684A.85322/12–2853
No. 758
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Hart)
Subject:
- Tripartite Draft Resolution on the Palestine Question (Banat Ya’qub Water Diversion).
Participants:
- Dr. Farid Zeineddine, Ambassador of Syria
- Dr. Charles Malik, Ambassador of Lebanon
- John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
- Mr. John D. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
- Mr. Parker T. Hart, Director, NE
Ambassador Zeineddine outlined to the Secretary the Syrian position regarding the Tripartite Resolution on Banat Ya’qub with particular reference to paragraph 11. He stated that while Syria recognized that the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization possessed certain powers of his own accorded to him by the Armistice Agreement, these did not extend to the machinery of conciliation or “reconciliation”. Paragraph 11 seemed to give to General Bennike duties of an undefined scope which more properly belonged to the Palestine Conciliation Commission. Ambassador Zeineddine wished to make it clear that Syrian consent was required where Syrian rights were involved and the resolution should not contain language which might give Israel the excuse to concert with Bennike on Syria’s rights without Syria’s consent. The Demilitarized Zone was an area in which each side had reserved its rights and where neither side had rights of sovereignty. Syria was much disturbed by Israel’s policy, carried on since 1951, of encroaching [Page 1467] on the Zone first by sending in Israeli police to control it, and finally by diverting water and simultaneously asserting that Israel was sovereign in the Zone and that Syria had no rights whatever in it. Actually certain Syrian rights to draw on Jordan water for use even outside the Zone had been recognized for a long time. On the other hand no use of Jordan water beyond the Zone on the west bank had existed before the Banat Ya’qub diversion. Syria desired to have explicit language reaffirming the necessity of Syrian consent in matters involving Syria’s rights. Furthermore, the Tripartite draft resolution in its present form stood no chance of adoption in the Security Council due to the threat of Russian veto even in the unlikely eventuality that it obtained seven votes.
The Secretary gave a general summary of American courses of action on Arab-Israel relations taken during 1953. United States Government actions by now should have proven to the Arabs that the United States Government was not acting with pro-Zionist bias, even though it did not respond to all Arab desires. The U.S. Government was seeking just solutions, not measures to please either side. The Tripartite draft was a case in point. The Secretary had never discussed this resolution with the Israeli Ambassador. In fact, his only previous discussion of it with a foreign representative was with Dr. Malik a few days ago. The United States was not prepared to see inserted in this resolution a change which would give Syria the right to veto any and all developmental action in this area of the Jordan Valley, any more than it would agree to unilateral seizure of water by either side. History showed that while Arabs and Israelis might talk together constructively at technical levels, the moment discussions reached a policy level, pressures on the Arab Governments forced them to take a public stand against any agreement which would permit benefit to Israel regardless of accompanying benefit to the Arab States. Consequently, he feared that a veto power would be used by Syria to block any constructive work.
Zeineddine interjected that his government would be quite happy over any use of the Jordan waters which would benefit the Arab refugees and it would not stand in the way of projects directed to this end. Syria had no intention of exercising a “veto” but simply desired to be assured that where her rights were in question, her consent would be required and not waived by others. Her main concern was that the Armistice Agreement should not be weakened. He had a few “slight changes” in the resolution to suggest and had already communicated these to Mr. Jernegan on December 26.
[Page 1468]The Secretary read aloud the provisions of new Article 14 of the Tripartite Resolution (S/3151/Revision 1, December 21, 1953)1 which he personally had drafted to meet what he understood to be the principal concern of Ambassador Zeineddine. He would be willing to discuss with Mr. Jernegan any further points which the Ambassador had raised with Mr. Jernegan, but made no commitment to change the draft resolution.
- Not printed, but see the second revision of the tripartite resolution, S/3151/Rev. 2, Document 770.↩