Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

683.84A322/9–1353: Telegram

No. 665
The Chargé in Israel (Russell) to the Department of State¹

secret
NIACT

Tel Aviv, September 13, 1953—8 p . m.

316. Embassy offers following comments (Deptel 207²):

1. IG’s hopes, especially re further large-scale immigration, have been firmly fixed on utilization by Israel of all of water of Jordan and part of Yarmuk. TVA plan will, therefore, encounter strong opposition on part of IG and public. Embassy feels, however, that its importance to our area objectives is so great and delay would so multiply difficulties that early action is highly desirable.

2. To help in extending to other area problems the marked unity which exists on Jerusalem, it would be desirable to advise friendly missions here prior to UNRWA submission of study to Hammarskjold.

3. An immediate question is whether, when, how, and by whom to get IG to delay further the construction on Jordan-Tiberias power project. Should we wait to see if General Bennike requests them to stop? If he should, that would take care of it. If he should decide not to, however, it might provide IG with excuse not to comply with a later request by US (although Bennike decision would presumably be on basis largely irrelevant to present problem, i.e., his decision would be on whether construction violated armistice agreement rather than on keeping things on even keel pending consideration of TVA plan). Should we wait to ascertain official reactions of Arab Governments before approaching IG? If, in response to our request IG stops now and Arab States then decline to give any consideration to plan, we might be discountenanced vis-à-vis Israel. On other hand, discontinuance by IG now at our request would be indication to Arabs we are capable of influencing IG action along peaceful and constructive lines. Conceivably, however, our argument with Arabs might be strengthened by sight of work in process. Arab country missions in better position evaluate these considerations.

4. In approaching Arab Govenments it could be pointed out Banat Yaacov likely to be only first of series of faits accompli, to serious and permanent disadvantage of Arabs, if TVA plan is not made occasion for regional study.³

Russell

1. Repeated priority to Damascus, Amman, and Beirut; sent by pouch to Jidda, Cairo, Baghdad, and London.
2. Supra.
3. The Department responded on Sept. 14 that it was considering an instruction responsive to telegram 316 from Tel Aviv, Sept. 13, in the event Bennike did not decide the Israelis should stop the construction at Banat Yaacov. (Telegram 208 to Tel Aviv, Sept. 14; 683.84A322/9–1353)