Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

684A.85322/1–954

No. 764
The Department of State to the Embassy in Syria¹

confidential
priority

Washington, January 11, 1954—6:31 p.m.

281. FYI. Re Embtel 264 Jan 9² Department and USUN are considering several possible revisions paragraphs 5, 9, 11 and 13 including those suggested by Zeineddine to USUN New York on Dec 29. Revisions he proposed to USUN were substantially same as those he proposed to Department Jan 4 except for slight difference in wording of 11. Our hope is that Zeineddine and Malik can be induced favor or at least not oppose resolution if it is modified; and that if Malik votes affirmatively or abstains it will greatly reduce likelihood of Soviet veto. Since if decision is taken to make changes they will have to be negotiated by USUN and UK and French delegations and used in bargaining with Malik and Zeineddine, it is essential that Zeineddine not be informed details our present thinking except in its discretion by USUN after his return New York. End FYI.

2. In reply his query (Embtel 264) you may inform Zeineddine that due Tripartite sponsorship resolution we cannot at this time say more than that US has his proposals under consideration.

3. If you see no objection please approach Shishakli earliest opportunity and emphasize that it is in best interest Syria, US and all concerned that some workable resolution be passed at early date; and stress danger that if resolution in some form is not soon passed Israelis may take unilateral action which could have gravest consequences. Inform Shishakli we hope he will instruct Zeineddine to take moderate line and to encourage Malik to vote for or at least abstain on a resolution containing at least minimum essentials.

If Shishakli brings up “Russian aid” theme along lines your tel 268 Jan 9, you may in your discretion stress our belief that Syrian encouragement of Soviet veto could have unfortunate consequences for Syria. Though Soviet veto under these circumstances may appear to uphold Syria’s position this may well assure that no resolution will be passed. In this case it is almost certain Israelis will start work on project again, a development which would be highly damaging to interests of all concerned.

4. Embassy Beirut should, if it believes useful purpose would be served, make similar approach to President Chamoun.

Dulles

1. Repeated priority to Beirut.
2. Telegram 264 from Damascus, Jan. 9, reported that Zeineddine had that day requested the Embassy to ascertain the U.S. reaction to proposals he presented to the Department on Jan. 4 for amendment of the draft resolution on the Israeli diversion project. (684A.85322/1–954)