effect on would-be infiltrators and could patrol the lengthy frontier. Assignment of tracking dogs directly to the UNTSO. Improved radio communication.

9. Acceptance by the parties of their obligation to attend MAC and other meetings called by appropriate United Nations officials.

10. Clear delineation of the demarcation line by United Nations surveyors, followed by the erection of physical barriers at points of greatest friction. Jordanian apprehensions that demarcation would imply acceptance of permanent frontiers for Israel could be minimized by a statement similar to that contained in the Armistice Agreement—the boundaries delineated are without prejudice to the rights, claims and positions of either party hereto in the ultimate peaceful settlement of the Palestine question (Article II).

11. Notification to the MAC by both parties of the punishment given persons accused and convicted of infiltration or other individual violations of the Armistice. Such sentences need not be published. The procedure could serve to reassure Israel, particularly, that Jordan is making sincere efforts to stop infiltration.

12. Issuance of passes for the movement of Arabs from the Gaza Strip to Jordan under United Nations supervision. The movement could take place in convoys along specified routes. At the present, a relatively large-scale illegal movement takes place between these two points. Legalization of this traffic, which generally may be innocent in motive, should serve to reduce incidents.

13. Reinstatement of the local commanders’ agreements. The persons concerned with armistice enforcement, including General Riley and General Bennike, attach first importance to cooperation on the local level. Police officials should be used and a premium attached to maintaining the quietest sector. (Reports from the Field attached first importance to the local commanders’ and similar agreements.)

1. Sent to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem.