885.211/9–1553: Telegram
No. 667
The Chargé in Jordan (Lynch) to the Department of State1
125. Deptel 102.2 This telegram is in reply to Deptel 102. Comment on Deptel 123,3 just received, will be forthcoming.
Embassy will naturally defer detailed comment on desk study report until it is received. Embassy understands completed report has been in area for past several weeks and early copy would be appreciated. It wishes tentatively to record that it has certain reservations re statements in paragraphs one and two of reference telegram.
Re paragraph four reference telegram Embassy considers Department’s presentation of picture is misleading, at least insofar as Amman’s position is concerned, and therefore wishes to clarify its attitude. It has been strongly in favor of Yarmuk-Jordan Valley project as means early settlement large number Arab refugees and Maqarin high dam as essential aspect of scheme. Embassy, however, unable to accept rest of Department’s reasoning in section 4 (a) until given full opportunity study TVA report because all of its previous information has indicated somewhat contrary views as to [Page 1314] time required and cost. Embassy also unable understand why proposed use Yarmuk waters would make Israel any more free to take unilateral action on Jordan waters than she is at present and in fact is apparently now doing.
Embassy Amman does not question that if the area were a single political unit, or even a group of friendly states, the broad scheme for the development of the Jordan Valley by using Lake Tiberias as a holding reservoir for the waters of the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers would constitute the most economical use of these waters and would be the best plan for the area as a whole.
As the Department must be aware Embassy’s opposition to the scheme and its advocacy of the Maqarin site as holding reservoir is based on the conviction that former plan is politically impracticable now, or in the foreseeable future. In other words, we are not presented with two alternatives and thus not a question of spending an “additional 60 or 70 million dollars for Maqarin high dam” but rather whether we are to do anything at all for Arab refugees.
If present plan involving use of Tiberias as holding reservoir is carried though, however, Embassy fears it will be considered by Arabs as just another example of US bowing to Zionist—not necessarily Israeli—pressure. However reasonable the scheme may be—and I appreciate that from the viewpoint of Washington it is entirely so—it must be remembered that the Palestinian and Jordanian Arabs are neither reasonable nor rational on the subject.
I have understood from numerous policy papers that owing to the strategic importance of the Near East the US had certain basic and vital objectives in the area. It is my considered opinion that if USG adopts the proposed TVA plan as a national policy the achievement of our objectives will not only be made more difficult but well nigh impossible. I think, for instance, it is quite within the realm of possibility that Point IV will be compelled to withdraw from Jordan altogether and of course any efforts on the part of the Embassy to promote friendship and understanding (by grant aid wheat, arms aid, educational grants or otherwise) will be completely nullified.
These statements doubtless sound extravagant and yet I think they present the situation with which we are confronted. To illustrate the Embassy’s thinking I believe it conceivable that the Prime Minister and one or two of his more broad-gauge ministers of state might be persuaded in private that the plan, which I understand is proposed in the TVA desk study, would not only be the best for the areas as a whole, but in the long run, for Jordan as well. Even so, I do not believe that any Jordan Government would dare give such a scheme serious consideration, because of fact that it involves cooperation with Israel. I do not believe that I could [Page 1315] even discuss this subject in confidence with this, or any other government in this country, because for their own protection they would feel compelled to leak it to the press and then on their own part come forth with a violently anti-American and “nobly patriotic” tirade uncompromisingly rejecting the whole project.
If Department finally decides to adopt recommendations of TVA desk study as official policy of the USG, I believe that we should not delude ourselves with the notion that because the plan is a rational one which would benefit Arab refugees or the area as a whole, that it will be acceptable or that it will advance us toward attainment or our oft-repeated objectives in area.
- Repeated to London, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Baghdad, Beirut, and Jidda.↩
- Printed as telegram 316 to Beirut, Document 656.↩
- Printed as telegram 207 to Tel Aviv, Document 664.↩