684A.86/11–1053

No. 725
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Secretary of State1

secret

I hope you can find time to read the attached paper on “Trends in Israel Policy”. I believe this staff paper represents an accurate analysis of the situation. It is interesting to note that the reporting from Israel itself is in balance with the reporting from the Arab states and that both lead to the conclusions in this paper.

I told you this morning there are reports that the Zionists in London were attempting to prevent a UK-Egyptian agreement. If this can be verified it would further support the conclusions of the attached paper.

[Page 1407]

[Attachment]

Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs

secret

Trends In Israel Policy Toward The Arabs

Discussion

Israel publicly insists that her policy is based on a “vision of peace of the Prophets of Israel” and she castigates the Arabs for adamant refusal to negotiate peace. Despite her deeds, which have been such as to preclude a reasonable settlement, Israel has made considerable progress in the propaganda battle to convince the American public of the justice of her case.

Arab unreasonableness is well advertised. Matters in which Israel may be considered at fault are as follows:

(1)
Ambassador Eban recently laid blame on Syria for the breakdown of discussions from November 1952 to May 1953 in the Mixed Armistice Commission on elimination of the Demilitarized Zones. Actually, they failed over Israel’s demand for complete control of the Jordan River. Regarding these talks, the chief Israel delegate cynically asserted: “We are doing it only to please the Americans” as nothing much can be settled. (Jerusalem’s 81, October 21, 1953)2
(2)
Informal agreement reached in Jordan-Israel talks in August, 1953 through the Mixed Armistice Commission to effect frontier rectifications by reciprocal exchanges to territory was blocked by last minute Israel demands for two additional hills. (Jerusalem’s 29, September 2, 1953; 81, October 21, 953; and 86, October 29, 1953)
(3)

Sudden series of border incidents perpetrated by Israel: August 28, 20 Arab refugees killed in the Egyptian occupied Gaza zone; during September Arab bedouins and flocks shot by armed forces in the El Auja Demilitarized Zone; and on the night of October 14/15, attack against the Jordanian village of Qibya. These incidents followed a relatively quiet period. All have been condemned by the Mixed Armistice Commission. General Bennike’s report to the Security Council on the border situation makes clear Israel’s reliance on the “old law of talon”.

Information received by the Embassy at Tel Aviv and the Consulate General at Jerusalem indicates that the Qibya attack may have been a deliberate Israel effort to provoke an engagement with the [Page 1408] Arab legion. (Tel Aviv’s 469, October 17, 1953, Jerusalem’s 81, October 21, 1953)

(4)
Arrogant and obstructive Israel attitude towards the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. Failure to heed General Bennike’s letter on Banat Ya’qub construction; refusal to cooperate in General Bennike’s inspection of Mount Scopus; threat to fire on chairman of Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission.
(5)

The Banat Ya’qub water diversion project was undertaken suddenly, was accelerated after General Bennike’s decision, and does not fit into previously discussed Israel development plans for the current fiscal year. Reports from the field have speculated that it was an Israel attempt to create a situation in which the Arabs would be forced to reject the Tennessee Valley Authority desk study. (Tel Aviv’s 557, October 31, 1953) The Israel actions have tended to nullify the Johnston mission. Despite Sharett’s promise to consider the Tennessee Valley Authority study, it was vigorously attacked and rejected by Minister without portfolio Lavon on October 31, who described it as “designed to stunt our growth”. In the same speech, Lavon asserted that the resumption of United States aid to Israel was due to pressure of American domestic politics. (Tel Aviv’s 569, November 3, 1953) The general reaction of Israel’s press has been critical and emotional, contending the plan would interfere with Israel’s own ideas.

The water resources and development adviser to the United States Operations Mission at Tel Aviv states that the Israel master plan for irrigation will practically eliminate the inflow of water into Lake Tiberias. The salt content of Lake Tiberias will then become so great as to make it unfit for irrigation. He reports that the Israel water resources people “assume that the full right of all the flow entering Lake Tiberias is theirs and also, since they are now using approximately one third of the Yarmuk summer flow, they feel as though a portion of that river’s flow belongs to Israel.” (Tel Aviv’s despatch 366, October 6, 1953)

(6)
Recent pronouncements by Israel leaders appear deliberately provocative to the Arabs. In his talk on October 20 regarding the Qibya incident, Ben Gurion stated: “All the responsibility rests on the Jordan Government which for years has tolerated and thereby encouraged acts of murder and pillage against the inhabitants of Israel.” On October 25, before the Jerusalem Economic Conference, he dwelt on such themes as readiness to accept two million additional immigrants and re-affirmation of Jerusalem as the Israeli capital, which has provoked strong condemnation from the Arab press.

[Page 1409]

Conclusion

An assessment of Israel’s deeds, as distinct from her declarations of intent, leads to the conclusion that her policy is either to: (1) coerce the Arabs into “peace” on Israel’s terms (which is an impossibility); or (2) prevent the restoration of stability in the belief that the present unsettled situation in the Near East is in Israel’s best interest. Possible reasons for this second objective would be: serve as an excuse for failure to achieve a permanent solution to economic problems; prevent alterations in the military balance by making it difficult for the Western Powers to provide arms to the Arabs; future expansionist plans.

In either case, Israel policy has served to counter United States endeavors to stabilize conditions in the area. Believing implicitly in the justice of their own cause, the Israelis appear unable to show the realism required for a successful adjustment into the Near Eastern environment. In the early days of the state, an almost mystical belief in the Zionist ability to perform “miracles” made the impossible appear readily obtainable. Failure of the expectations aroused, has intensified Israel’s latent feeling of frustration and insecurity and induced resort to the heedless and provocative acts recently undertaken. These factors make Israel’s unpredictable and uncontrollable dynamism, rather than the static negativism of the Arab states, the major present source of danger in the Near East.

The following are sample recent telegrams bearing on Israel’s attitudes:

[Here follows a list of eight documents: The six telegrams and one despatch referred to in the body of the paper, and telegram 213 from Amman, Document 723.]

  1. Sent through the Executive Secretariat; copies were sent also to Under Secretary Smith and to Acting Deputy Under Secretary Murphy. A marginal notation by O’Connor indicates that the memorandum was seen by Secretary Dulles.
  2. None of the telegrams referred to in this paper is printed.