Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

774.00/7–3152

No. 464
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Eygpt and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Affairs (Stabler)

secret

[Washington,] July 31, 1952.

Subject:

• Israel Views on Egyptian Situation

Participants:

• Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
• Mr. Eliashiv Ben-Horin, First Secretary of the Embassy
• NE—Mr. Hart
• NE—Mr. Stabler

Mr. Eban called on Mr. Hart on July 31 at the former’s request. Mr. Eban said that he and his government had been giving considerable thought to recent developments in Egypt and desired to exchange views with the Department. He mentioned that Mr. Sharrett and Ambassador Davis had had a conversation in Tel Aviv on this subject which is of great interest to the Israeli Government.

Mr. Eban said that it was his government’s view that it was too early yet to tell in what direction Egypt was headed, but that it seemed useful to exchange views with the Department at this stage in the hope of evolving some ideas. The loss of King Farouk was not necessarily a disturbing factor from Israel’s point of view since Israel believed that Farouk had adopted an intransigent attitude toward Israel and that he had in fact instructed his diplomatic representatives not to think in terms of Egyptian-Israel peace. On the other hand, the constant reference to General Naguib as a “hero in the Palestine war” and continued discussion regarding Palestine War arms scandal as the reason for Egypt’s defeat were disturbing. According to Israel officers they had no recollection of Naguib and he had not in any way stood out during the Palestine affair. The Israel Government was concerned that continued references to the Palestine “War” might revive aggressive ideology among Egyptian officers.

The Israel Government was also concerned by the growth of military dictatorships in the countries which surround Israel, since with the decline of civilian thinking, military thinking would prevail and in the case of Syria, there was little evidence that the Syrian regime wished to come to terms with Israel. Mr. Eban alluded to the fact that the United States had urged Israel to be more forthcoming in connection with Shishikli and said that while Israel was endeavoring to respond to these suggestions, there was no evidence of a similar attitude on the part of the Syrians. Mr. Eban emphasized that Israel’s obsession with its security was being magnified by the accession to power in neighboring countries of military leaders.

Mr. Eban continued that Israel representatives, notably Messrs. Sassoon and Divon, had sent a number of reports from Europe where they had been in touch with certain leading members of the Wafd. These contacts had taken place both before and just after the coup although Israel was now uninformed since the principal figures had returned to Egypt. Israel representatives in Europe had reported their impression that the Wafd leaders were not adverse to settlement between Egypt and Israel on the basis of there being no real disagreement between Egypt and Israel and the desirability of liquidating unnecessary Egyptian commitments. Mr. Eban pointed to the fact that the bulk of Egypt’s Army is based on the Gaza strip and serves no useful purpose. Mr. Eban admitted that it was difficult to tell whether the contacts between the Israel representatives and the Wafd leaders were sincere or whether they were simply light oriental platitudes of individuals who had no governmental responsibility. Nevertheless, he thought that these straws in the wind were sufficiently significant not to be disregarded.

Mr. Eban then brought himself to the main point of the discussion. He said that Israel hoped that the new regime in Egypt might offer a way for Egyptian-Israel peace. He hoped that the United States would find it possible to make clear to General Naguib that the United States favored such a peace and that it would be in Egypt’s interest as well as in the interest of stability in the Middle East for peace to be concluded. Mr. Eban remarked that Ambassador Caffery enjoys a position of highest respect and confidence in Egypt and that he has an extraordinary influence on Egyptians of all political parties. Mr. Eban believed that with this position Ambassador Caffery is in an excellent position to counsel the new regime with respect to peace with Israel. He recognized that there were certain difficulties involved in this. At the same time he made it very clear that his government did not accept as valid any contention that the Anglo-Egyptian problem should necessarily have priority over this other important issue of achieving peace between Egypt and Israel. Mr. Eban also made clear that the note of July 28 on the Suez Canal restrictions was not related to recent developments and that the decision to present the note to the US, UK and France had been made several weeks ago. He said that should the Suez Canal restrictions question be settled, this in itself would only mean that the armistice agreement between Israel and Egypt would function as it should. It did not necessarily mean that peace had been achieved and it was the broader aspect of this question that Israel was interested in at this time.

The Department’s representatives agreed that it was too early yet to tell what the ultimate aims of the new movement in Egypt would be. There were certain encouraging signs but at the same time there was a sufficient number of question marks to leave one in doubt. The Department’s representatives noted that to date neither Naguib nor Ali Maher had made any public references to the Israel question and as a matter of fact their attitude on external questions was restrained. It was pointed out that Israel’s concern regarding reference to Naguib as a hero in the Palestine War should not color their attitude since irrespective of how the Israelis felt about the Palestine conflict, the Egyptians viewed it in a somewhat different light. With regard to a military dictatorship, the Department’s representatives pointed out the US did not approve of the violent overthrow of legally constituted governments and that we would give no indication that we approved this type of activity as a national policy. At the same time it must be admitted that leadership is required in some of these Near Eastern states and that if stability could be restored to the Egyptian Government and graft and corruption eliminated this would be all for the good. The Department did not know how far the military would go with respect to reinstituting regular processes of government but it had been encouraged by the orderly way in which this whole coup had developed.

The Department’s representatives emphasized that the US Government continued to hope that a way could be found to settle the Arab-Israel question and that as an issue affecting the stability in the Middle East, the Israel question was high on the list. We desired to see a settlement reached between Egypt and Israel and would use any appropriate opening to further this end; but we could not tell at this moment whether an opportunity would be forthcoming at Cairo. While the Anglo-Egyptian problem might not have priority over the Israel question, it must be said that the Egyptians appeared to be more anxious to see a solution to the former than to the latter. The Department’s representatives said that it might be difficult for the US alone to approach the new Egyptian regime regarding a settlement with Israel when and if the time seemed appropriate to do so. The fact that the US was so closely associated in the Arab eyes on the side of Israel made us suspect in dealing with questions affecting Israel. As a purely informal proposition which had not been discussed with anyone else in the Department, Mr. Stabler said that there might be some utility, if and when the time were appropriate, in an informal démarche to the Egyptian Government by the signatories of the tripartite declaration. This démarche could be made within the framework of the concern of these three powers for the security and stability of the Near East. It was emphasized that this was purely a personal suggestion and had no status. Mr. Eban said he thought the idea might have merit but he wondered whether the UK would be willing to involve itself in this question when it was already a party to another dispute. The Department’s representatives emphasized that the situation would have to become a great deal more clear before thought could be given to the matter raised by Mr. Eban but that he could be assured that the US Government still had as its policy peace between the Arab States and Israel. It was agreed that we would keep in touch with the Israel Government concerning this question.

During the course of the conversation the Department’s representatives mentioned that some concern had been felt by Egyptian military authorities in Gaza over Israel military maneuvers in that area. Mr. Eban said that his government had issued a public statement to the effect that Israel fully respected the Egypt–Israel Armistice agreement which still governed relationship between those two countries. It was the hope of the Government that Egypt would issue a similar statement.