320.2 AA/4–352: Despatch
No. 418
The Chargé in Jordan (Fritzlan) to the Department of State
No. 268
Subject:
- Arab Refugee Problem–UNRWA Operations
For some time I have been disturbed over the failure of UNRWA to accomplish anything substantial in Jordan in the form of refugee resettlement. The reason for this state of affairs seems to be twofold. There is a significant lack of cooperation and enterprise on the part of the Jordan Government in this field; furthermore it would appear that the terms of reference by which Mr. Blandford is bound, which preclude the undertaking of any development projects which do not lead directly and conclusively to refugee resettlement, serve to fetter the operations of UNRWA in Jordan with the result that month after month large sums of money are spent for direct relief to keep the refugees alive without anything substantial being undertaken to make refugees self-supporting and to take them off the ration lists.
It will be recalled that at the past General Assembly in Paris high hopes were entertained by not only Mr. Blandford, but by the United States, United Kingdom and other delegations primarily responsible for the operations of UNRWA, that the new program would have the active support of the Arab States and could be put into operation with little delay. As far as Jordan is concerned these hopes have not been justified. It is of course fully realized that the absorbtive capacity of this country is very limited and that at least 350,000 of the approximately half million refugees in the country must look to other countries for their ultimate resettlement. For some time our thinking has been concentrated upon Syria as an area which could absorb this manpower. A year ago it seemed that the Syrian Government had accepted in principle the resettlement of a portion of these refugees within Syria. However no action has been taken by the Syrian Government to implement this principle [Page 911] and it is doubted if the Government in power there today will make a firm undertaking in this respect. Nor is the Syrian Government the only one to be blamed for this situation. Undoubtedly a great deal more could be done in Jordan than has been done in the direction of resettlement. However, before this can happen there must be a considerable amount of education work carried out among the refugees to convince them that, despite past United Nations General Assembly decisions and past promises made by Arab leaders, they can never hope to return in large numbers to their previous homes. This the Jordan Government has shown no willingness to do.
The foregoing considerations lead one to believe that, despite certain actions of the Arab League which have appeared to be favorable to the principle of refugee resettlement, it is the basic policy of the Arab States to obstruct resettlement but to give some vague and meaningless encouragement to UNRWA in its efforts in order that the United Nations might continue to assume responsibility for the maintenance of these refugees; the purpose of this policy being simply to keep the Palestine problem alive in the hope of bringing about the downfall of Israel.
The British Minister in Amman, Mr. Furlonge, and I have had sporadic conversations on this subject and I find he shares the concern of this Legation regarding the whole problem. He tells me that during his visit to Damascus over the past weekend he, together with the British Minister there, discussed the problem at great length with Minister Cannon and Mr. Clark. It was apparent that all shared the feeling that time was running out fast and that the Arab States should be solemnly warned in the near future that unless concrete results were obtained from Mr. Blandford’s new program, it was most unlikely that at the next session of the General Assembly the United Nations would continue to assume responsibility for the refugees as it had in the past. Mr. Furlonge repeated to me certain proposals he had made in Damascus which doubtless the Legation there will report to the Department. However, at the risk of being repetitious, I summarize them below. It will readily become apparent that there is very little essentially new in Mr. Furlonge’s proposals.
It is Mr. Furlonge’s idea that after a solemn warning has been issued to the Arab States principally concerned in the matter, we should wait, say, two months in order to satisfy ourselves concerning any change of attitude on the part of the Arab States. Should no change of attitude become apparent, we should then approach them along the following lines:
It should be made clear that the failure of Mr. Blandford’s program will almost certainly cause the U.S. Congress as well as other [Page 912] legislative bodies to withhold funds for Arab refugees. Furthermore, we consider that the time has come when we must insist upon the Arab States assuming a greater measure of responsibility, if not full responsibility, for the refugees in their territories. We accordingly consider that at the next General Assembly we will oppose any plans for further contributions to UNRWA for the direct relief of Arab refugees. However, since we are not oblivious to the humanitarian problem involved, we will propose that a fund be established in order to assist those Arab States which have assumed responsibility for the administration of relief to refugees within their borders, and that the money available from this fund will be allotted over certain periods in diminishing quantities based on some reasonable formula. Those States which feel they are unable from their own resources to support these refugees may apply for assistance from this fund. In addition to the foregoing we would say to the Arabs that we would support their applications for economic assistance, leading directly to resettlement, made to the various agencies (Mutual Security Administration, the United Kingdom as regards loans to certain countries, the International Bank, Export-Import Bank, etc.), which are now providing capital for the development of these countries.
While there is much to commend Mr. Furlonge’s plan, it will readily be realized that there are certain weak points in it. It seems to me that in making these proposals he is not fully alive to the political aspects of the problem. It would be difficult, though perhaps not entirely out of the question, to force through the General Assembly a resolution which absolved the United Nations from any responsibility for the Palestine refugees and which placed that responsibility entirely upon the Governments concerned. Unfortunately there are numerous resolutions on the books of the General Assembly which provide clearly that those refugees wishing to return to their former homes should be permitted to do so, the rest being adequately compensated. Were we to attempt to force through such a drastic resolution, we would undoubtedly incur the violent hostility of not only the whole Arab and Moslem world, but also a number of Asiatic and possibly South American countries. It is perhaps questionable whether we would wish to go so far on this issue and perhaps alienate these countries on what we may consider larger and more important issues.
My own feeling is that the Arab States would not respond as we might hope to a solemn warning of the nature mentioned above and it seems to me doubtful that, should there be little if any response, we would find ourselves in a position to issue a threat of the type mentioned by Mr. Furlonge. Nevertheless there would seem to be considerable merit in the idea of issuing a warning [Page 913] couched in general terms. Certainly the situation as seen from this Capital has not improved appreciably in the past year and there is little if any sign that it will be improved in the near future. In view of this it seems imperative that the whole problem of the Palestine refugees and the operations of UNRWA be reviewed in the hope that a new and more effective approach might be made.