684A.86/1–1554
No. 768
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Officer in Charge of Palestine-Israel-Jordan Affairs (Waller)
Subject:
- Israel-Arab Relations, including: the Egyptian blockade, the Israel-Jordan Armistice, the Banat Ya’qub project, the Arab League, and arms supplies for the Near East.
Participants:
- The Secretary
- Ambassador Abba Eban of Israel
- Minister Reuven Shiloah of Israel
- NEA-Mr. Byroade
- NE-Mr. Waller
Ambassador Eban reviewed Egyptian activities during the past few years to maintain and intensify the blockade against shipping to and from Israel. Egypt’s denial of Suez Canal transit facilities is costing Israel annually an amount equivalent to US aid. Each time Israel has sought political action through the SC the US has said the time was inopportune. He has now been authorized to bring the matter again to the SC at a suitable time. His present thinking is to do so in February after the Banat Ya’qub resolution has been passed and the SC agenda is less crowded. He said the British Government believes conclusion of an Anglo-Egyptian agreement on Suez would help the Egyptian Government initiate peace talks with Israel. Pending such an agreement Israel wants the SC to order Egypt to abolish the restrictive regulations. Egyptian compliance with the SC resolution would strengthen the armistice machinery.
The Ambassador said Israel’s most pressing concern with Jordan is for a conference as required by Article XII of the Armistice Agreement. Israel is not trying to drag Jordan into peace discussions. On the contrary, Israel wants to limit the conference to the terms of the Armistice Agreement and has asked the UNSYG to reassure the Jordanians on this score. It is basically a question of Jordan honoring its signature.
The Ambassador said he was disquieted by Syrian reaction to the compromise text of the Banat Ya’qub resolution, since the Jordan River flows some 60 miles in Israel but not one inch in Syria. Israel is not enthusiastic about the resolution but recognizes it does give Israel an opportunity to present its case to the Chief of Staff. In a recent conversation, Vyshinsky strongly denied he supports the Syrian viewpoint. His objection to paragraph 11 of the draft resolution [Page 1480] is that it does not deal specifically with the canal project. Vishinsky looks upon the present draft resolution as a means of imposing the “Johnston Plan”—an American plot—on the area. Vishinsky did not indicate if he would veto the present text but did say that if the resolution should specifically mention the canal project he could more easily approve it.
The Ambassador reviewed recent actions and statements by members of the Arab League, such as the statement of King Saud of Saudi Arabia that Israel should be wiped out, and said everything indicates the Arab states are tired of the armistice arrangements and wish to find ways to attack Israel. They consider the Qibya debate supported their viewpoint when, in fact, the resolution was in support of the armistice machinery. The Ambassador advocated “strong words to the Arab states”, initially by diplomatic means but subsequently by some public statement to make the US position clear.
The Ambassador stated that any decision regarding arms supplies for the Arabs would only intensify their intransigence. There should be no differentiation between countries contiguous and noncontiguous to Israel, since the latter countries, notably Saudi Arabia and Iraq, have been as hostile toward Israel as neighboring countries. He referred to Iraq as one of the spearheads of anti-Israel activity. His government’s view is that now is not a good time to provide arms to the Arab states.
The Secretary said, in reply, that while the Ambassador had raised many questions he would be unable to respond to all of them. However, the Ambassador’s understanding is correct that the US interprets each event on its merits. As examples, he said he has recently told some Arab representatives that no one has the right to waste water in an area where water is so precious. Also he has opposed giving Syria a veto power in the canal construction project since it is apparent that Syria would only use the veto power negatively. He believed US policies are clear and would be surprised if any responsible Arab misunderstood them. He was aware that the US has seldom, if ever, been more unpopular with both the Arab states and Israel. Only small quantities of arms are to be supplied the Arabs and then only after adequate safeguards not to increase the danger to Israel. He was inclined to share the Ambassador’s dim view of recent developments in the Near East but did not feel so frustrated that he would give up hope for peace. He was glad to have Ambassador Eban’s views.
Mr. Byroade said a request has been sent our Embassy at Jidda for the text of King Saud’s reported remarks about Israel which, if true, would be deplorable. Also the US feels strongly that Jordan should accept its obligation under Article XII and have so informed [Page 1481] the Arab governments. He understood UNSYG Hammerskjold plans to proceed to Jerusalem and convoke the conference himself.
The Secretary said that he has hoped for the past year to get Egypt to undertake peace negotiations with Israel. The best line seems to be to wait for the Anglo-Egyptian agreement to be concluded and then bring all possible pressure to bear on Egypt to make peace. Ambassador Eban said Israel would welcome an Anglo-Egyptian settlement and his government has expressed its sympathy with Egyptian national aspirations. Also, Israel would like any Anglo-Egyptian agreement to include a firm Egyptian commitment on free passage of shipping through the Suez Canal. One reason Israel might ask SC consideration of Suez Canal restrictions is that the discussions might extend to general peace talks. The Secretary referred to his understanding that some of Israel’s friends were working against an Anglo-Egyptian agreement believing an agreement would give Egypt military advantage over Israel. He said there was nothing in the agreement whereby Egypt would inherit the British installations in the Canal Zone. That question might arise after seven years when, and if, British troops should all be withdrawn from the Canal Zone.