684A.86/4–1754: Telegram
No. 800
The Chargé in Israel (Russell) to the Department of State1
priority
1072. Israel-Arab border problem (Department’s telegram 717)2 stems in part from presence of several hundred thousand Arab refugees along border with juxtaposition Arab poverty and Israel’s comparative wealth; in part from feelings of Arab elements that infiltration is effective adjunct to Arab economic boycott; and in part from Israeli Government’s excessive harshness in attempting deal with infiltrators, which increases dimensions of problem, and policy of refusing participate in partial measures in its attempt secure full peace agreements. To extent first is cause, it can be dealt with only by resettlement of refugees. Second can be effectively dealt with only by convincing Arab leaders that prolongation of infiltration is against their interests. Third by insistence to Israeli Government of folly of its policies.
Concrete reality toward which all efforts must be directed, through Security Council or otherwise, is meetings between Israel and representatives of respective Arab countries with desire on [Page 1521] both sides to make progress on infiltration problem. Israel–Jordan meeting should: (a) be of such a nature and in such context as to provide least embarrassment on part of Jordanian Government towards its public and toward other Arab states, (b) provide greatest assurance to Jordan that it will have support of other powers and UN Secretary General in a last solution and will not be in danger of loss of position through superior maneuvering by Israel.
Embassy believes approach by tripartite powers and Secretary General of UN to Jordan, Egypt and Syria would be likely to be more effective than initial Security Council action, since it would provide less publicity and greater opportunity of flexibility in formulating arrangements, of speaking frankly to governments concerned, and of finding face-saving formula for Arabs. It would minimize danger of Soviet maneuvering to get into the picture. Also it would be easier to try Security Council if direct conversations failed than vice versa.
Tripartite powers and UN Secretary General might say to Arab Governments: Present situation involves real danger of outbreak of hostilities which would inevitably result in death and hardship to large number of Jordan population as well as political chaos and vacuum which must concern entire free world.
Israel Government might be told: Israel’s insistence on attempting coerce Arab Governments and peoples into immediate and complete peace and Israeli Government’s refusal to cooperate in numerous measures which have been suggested for achieving progressive tranquillity as step to definitive peace has been a cause of present threatening situation. Other powers willing to do whatever possible to bring about improvement, but this will be possible only if Israel: (a) whole-heartedly cooperates in measures that will progressively restore tranquillity but may fall short of complete peace; (b) shows more perception of legitimate concern of Arabs and other powers over such policies as reprisal raids and unlimited immigration into Israel and IG unilateral and fait accompli approach on such problems as Jerusalem and Banat Yaacov; and (c) ceases attempting to make it appear to Arabs at all times that IG is in drivers seat and is calling terms.
Embassy suggests as specific measures:
(a) Resumption full participation in MACS by all parties: (b) reactivation of local commander agreements Jordan–Israel border with similar arrangements other borders; (c) completion of clear and continuous marking of boundary lines with deterrent fencing where infiltration most serious; (d) establishment of survey groups for each boundary with chairmen designated by UNSYG and representation both parties to study and make recommendations measures designed to reduce border incidents; (e) establishment procedures [Page 1522] of appeal by either party to local commander agreements to MAC, chief of UNTSO, and possibly UNSYG, in cases where it is claimed other party not implementing agreements in good faith; (f) strengthening of UNTSO by staff which could cooperate with police of both sides in implementing local commander agreements.
Embassy also suggests reaffirmation, strengthening and spelling out of tripartite guarantee of present Israel–Arab border. It would help relieve border tension by lessening sense of need of military measures by respective countries along border which sometimes leads to exchange of fire like that recently on Israel-Syrian border. It would also lessen IG compulsion take measures to counteract Israel public’s nervousness resulting from hostile declarations of Arab leaders and prospective change in balance military power in area from Egyptian control Suez base and US program of arms aid.
- Transmitted in two sections; repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, London, and Paris.↩
- Printed as telegram 407 to Amman, Document 796.↩