Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

684A.85/2–1253: Telegram

No. 567
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Jordan¹

confidential
priority

Washington, February 12, 1953—7:54 p.m.

625. Department has carefully studied the excellent reporting from Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Amman on Israel–Jordan border situation and Department’s analysis and action required are indicated hereunder:

Analysis

1. Even with complete goodwill on part Jordan and Israel authorities some frontier friction would occur, particularly at harvest time, since lengthy frontier and difficult terrain make total elimination infiltration virtually impossible. The problem is for each government to exercise maximum control its inhabitants to limit infiltration to minimum.

2. HKJ authorities state all possible measures to prevent infiltration have been taken. Nevertheless the National Guard is the main if not only border enforcing agency except in the Jerusalem area where the Arab Legion exercises some if not complete control. Indications are National Guard not completely reliable and hence not capable handling its responsibility. Greater use of Legion would undoubtedly decrease border violations.

3. The MAC has the responsibility for policing armistice agreements and for investigating violations arising under the agreement. The MAC does not have enforcing powers.

4. There is no basis for assumption that the US and UN are synonymous and US should therefore enforce armistice agreements. Fact is while US is member of UN it possesses same prerogative as all other member nations, namely, one vote which the vote of any other state could nullify in the GA.

5. Department believes solution problem Israel–Jordan border relations lies in concerted effort both parties to arrive at permanent workable arrangements which are faithfully implemented by both sides. The MAC has been established for this very purpose. Declarations of desire for stable, peaceful relations on border do little to contribute to stability if not followed up by conscientious action by both of the parties to the agreement.

6. The MAC has verified that Israel forces crossed demarcation line and attacked Falama but has ascertained that Jordan forces had no part in the mining of the railway in Israel. USG therefore cannot consider the two incidents comparable since all indications point to the Israel attack on Falama as a carefully planned operation carried out as a part of a major policy decision of IG.

7. Israel’s policy of reprisal raids has already been subject of strong US disapprobation, as for example, Byroade to Sharett June 20,²Hart to Makleff June 24,³ and, most recently, Jernegan to Goitein January 30⁴ (see memos conversation those dates). IG officials have always maintained that retaliatory raids are necessary and justifiable to keep down infiltration. IG to date has been unwilling to give assurances that such raids will cease. Is USG therefore to assume that IG will continue to flout friendly counsel and take matters into own hands? USG considers these raids a grave danger to the security and stability of the area and if they are not expressly and clearly abandoned it must accordingly reserve its right to take appropriate action under the Tripartite Declaration and possibly under UN procedures.

Action for Amman

1. Paragraphs of above analysis considered applicable to Jordan are one through five. These should be incorporated into an aide-mémoire which should be left by Ambassador with Foreign Minister after oral representations along same lines.

2. The information contained in paragraphs six and seven may be conveyed orally to Foreign Minister after completion action contained preceding paragraph. No written record of these two paragraphs are to be left with HKJ Government.

Action for Tel Aviv

1. Paragraphs of analysis considered applicable to Israel are one, five, six and seven. These should be incorporated into an aide-mémoire which Ambassador should leave with Foreign Minister. Verbal report of démarche to HKJ should be given to Foreign Minister.

2. In conveying foregoing information to Foreign Minister you should express USG regret that IG has not seen fit to accept friendly counsel and that USG must consider what further step will be required to impress IG sufficiently with importance of abandoning policy of reprisal raids into neighboring territory.

Dulles

1. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, London, Paris, Ankara, and the Arab capitals.
2. See the two memoranda of conversation, Documents 449 and 450.
3. Memorandum of conversation not printed.
4. Memorandum of conversation not printed, but see telegram 726 to Tel Aviv, Document 552.