Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

684A.85/5–853: Telegram

No. 611
The Consul at Jerusalem (Tyler) to the Department of State¹

secret

Jerusalem, May 8, 1953—2 p.m.

150. It is not MAC which needs enlarging (Deptel 59)² or changing but attitude of Israel and Jordan who established it in article 11 of armistice agreement to rule on compliance both parties with that armistice. Both sides should:

(1) Cease using MAC as propaganda scoreboard to expose evil acts of other.

(2) Discipline its own individual offenders when found. Punishment may not always be necessary as understandable fright may cause an illegal shot and unwitting crossing line very easy here.

(3) Where national prestige and security reasons allow, show good faith and admit in MAC just complaints of other side. Israel is especially prone to rush in counter claim for the record to every Jordan complaint.

Observers have difficult job at best and by time they reach scene of incident clear evidence not always available and evidence can and has been faked. Small wonder De Ridder has to abstain from voting on many complaints for lack of convincing evidence. Israel’s denunciation of him as biased because he does not vote for Israel is to be condemned.

(4) Israel should cease yelling “infiltrator” before adequate time has elapsed for investigation, and stop calling on MAC observers for work that is primary responsibility of Israel police for crimes committed inside Israel. MAC not police force, and to criticize MAC for not doing work it is not supposed to do shows ignorance or deliberate undermining of UN prestige in area for reasons that are at best obscure. I reiterate that if Israel sincere in her protestations against infiltrators her stubborn refusal to reinstate local commanders agreements, the best method of controlling it discovered so far, not understandable (Contel 131).³

(5) When Israel police have fingerprints, bits of clothing or other evidence they feel point to infiltrator they should give such evidence to Jordan MAC delegates with request for investigation (not done in Genauer case—Contel 143).⁴ Jordan would be admittedly reluctant to find its own citizens guilty but it does not want murderers wandering around Jordan unpunished. UN itself can help bring about increase in prestige of MAC by appointing press officer who, while withholding names of observers and certain gruesome details tending to inflame public, would publish correct version. MAC decisions are now known to both Israel and Jordan authorities who varnish them for propaganda purposes. A UN press officer could do much to tone down some of the purple prose of Nashashzbi and the frequent distortions of fact and worse, the building up of tension and fear, appearing in Israel press.

Tyler

1. Repeated to Amman, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, London, and Paris.
2. Printed as telegram 962 to Tel Aviv, Document 600.
3. Not printed.
4. Not printed.