Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

684A.85322/10–1353: Telegram

No. 687
The Chargé in Jordan (Seelye) to the Department of State¹

top secret
priority

Amman, October 13, 1953—5 p.m.

157. This Jordan’s mood on eve of Johnston mission to Near East as it affects mission’s primary task in area (Deptel 159):²

1. Jordan is disillusioned by seeming US failure to redress US policy imbalance with respect Israel and Arab States 5 months after dramatic visit of Secretary State to area had inspired such high hopes for a bold and impartial US policy. Arrival of second major US mission to area in wake of disillusionment risks serious repercussions adversely affecting US interests if it becomes clear that mission, rather than recouping US losses in area accentuated by non-fulfillment of hopes, offers little better than collaboration with Israel on Jordan-Yarmuk waters, whatever the economic benefits.

2. Jordan, long less xenophobic than its fellow Arab States, shows increasing signs of anti-Americanism. This is proportionate to extent Jordan attributes pro-Israelism to US moves in Near East. Task of Johnston mission is rendered less susceptible of achievement by fact it comes on heels of Israeli diversionary action at Baanat Yaacov (Embtel 152).³ Mission will be hard put to convince Jordan Government and harder put to convince Jordan molders of public opinion that timing of proposal not further evidence of US subservience to Israel. If mission unable to disabuse Jordan of this belief, and if proposal is made public, there is risk of exacerbating anti-Americanism to point of no return.

3. Jordan Government and public opinion channels are presently dominated by the Palestinian. He is bitter, emotional, and he has not forgotten. An appeal to his economic reason, without in any way attempting to satisfy his psychological (pathological, if you will) complex, risks not only failure, but may prejudice any future US efforts to solve Palestine problem in toto. An appeal to his sense of dramatics (e.g., espousal of his “right to return”), mixed with fair amount of justice (e.g., promise of compensation, territorial rectification of Jordan-Israeli border) has better chance of securing his recognition of economic facts of life. If mission’s proposal for joint control of Yarmuk-Jordan waters cannot now be made part of larger, overall political settlement, it would be better for US interests not to broach proposal at all (Embtel 129).³

4. Jordan, like all Arab States, is a nation of bargainers, but Jordan is not likely to consider the barter of exclusive control of the Yarmuk waters for future economic aid a bargain. Threat of withholding US economic aid to Jordan is not expected to overcome emotional aversion to doing business with Israel (except on terms of overall political peace settlement involving major Israeli concessions), even if alternative means servere economic dislocations within country. It is peculiar, but nevertheless, fundamental quirk of the Jordanian-Palestinian to prefer hurting himself to helping his opponent. Since Jordan still believes consummation of unilateral Yarmuk-Jordan valley project is tenet of US policy in this area (Embtel 152) and since Jordan believes that it and Syria have exclusive right to Yarmuk River and that it has proportionate right to Jordan River, use of bargaining tactic suggested by Department not only has little chance of success (for reasons already mentioned), but risks severe censure of US ethics with resultant diminution of already low US moral position.

To avoid risks cited in above four paragraphs, it is of utmost importance that Johnston be authorized to offer a more substantial quid pro quo than further economic aid, that he carefully sound out Jordanian attitudes before making any proposals, and that release of TVA study be postponed until completion Johnston mission.

Seelye

1. Repeated to Damascus, Beirut, Tel Aviv, London, Cairo, Paris, and Baghdad.
2. Printed as telegram 1928 to London, Document 684.
3. Not printed.
3. Not printed.