786.00/2–1753
No. 570
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Hart)
Subject:
- Interview with Under Secretary Smith by Diplomatic Representatives of Seven Arab States.
Participants:
- Mr. Mohamed Kamil Abdul Rahim, Egyptian Ambassador
- Dr. Farid Zeineddine, Syrian Ambassador
- Mr. Abdullah Ibrahim Bakr, Minister
- Plenipotentiary, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of Iraq
- Dr. Yusuf Haikal, Minister of the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan
- Sayed Abdurrahman Ibn Abdussamed Abu-Taleb, Chargé d’Affaires, Legation of Yemen
- Mr. Hassan Saab, First Secretary, Legation of Lebanon, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim
- Sheikh Mohammed Muhtasib, Second Secretary, Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim
- Under Secretary Walter Bedell Smith
- Assistant Secretary Henry A. Byroade, NEA
- Mr. Parker T. Hart, Director, NE
This call had been requested on an urgent basis on February 16 by the Egyptian Embassy, speaking on behalf of the Arab group. The Egyptian Ambassador acted as primary spokesman for the [Page 1137] group, being Dean of the Arab corps. He stated that the purpose of the visit was twofold: first, to congratulate Mr. Smith on his appointment as Under Secretary and, second, to express the deep concern of the Arab states over the implications which the recent rupture between the Soviet Union and Israel might have in terms of Zionist pressures on the United States Government. He said that it was evident that this rupture would provoke a renewed wave of sympathy in the United States for Zionism and might result in pressures for statements or actions by the United States Government which would be interpreted in the Arab world as unfriendly. He pointed out that the Communist “line” in the Arab world emphasizes anti-Zionism and extreme Arab nationalism, and that Communists would have little difficulty in attracting Arab sympathy if the United States Government took a position on behalf of Israel and against the Soviet Union which would, by implication, be a position against Arab interests. He pointed out that the rank and file of Arabs would not be able to discriminate between the Communist “line” and the truth, and that the reservoir of goodwill toward America which still remains in the Arab world would be heavily drained if the United States Government should yield to the pressures of Zionism exerted through American Jewry.
Ambassador Zeineddine of Syria commented further that such a yielding by the U.S. Government would undermine the position of moderate pro-Western leadership in the Arab states to the point where it might be removed from authority.
The Under Secretary asked Mr. Zeineddine for further elucidation as to the dangers which he envisaged. Mr. Zeineddine replied that he feared military aid and disproportionate economic aid to Israel. In effect, he feared a continuation of the general orientation of the previous Administration.
General Smith responded that he had recently had occasion to call to the attention of his friend, Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel—for whom he had always entertained high respect—that the United States could not be accused of discriminating against Israel in its policies. He felt that by the same token the U.S. had a good record of helpfulness toward the Arab countries; the U.S. Government sought peace and stability throughout the area and stood firmly against any aggression. Indeed, as his visitors were probably aware, the U.S. Government had recently dispatched a very strong note to Tel Aviv regarding the recent incursions by Israeli armed forces into Jordan, which it felt could not be excused by Israel on grounds of individual infiltration from the Jordan side. With respect to the recent rift between the Soviet Union and Israel, his visitors might fear that this might result in a recrudescence of large-scale Jewish emigration from Eastern Europe into Israel. [Page 1138] However, from his years in Moscow, the Under Secretary felt certain that the Soviet Union would never permit large-scale emigration from the Iron Curtain, this being contrary to very firmly established Soviet policy. Turning to Ambassador Zeineddine, whom he had known in Moscow, he inquired whether the latter agreed. Both Mr. Zeineddine and the Ambassador of Egypt responded that they did agree and that this was not what the Arabs mainly feared. What they feared most were public statements supporting Israel, resolutions by Congress and general diplomatic support which would “pour oil” on the smoldering fires of resentment against the U.S. which existed as the result of America’s part in the creation of the State of Israel and its subsequent assistance to that country.
Note: Contrary to February 18 reports in the American press, the Arab representatives did not seek assurances from the Under Secretary that the United States would cease all aid to Israel; nor did they seek direct commitments on any subjects. The purpose of their visit was to give expression to their apprehensions and to their hope that this Government would not yield to Zionist pressures.