680.84A/11–752
No. 511
Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert L. Burns of the Office of
Near Eastern Affairs
Subject:
- Visit of Ambassador Eban regarding (1) Israel-Arab relations; (2) NE security and military assistance; (3) PCC; and (4) territorial adjustments.
Participants:
- Ambassador Abba Eban, Israel Embassy
- Mr. David Goitein, Minister of Israel Embassy
- Mr. Byroade—NEA
- Mr. Burns—NE
Ambassador Eban, at his request, called on Mr. Byroade at 3:00 p.m. today to discuss Arab-Israel peace prospects and the Near East security situation.
The Ambassador began by stating that the Israel Government had noted only a “change of atmosphere” in Israel-Arab relations, but nothing more substantial. There were increasing contacts abroad between Israel and Arab officials, but the Egyptians had [Page 1046] become disinterested; their emphasis was now being placed on the North African issues. There had been a “retreat” in the Egyptian press, which was resuming its previous hostile attitude toward Israel. General Naguib’s overtures to the Egyptian Jewish community were being explained as domestic moves without international implications, and it was being said that Egypt would follow the Arab League’s policies vis-à-vis Israel. In short, if a change in the Egyptian attitude was developing, it was extremely slow in coming about.
Mr. Byroade agreed that there had been no really important developments but that a change of atmosphere must precede other more tangible evidences of a change in the Arab position regarding Israel. He was pleased with the changed atmosphere which had taken place within the Israel Government regarding Israel’s policies toward the Arab states. A lengthy cable had just been received from the Embassy at Damascus1 setting forth Shishikli’s views on how the Israel-Syrian border problem could be resolved. These views would be studied. If possible they should be moved on; a settlement of this problem should not be postponed until an overall settlement can be reached between Israel and Syria.
With regard to the security situation in the NE, the Ambassador stated that military aid to the Arab states should be linked with an indication of a change in their attitude toward Israel. The UK’s dispatch of arms to Egypt causes Israel concern, as does the UK’s offer of jets to Israel and various Arab states. Israel intends to reject the British offer and argue what Israel considers to be a wrong interpretation of the tripartite agreement on the furnishing of arms to NE states. Israel would much rather see these jets withheld from the Arabs even if it means they would be denied Israel as well.
Mr. Byroade stated that the question of Egypt required frank discussion. Egypt has received nothing from the West in return for the cooperative attitude which it has shown. There is no chance of General Naguib and his government remaining in power if there continues to be an imbalance between Egypt’s more helpful attitude and the lack of concrete assistance from the West. There are four major matters concerning which Egypt’s cooperation is needed: settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute; the organization of a NE defense arrangement; Israel-Arab peace; and a helpful attitude in the Arab League. Naguib has turned to the West for assistance and the West has been haggling too much over how this should be accomplished, with the result that very little aid has been forthcoming. The UK grudgingly had released the jets which [Page 1047] Egypt already partially owned. The West must be more forthright in helping Egypt, through such means as buying its cotton and providing military and financial assistance. Peace between Egypt and Israel can be one of the objectives toward which we can work in connection with Western assistance to Egypt.
The Ambassador agreed that the West must give something to Egypt if it is to gain influence in that country. Israel has only one quarrel: the West is placing economic aid and military aid on the same footing. Israel would be glad to see Egypt furnished economic assistance; this would be a real contribution toward stability in the NE. But military aid is not what Egypt needs and is not a contribution toward stability. Mr. Byroade pointed out that the Egyptian Army, having led the change in government in Egypt, is not an effective military force and the West must give something to those who came to power on a platform of ridding the army and government of corruption. Egypt is not being considered as a potential bastion of defense in the ME; we are looking more to Turkey and Pakistan to play that role. However, for a small amount of transportation, signal and other equipment we stand to gain a lot in Egypt.
The Ambassador commented that this was a peculiar situation: The US supplying arms to a country which is at war with a country with which the US maintains friendly relations. Mr. Byroade questioned whether in the event that Israel should present the US with a request for military assistance, Israel would want the US to require that the furnishing of such aid be preceded by full peace with the Arabs. The Ambassador replied that in such a case it would be logical for the US to require a country to indicate its readiness to conclude peace.
As regards the UK’s offer of jets to Israel and various Arab states, Mr. Byroade said that this had come as a complete surprise to us, that it was a move taken at the instance of Churchill and that we had informed the UK of our concern over such action. It appeared that the UK offer was made solely on economic grounds.
Mr. Byroade pointed out that the US Government is criticized daily because of the large amount of economic aid which it has provided Israel compared to that which has been made available to the Arab states. The Ambassador emphasized that this is economic, not military, aid. Mr. Byroade explained that the Arab states know that if it were not for the economic assistance which Israel has received, Israel would be unable to maintain its military establishment. Mr. Byroade said that it was his personal opinion that Israel has a larger military establishment than it needs. In any event he could not see Egypt attacking Israel after receiving military aid from the West. He had been thinking of ways of putting teeth in [Page 1048] the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950, and with the West supplying arms to the area it would seem that the West would be in a more authoritative position when it comes to forestalling aggression within the area.
The real need however is to redirect Arab fears from Israel to the threat from the north.
The Ambassador stated that Israel is willing to enter into a defense organization in connection with its application for arms aid and is anxious to obtain a response to its formal démarche regarding military aid, particularly since the trend in American foreign aid seems to be toward military aid on strategic grounds rather than aid on basically economic grounds. Israel aspires to achieve the same relationship with the US as that enjoyed by the “Greco-Turkish family”, and therefore Israel’s request for aid is also an offer of a stronger more binding relationship with the US and the Western security system. It appears that Israel constitutes the first instance of a country “knocking on the door” for admission into the defense system of the West, and not being admitted.
Mr. Byroade described the primary US objective as a NE with some prospect of area defense. At this stage many states in the area are not friendly toward the US. On the other hand, Israel is not threatened, and is far ahead in its military potential. If the US were to accede to Israel’s request that military aid not be provided these states, the US would be much less likely to realize its primary objective in the area. He did not agree that the US should not entertain Egypt’s request for nominal assistance. The US is not contemplating anything which would be harmful to Israel.
The Ambassador concluded the discussion of this subject by saying that Israel’s first objective had been that there be no increase in the overall military strength of the Arab states. However, if that was not possible because of overriding political considerations, Israel’s alternative would be also to receive military aid.
The Ambassador then turned to the subject of the PCC. Israel’s position is that if the PCC is to continue it should do so as presently composed, treating with such subjects as blocked accounts and compensation. Also, its present terms of reference should be maintained. It has been rumored that the Arabs are interested in enlarging the Commission to a seven-member body, including Pakistan and a Latin American state. Israel wishes to see the Commission’s mediation role played down and responsibility placed upon the parties to enter into direct discussions. The Ambassador observed that the UN was not devised as a substitute for direct diplomacy. A group of states (Canada, Mexico, Australia, New Zealand, Netherlands, Ecuador and others) appear ready to propose at the General Assembly that Israel and the Arab states settle their problems [Page 1049] directly, while in no way inferring an abolition of the PCC. Israel requests US support for such a move, and would hope for UK, French and Turkish support as well. It would not be Israel’s intention to have these four powers take the initiative unless they so wished. Mr. Byroade said that he could think of no objection to such a proposal.
The Ambassador stated that Prime Minister Ben Gurion’s position on arriving at border settlements with its Arab neighbors is that an offer of territory in the course thereof is the biggest card that a country can play, and therefore one that should be kept as a trump. As a consequence the Prime Minister’s idea on a border arrangement per se, and a border arrangement as a part of an overall peace settlement, are quite different.
Mr. Byroade concluded the conversation by saying that he wished to talk again with the Ambassador, especially with a view to avoiding misunderstandings of what the US is attempting to accomplish in Egypt.
- The reference is presumably to telegram 345 from Damascus, Document 509.↩