Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

611.84A/3–1954: Telegram

No. 778
The Chargé in Israel (Russell) to the Department of State¹

confidential
priority

Tel Aviv, March 19, 1954—5 p.m.

954. Re Embtel 951.² Bendor, head US division Foreign Ministry, last evening at dinner Tel Aviv, made following comments which he said could be regarded in nature of official statement: Israel public shocked and bitter at Negev bus ambush. Too early to tell what direction reaction will take. Israeli Government and public fundamentally divided between policy of forcefully demonstrating Israel strength and determination at this time and policy of restraint enunciated by Sharett in speech three days ago (Embtel 944).² Reaction of world opinion, UN, Western powers and particularly US to latest outrage and international measures flowing therefrom could be determining factor. (Unofficially Bendor said Sharett’s position with public and even within own party also likely to be determined thereby.)

Bendor said great importance therefore will attach to whether US expresses its strong abhorrence of bus ambush episode and is active in securing Security Council resolution of severe condemnation.

I expressed to Bendor my concern over mounting tension and increasing tempo and seriousness of recent episodes. I said it might be necessary to choose between statements and resolutions of abhorrence and condemnation on one hand or on other hand utilizing Jordan’s possible need rectify impairment moral position by urging Jordan agree to meeting on border problem with Israel under Article 12 or possibly (to enable Jordan to save face in light of recent rejection of meeting) under some other terms of reference. Bendor indicated some interest in this but suggested that even in pursuance of latter course there should be some indication of censure.

There is no doubt that bus massacre has greatly shocked Israel public and that they regard it as much more than another incident.

Bus ambush will undoubtedly be exploited by Lavon-Dayan element (undoubtedly in close touch with Ben Gurion) to create support for present show of strength by Israel. It is not clear what form this would take although it might include greater use of reprisals, increased Israel activity in demilitarized zones as Banat Yaacov and El Auja, more drastic treatment of infiltrators, firmer retaliation to firing from Syrian positions on Lake Tiberias and by Arabs from old city Jerusalem walls, and exploitation of instability in Arab countries as indicated in press comment at time of Syrian and Egyptian political crises.

Embassy believes desire of Sharett group for proof that his policy of moderation is correct might be met by action of kind indicated last paragraph Embtel 950,³ provided démarche to Jordon proves successful in bringing about negotiations at early date.

It can be anticipated that over longer period similar argument may be advanced by Sharett group to obtain western powers support for Israel’s position on such questions as Egyptian blockade, Arab economic boycott, status of Jerusalem as Israel capital and arms aid to Arabs. Embassy does not believe UN or western powers should capitulate to Israel position on all these issues as price for maintaining Sharett position in government but does believe action of kind suggested last paragraph Embtel 950, might serve present purpose strengthening Sharett element which we regard as desirable.

Russell

1. Repeated to Amman.
2. Not printed.
2. Not printed.
3. Document 776.