Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

684A.86/2–653: Telegram

No. 558
The Ambassador in Jordan (Green) to the Department of State¹

secret

Amman, February 6, 1953—6 p.m.

643. In the four years which have elapsed since the cessation of hostilities in Palestine we have made no headway toward achieving a permanent settlement between Israel and the Arab States. The Palestine conciliation commission has worked hard and conscientiously in its search for a solution and a minority group of powers in the UN General Assembly has recommended immediate direct negotiations. But like the numerous investigative commissions to pre-war Palestine all measures have failed. If during the four year search for a settlement there have been signs of progress they have been illusory for they have been built upon quicksand. The fact is negotiations based on a recognition of the present status quo will never materialize apparently on conciliatory attitudes by an Abdullah, a Naguib, or a Shishikli notwithstanding.

Let us face the hard and bitter fact that the Arab world will not consent to a permanent settlement with Israel except on the basis of certain conditions which will perforce require a change in the status quo. Any attempt at settlement which ignores these conditions is destined to failure at the start. Nothing has occurred to soften this attitude and there is no prospect that anything will. On the contrary, Jordan’s position vis-à-vis Israel has stiffened considerably in the last several weeks as a result of the cold-blooded Israeli attacks on Arab border villages as well as Israeli attempts to place the blame on the Arabs. So deeply are what they consider the wrongs of Palestine embedded in the psychology of Arabs on Israel’s periphery that there are absolutely no prospects of an Arab-Israel peace in our time except along lines which entail concessions by Israel.

We may adopt either of two alternative lines of action: Either (1) we continue to go along with the present situation deluding ourselves into believing that a solution to the Arab-Israel deadlock can be found on the basis of the present status quo or (2) we immediately exercise our natural influence over Israel to oblige that country in its own interest and in our interest to enter into negotiations with the Arab States through channels acceptable to them on the basis of certain conditions indispensable to the establishment of peaceful relations between Israel and her neighbors:

a. The internationalization of Jerusalem.

b. Recognition of the right of the refugees to return to their homes and lands.

c. Full compensation to all those who do not exercise this right.

d. Rectification of the existing boundaries between Israel and her neighbors with special reference to the areas where villages are left on the Arab side of the armistice lines while most of their cultivatable lands are held by Israel.

To continue to follow the first line of action invites failure if not disaster. It necessitates the continued outlay of US capital to buttress a precarious Israel economy doomed by an Arab blockade. It requires the continued outlay of US capital to support refugees who cannot be supported by host countries whose economies suffer from the blockade they are imposing on Israel. It means the exhaustion of whatever American influence and prestige remains in this area. Finally it courts the peril of widespread Communism in Arab States where the mood is one of despair and where confidence in the West is being replaced by hope in the East. Circumstances such as these do not augur well for MEDO or any other US plans for the area.

The second line of action offers a real hope of success. From numerous conversations that I and members of my staff have had with Jordanians at all levels I am convinced that if the four conditions mentioned above are used as a basis for negotiations peace between Israel and the Arab States is a distinct probability. The attitudes of the Jordanian leaders are not controlled by extremists who aim at nothing less than the destruction of Israel as alleged elsewhere. Jordanian leaders will listen to reason and reason to them in the Arab-Israel complex starts with the acceptance of these four conditions.

If we adopt alternative two we shall not only have real chances of peace but we shall be acting in the best interests of the US. It is not too late to recoup our losses—financial, strategic, in prestige or otherwise—but time is running out and we must act now. The present state of affairs between Jordan and Israel makes this a matter of extreme urgency and the present economic situation in Israel (see Tel Aviv’s 1209 January 29 [28]) would seem to present a golden opportunity.

Green

1. Repeated to Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, and Baghdad.