The attached memorandum (Tab A) sets forth at considerable length
outstanding problems in Palestine and a specific course of action in
connection with the Arab refugee program. We believe that:
Tab A deals with the foregoing issues in considerably greater detail.
Discuss this subject with the President, and obtain his agreement to
negotiate with Israel and the Arabs to obtain their agreement to an
overall plan for equitable division of Jordan waters together with
related territorial adjustments and the repatriation to Israel of a
limited number of refugees. Tell him that we would propose to work
through diplomatic channels and through the U.N. at the 8th Session of
the General Assembly, and that a policy statement by him may be required
at an appropriate time.
If the President concurs in this approach, we will submit to you specific
steps to be taken to arrange an economic division of the Jordan waters
in accordance with the TVA suggestions,
with such territorial adjustments as necessary to provide a basis for
joint control and continued flow of the waters in accordance with
findings of the Senate subcommittee (Tab C), so that the Jordan–Yarmuk
water resources may be used to best advantage and contribute toward a
solution of the Arab refugee problem.
Tab A
Detailed Discussion of Need for Early Diplomatic
Initiative by U.S. Government Re Arab Refugees and Related
Palestine Issues
- 1.
- There is a growing Arab mood of disillusionment that your
visit to the Near East and your address of June 1 have not been
followed up by a visible attack on the basic causes of tension
in the Palestine area.
- 2.
- An Israel “Peace Plan” (peace with the Arab States) is
understood to be in preparation, for use after the 8th U.N.
General Assembly, or possibly earlier. Although its features are
not known, indications of Israel’s attitude on peace terms make
it virtually certain that this “plan” will constitute an appeal
for world (especially American) support to place the Arabs at a
moral disadvantage and thereby neutralize growing American
interest in Arab friendship. The Israel plan, however
conciliatory (it is expected to offer no
[Page 1271]
major concession), will be
rejected out of hand by the Arabs because of its origin. Israel
will seek to enlist advance U.S. Government blessing for its
plan; in any event it is likely to seek the support of
Congressional and American public opinion.
- 3.
- Israel is extremely nervous over the prospect of U.S. military
aid to the Arab world; has stepped up her own orders for
ordinance equipment from U.S. and elsewhere (these are being
carefully screened by our secret tripartite committee with the
UK and France); and may accelerate her “peace plan” and even
provoke border incidents to block military aid to the
Arabs.
- 4.
- The Department has received an Israeli note (Tab B)4 calling
for a regional application of Lebanon’s Litani, as well as the
Jordan and Yarmuk water resources along lines favoring Israel’s
plan to divert Jordan water to the coastal plain and the Negev.
While diversion of the Litani might assist the further
development of the Jordan valley, we cannot afford to delay
other action in view of Lebanon’s certain condemnation of such a
proposal; further, Lebanon is developing her own plans for use
of Litani waters in Lebanon. The Litani lies entirely in
Lebanon.
- 5.
- If we are to win a measure of confidence in U.S. good will and
impartiality in the Near East as well as broad support for our
new policy in the United States, I am convinced we should take
some action, however limited, to demonstrate our attitude before
Israel seizes the diplomatic initiative and the initiative with
American public opinion.
- 6.
- It is desirable that such U.S. action be undertaken
unilaterally and before the regular UN 8th General Assembly session.
- 7.
- The most urgent issue—and one wherein time works clearly
against area peace and stability—is that of the Palestine Arab
Refugees. Linked therewith are problems of the Jordan–Yarmuk
water system, boundary rectifications, repatriation,
compensation and resettlement in Arab lands. Progress on
existing plans for resettlement of refugees in Syria, Jordan and
Egypt is painfully slow. All plans are still largely on paper,
and there is no prospect for resettlement in Lebanon and Iraq.
Whatever the clarity, or obscurity, of issues such as boundaries
and Jerusalem, the humanitarian aspects of the refugee problem
are very clear. There is an unfulfilled moral and legal
obligation of Israel (as well as of the Arab States) to share in
the refugee burden. Whatever may be the historic validity of
Israel’s present legal position of water rights and boundaries,
Israel has little else but a little water and land to contribute
to a solution of this problem. Her stated willingness to
compensate the refugees has never been spelled out into a firm
offer, and it is our
[Page 1272]
belief that such compensation would have to be made primarily
with outside assistance.
- 8.
- Israel, even with its present expanded boundaries (as compared
with the 1947 Partition Plan) is a crowded land of 1.6 million,
yet her avowed intention is to welcome 2½ million Jews (or any
releasable fraction thereof) from behind the Iron Curtain. Her
renewal of relations with the USSR, while probably intended primarily to increase
Israel’s maneuverability between East and West, has the stated
objective of encouraging this emigration to Zion.
- 9.
- Israel is in a weak moral position in welcoming such
immigration, or any substantial fraction thereof, while
insisting as she does that she will not permit repatriation of
any Arab refugees. She therefore
points to the security risk of such repatriation. While we
recognize the security factor, it is not a decisive argument
against re-admission of up to 100,000 peasants, who might work
land which has lain fallow since 1948.
- 10.
- The one firm Palestine issue in which we can take a balanced,
impartial position now is in regard to the duty of both sides to assist the UN in an accelerated program to give
many of the refugees a chance to work and make their
living.
- 11.
- We therefore think we should separate the refugee problem for
special attack at this time. The report of the Near East
Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee (Tab B [C]) is helpful in this connection.
- 12.
- Following is a rough outline of possibilities open to the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees:
- In Jordan—A general agreement
has been signed that holds out prospects, if engineering
and political problems are solved, of settling (out of
approximately 450,000 in Jordan) between . . .
150/200,000
- In Syria—Shishakli has signed
an agreement covering the 80,000 refugees now in Syria,
but he will not publicize this agreement and is slow in
making land available to UNRWA . . . 80/80,000
- In Egypt—The government has
signed an agreement to provide for settlement in Sinai,
has made this agreement public, and engineering studies
are going ahead. Out of approximately 200,000, this
might cover . . . 100/150,000
- In Israel—No progress toward
repatriation is noted, but a case could be made and
pressed for as many as . . . 100/100,000
- In Lebanon—Lebanon has so far
refused to settle any of the approximately 100,000
refugeees camped in her territory, fearing to upset her
delicate balance between Christians and Muslims.
- In Iraq—Iraq has refused to
cooperate beyond sheltering approximately 5,000
refugees. Her reasons are insistence on repatriation and
on her primary duty to settle Bedouins and other
indigents.
- Total prospects in sight
therefore are within the range of . .
.430/530,000
- 13.
- This leaves about 320/420,000 refugees unprovided for. Our
timetable for the lower range of prospective settlement is
admittedly a long one.
- 14.
- The most immediate hope for action lies in Jordan, and local
hopes are high for development of the Jordan Valley. Economic
and time-saving development of the Jordan Valley requires action
specifically directed at the problem of the Jordan River.
As a result of a study financed by the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees and conducted by the Tennessee
Valley Authority, who employed Chas. T. Main, Inc., of Boston, as
consulting engineers, we are in a position to determine basic
engineering factors regarding the use of waters within the Jordan
watershed. From these facts it is necessary to draw conclusions both
economic and political in their nature.
Israel’s political boundaries were designed with a view to obtaining
access to strategic points on the Jordan River in order to be able
to divert a substantial volume of the waters of the river into
Israel. These plans are in conflict with those of the Arab States. A
realization of Israel’s plans to the full extent would preclude the
irrigation of more than one-third of the Jordan Valley; our
principal hope for the rehabilitation of a sizeable number of the
Arab refugees rests on the irrigation of the entire valley.
Based on the belief that any substantial territorial readjustments
would be impossible to achieve, the Jordanian government, with the
use of U.S. technicians under the Technical Assistance program, is
advocating the development of a storage dam on the Yarmuk River at a
site which is within the control of Syria and Jordan. Analysis by
the TVA and their consultants
indicates that a dam and the necessary appurtenances at the proposed
site at Maqarin would cost approximately $66,000,000, and would take
five to eight years to construct. Because of the nature of the
terrain, the resultant reservoir would not serve as a satisfactory
regulator of the flow of the Yarmuk River, as an insufficient
quantity of water could be stored to avail to the full of the
irregularities in the flow of the river over a period of years.
Furthermore, from the best estimates available, in which the TCA engineers in Jordan concur, the
regulated flow of the Yarmuk would barely suffice to provide the
necessary water to irrigate the eastern side of the Jordan Valley,
leaving the western side of the Valley in Jordan territory unserved
except to the extent irrigation could be conducted on the western
side by control of the wadis flowing into the Jordan from west to
east and from underground water. These sources are inadequate to
serve more than a fraction of the west side of the Valley.
The economic approach to the irrigation of the Jordan Valley requires
the use of Lake Tiberias, a natural reservoir, for storage and
[Page 1274]
regulation of the flow
both of the Jordan and the Yarmuk Rivers. It would involve an
eventual division of the waters involving the use by Jordan of 774
million cubic meters annually, and by Israel of 394 millions,
resulting in irrigation of 490,000 dunums in Jordan and 416,000
dunums in Israel. Use of Lake Tiberias as a reservoir would require
the construction of a diversion canal from the Yarmuk River into
Lake Tiberias and a small increase in the height of the present dam
at the outlet of the Lake. The costs of these two operations are
insignificant in comparison to the cost of a high dam on the Yarmuk,
and much less time-consuming. It is estimated that increasing the
height of the dam at Lake Tiberias would require the expenditure of
about $700,000, and that the construction of a canal from the Yarmuk
into Lake Tiberias would cost approximately $2,300,000.
Furthermore, these works could be undertaken and completed within a
two-year period. Development of the Jordan Valley along these lines
would permit sufficient water to be available from the Jordan and
the Yarmuk rivers to irrigate substantially all of the available
land of the Valley, both on the east and west sides of the river. A
smaller dam than presently contemplated could be built at Maqarin to
provide electric power.
This development, on the other hand, presents two great obstacles:
first, it will require Israel to renounce her claims to more than
400 million cubic meters of water for diversion into Israel. Israel
had counted on 850 million cubic meters for irrigation, on which in
turn her hopes for an expanded population are based. Israel has
further sought the presently unused waters of the Lebanon’s Litani,
for which river Lebanon is developing other plans for part if not
all of its waters. The proposed development of the Jordan would also
require an adjustment of boundaries at the southern end of Lake
Tiberias to enable the Arabs to be reassured as to their continued
supply of water from Lake Tiberias. Israel’s boundaries presently
extend to the east of the Jordan and of Lake Tiberias, and the Arabs
will not agree that their resources of water be under the physical
control of the Israelis. This subject was considered by the
subcommittee of the Senate which recently considered the Palestine
Refugee problem, and the report of the Senate Subcommittee (Tab C)
reads in part as follows:
“. . .The United States is prepared to furnish its share of
the technical services and funds, but essential to the
success of the project is effective action by the United
Nations to secure an understanding on the disputed issues of
water rights, and adequate measures to assure the
appropriate control of these waters so that countries
concerned could depend on their continued flow. Territorial
[Page 1275]
adjustments
to provide the basis for joint control should be
considered.”
It should be noted that Israel’s ability to divert substantial
volumes of water from the Jordan and its tributaries north of Lake
Tiberias on an economical basis depends on the cooperation of Syria
and Lebanon to permit Israel to carry out construction in the
demilitarized zone on the upper Jordan, and to permit storage of
certain waters in their own territories. It is significant that
negotiations between Syria and Israel looking to boundary
settlements on the Jordan have recently been broken off.
Funds which are available for special economic aid to the Near East
could provide inducement to Israel to agree to the proposed division
of waters, if a portion of these funds were directed to development
of Israel’s share of upper Jordan waters. Progress is now stalled
because of Syrian and Lebanese opposition, and shortage of funds.
Syrian and Lebanese opposition to Israel’s development of the upper
Jordan waters in the demilitarized zones might conceivably be
overcome if resultant benefits to the Arabs in Jordan were
demonstrated.
