Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

684A.86/4–1954: Telegram

No. 804
The Ambassador in Syria (Moose) to the Department of State¹

top secret
priority

Damascus, April 19, 1954—5 p.m.

455. Deptel 417, April 15.²

Following comments on numbered paragraphs Deptel 417:

(1) As far as Syro-Israeli relations concerned, meetings under MAC auspices offer best prospect discussion and gradual elimination points friction along frontier. Such meetings inaugurated early 1953 were suspended last May and have not resumed due Banat Yaacov controversy. Informal talks might be renewed as result request MAC chairman that parties discuss ways improving border situation along lines paragraph 2 below. Request could be supported as necessary by three powers;

(2) Specific improvements in armistice agreements and machinery, which would facilitate subsequent more general discussions, might include: (1) renegotiating armistice demarcation line in order remove such anomalies as separation certain Syrians from traditional watering and fishing locations; (2) replacement Syro-Israeli demilitarized zones, which never intended as final solution border problems, with line perhaps through Huleh and Tiberias and Jordan River (efforts parties informally negotiate such arrangement suspended in May 1953);

(3) Assignment politico-legal officers to each MAC under Vigier’s general direction;

(4) Employment UN translators.

While special committee might be formed to pursue foregoing, believe existing machinery can handle problems if given effective UN and tripartite support. New body might draw Arab fire as western ruse “force” peace talks.

Foregoing is submitted in response to Department’s invitation. Embassy does not believe, however, that solution of Palestine problem depends on better procedures. Of greater importance are basic attitudes of Near East governments which include (a) Israeli “tough” policy toward its Arab neighbors, (b) Arabs lack of confidence in policy of UN and western powers, and (c) emotional spite of Arabs which renders them unable to regard relationship with Israel rationally.

If UN and western powers prevail on Israel to act in accordance with professed Israeli desire to have peace with neighboring Arab states, such action will eliminate point (a) above, will prepare way for elimination points (b) and (c) and be real contribution toward improvement immediate situation and toward eventual achievement of peace in Near East. Only Communists are likely to profit if effective measures are not taken or are long delayed.

This Embassy sees no quick, easy or dramatic solution; and any measure which attracts widespread publicity is more likely to hamper than to help.

Moose

1. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, London, and Paris.
2. Printed as telegram 407 to Amman, Document 796.