974.5301/2–353: Airgram
No. 555
The Acting Secretary
of State to the Embassy in
Egypt
A–246. Mr. Gontran de Juniac, Minister of the French Embassy in Washington and Mr. Bernard Burrows, Counselor of the British [Page 1114] Embassy in Washington, called on Mr. Henry Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State, on January 29 to leave with him an aide-mémoire concerning freedom of transit through the Suez Canal. The text of the aide-mémoire is given below. As an aid toward assisting the Department in arriving at a position on this question your telegraphic comments are invited.
“Her Majesty’s Ambassador for the United Kingdom presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour, under instructions from Her Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to put to him the following proposals for an exchange of views between the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and France concerning the freedom of transit through the Suez Canal:—
“Recent events have shown that the Egyptian Government appear to be bringing more understanding and at the same time a realistic approach to bear on the discussion of international problems. Although it is necessary to guard against over-optimism, the possibility cannot henceforth be excluded that agreements may be reached on questions, such as those of the Sudan, Suez Canal and Defence, on which a deadlock had been caused by former Ministries.
- “2. But any agreement relating to the Suez Canal Zone or to the defence of the Near East will have necessarily in order to be legally valid, to respect the international status of the Canal, resulting as this does from its guarantee by international agreements reinforced by uninterrupted usage. It follows then that we should define and formulate the principles which the signatory powers of such an instrument would intend to respect in this regard, and which would have in any case to be invoked in the text of any final agreement.
- “3. The Governments of the United Kingdom and the French Republic consider that without delay the United States, British and French Governments should consult together about the matter.
- “4. If the attitude of the Egyptian Government were afterwards to disappoint the Western Powers, such conversations would turn out to have been even more indispensable.
- “5. Developments in the last few years in the Middle East have made it possible to estimate the degree to which the political instability of this area directly affects the security and freedom of communications through the Suez Canal. They have at the same time clearly displayed the solidarity which exists among those nations principally interested in the maintenance of this freedom and security.
- “6. The Governments of the French Republic and the United Kingdom, while realising that the political instability existing in the Middle East has had serious repercussions on international navigation through the Isthmus of Suez and could eventually have repercussions still more disquieting, consider that such a state of things would lead in the end to a consequence even more serious, that of allowing the establishment of a precedent which would risk the calling in question of those very principles on which freedom of transit through the Canal rests in law. They have been confirmed [Page 1115] in their opinion by the representations made on this score by shipping companies and the International Chamber of Shipping.
- “7. The rights of the Maritime Powers cannot be contested.
- “8. They have as their basis the Convention of Constantinople of the 29th October, 1888, and the uninterrupted use of the Canal for more than eighty years under conditions which have given to the Canal an international status based on the three principles of (i) freedom of access and of passage, (ii) equality of flag without discrimination and (iii) the obligation on the Powers not to indulge in this area in any act of hostility or of war.
- “9. The Egyptian Government, without contesting that these principles remain the charter of the Powers interested in the use of the Canal, have taken various measures, which, under the pretext of protecting individual rights which they claim, have resulted in seriously compromising freedom of communications through the Canal.
- “10. The Governments of the United Kingdom and of the French Republic, as well as the Government of the United States, have always contested the equity and legality of these measures. They are, however, especially concerned to avoid the always possible deterioration of the situation, which might in certain circumstances lead to the complete stoppage of traffic through the Canal by reason either of direct interference with shipping or of action detrimental to the regular and satisfactory working of the technical services of the Suez Canal Company. They consider therefore that the Maritime Powers should study the means of safeguarding their common interests, and in particular whether at a suitable moment they should declare publicly their common desire to ensure freedom of communication. The Egyptian Government could be and ought to be associated in this declaration, inspired as it is only by respect for treaties and in the interests of all the Powers without exception.
- “11. It would in addition be in the interest of these powers to take counsel now with a view to finding means of maintaining the freedom and security of communications, as a safeguard against the eventuality of the Egyptian Government’s refusing nevertheless to join the other Powers or, having subscribed to a common declaration, acting in a manner incompatible with it.
- “12. If the Government of the United States shares the opinion
of the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the French
Republic about the position outlined above, they will no doubt
agree with them that a preliminary exchange of views among the
three Powers ought to take place as soon as possible with an
agenda covering the following points:—
- “(1) Definition of the basic principles on which the Maritime Powers concerned would wish to base the right of freedom of transit through the Suez Canal, and what this implies for the effective maintenance and eventual safeguard of this freedom.
- “(2) Study of the conditions under which the Maritime
Powers concerned would:
- “(a) persuade Egypt to reaffirm these principles;
- “(b) make, in default of this solution and at a suitable moment, a public declaration reaffirming these principles.
- “(3) Examination of the measures which might be taken in the last resort by the interested Maritime Powers in order to safeguard, in circumstances to be defined, freedom of transit through the Canal.
- “13. These preliminary conversations would take place in the greatest secrecy. In the light of their conclusions, the three Governments would be able to decide by what method to approach the other principal users of the Canal, i.e., the Norwegian, Netherlands, Italian, Danish and Swedish Governments and invite them to associate themselves eventually with the action proposed.”