684A.85/5–553: Telegram
No. 602
The Ambassador in Jordan Green) to the Department of State1
934. Deptel 873, paragraph 5.2 Although the setting up of three MAC’s might expedite investigations at times when several border incidents occur more or less simultaneously, disadvantages of such fragmentation of present organization would seem to outweigh advantages. Principal disadvantages would be (1) probability of decisions based on conflicting principles with resulting confusion and (2) difficulty HKJ would encounter in finding three competent men willing to undertake distasteful and unpopular duties required.
It is suggested that if any change of organization is to be made it should await arrival of successor to General Riley and be based upon his suggestions. Any suggestions for reorganization would have to be carried out by agreement between HKJ and Israeli Government (see Jerusalem’s 147).3
Embassy is not familiar with details of MAC organization but it is my impression that what is needed is not so much reorganization as (1) improvement of quality of observers and (2) more effective cooperation between HKJ and Israel Government by means of restoration of local commander’s agreements.
One of the principal weaknesses of MAC is that its decisions are not published. That enables both sides to give out fragmentary and in some cases distorted versions of MAC action. I strongly recommend that arrangements be made for immediate release to the press of texts of all decisions reached on border incidents. Such publicity would, I believe, have a very salutory effect, as prompt and accurate publicity in Jordan, in Israel and abroad would be a deterrent of aggressive acts and a strong incentive to the maintenance of order along the border.
- Repeated to Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, London, and Paris.↩
- Printed as telegram 962 to Tel Aviv, Document 600.↩
- In telegram 147 from Jerusalem, May 2, Consul Tyler reminded the Department (in response to the last paragraph of its telegram 962 to Tel Aviv, Document 600) that the Armistice Agreements between Jordan and Israel had been signed by those two parties and could be amended only by them. Jordan and Israel would have to suggest and agree to the creation of additional Mixed Armistice Commissions; the United Nations could not impose them. (684A.85/5–253)↩