783.00/9–2552: Despatch
No. 494
The Minister in Syria (Cannon) to the Department of State
No. 185
Reference:
- Legtel 222, September 23, 19521
Subject:
- Transmittal Memorandum Minister’s Conversation with Shishikli2
Summary
In my first substantive conversation with Colonel Shishikli, the latter set forth in some detail his ideas on recent events in Lebanon, his views on Near Eastern history since the departure of the Turks, and his opinions on specific current topics such as his interest in establishing a modus vivendi with Israel and belief that the Arab States should be included in MEDO plans from their inception. He indicated that further general and specific discussions would be required before the conclusion of any bilateral aid agreements with the United States.
In the course of my first lengthy substantive conversation with Colonel Shishikli, a two and one-half hour near-monologue at my Residence on the evening of September 22, he talked cordially and long about many past and present aspects of Near Eastern politics. [Page 1010] A summary of his remarks is forwarded in the enclosed memorandum. Beyond asking several questions, my contribution to the conversation was small. The following observations and comments are intended to be read in conjunction with the attached memorandum of conversation.
Lebanon: The Legation accepts at face value Col. Shishikli’s disclaimer of aggressive designs on Lebanon. In approving a “strong hand” to guide that country, he appears to recommend for Lebanon the kind of guidance he himself is giving Syria. Though he exercises authority in Syria without full assumption of responsibility, he is critical of that identical situation in Lebanon.
Recent Near Eastern History: Col. Shishikli’s interpretation of events in this area since the end of the Turkish regime implies that Arab progress and Syrian independence have resulted solely from Arab efforts, while delays and difficulties have been caused by foreign powers. There has been much discussion of the nature and extent of Allied commitments to the late King Hussein and his associates during World War I, and it hardly seems worthwhile to question Col. Shishikli’s interpretation. The Colonel’s evaluation of the Arab States’ assistance to the Allied Powers during World War II seems to be exaggerated. He gave no credit either to the British or ourselves for any share in the “fortuitous circumstances arising out of the War” which resulted in statehood for Syria. Willingness to arrogate to one self all credit and to attribute all blame to the foreigner is not, of course, confined solely to Syrians, or even to Orientals.
Arab Unity: Citing the fragmentation of the area by the mandatory powers and the heavy total cost of the bureaucracies of the several Arab States, Col. Shishikli advanced an implicit argument for some form of Arab union. His statement concerning the alleged failure of either Lebanon or Jordan to achieve economic viability is additional evidence of the trend of his thinking. Members of his cabinet are well known for their support of the idea of Arab union, and reference to this concept is made in the constitution of the new “Government” party, of which Shishikli is the “responsible director”.
Israel: Col. Shishikli showed considerable forebearance in dividing the responsibility for the creation of the State of Israel between the United States and Great Britain, an event for which the United States is given full credit by many Arabs. In the face of his public statements to the contrary, his private recognition that Israel will be a factor in the area for a long time is gratifyingly realistic. It should be noted, of course, that throughout his discussion of problems connected with Israel, Col. Shishikli is concerned with the establishment of a modus vivendi rather than with a permanent [Page 1011] settlement. He appears to envisage frontier delimitation and refugee resettlement as “temporary” measures which will last a decade, a generation or a century but only until such time as Arab rights can be effectively reasserted. Just as placement of refugees here is being attempted without reference to “resettlement,” so any improvement of Syrian relations with Israel may be feasible only if explicit references to “peace” are omitted.
MEDO: The view expressed by Col. Shishikli that Near Eastern States should be included in MEDO plans from their inception coincides with the Department’s policy. Although the subject of arms was not specifically mentioned, it has been made clear that Col. Shishikli would like military assistance as well as equitable recognition of Arab importance in any regional defense arrangements.
U.S. Aid Agreements: Pending 511 (b) and 408 (e) agreements were not directly mentioned by Col. Shishikli. His remark that consideration of specific agreements should be deferred until the completion of general informal discussions would appear to presage further delay in conclusion of those agreements. Despite his awareness of the Department’s November cutoff date on ten million dollars of economic assistance, he appears to be holding to his own timetable which is dominated by Syrian and Arab considerations.
Summary: Throughout Colonel Shishikli’s conversation, it was obvious that he views all proposed arrangements with the West in the light of Syrian and Arab interests, and that he is determined to maintain and support Arab claims against Israel. Programs and policies conceived without recognition of these factors will find no ready acceptance in Syria.
William D. Brewer
Second Secretary of Legation