Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 156

No. 33
Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Embassy in Iraq¹

confidential
ST D–6/1

Baghdad, May 18, 1953.

Subject:

• Iraq

Participants:

• United States
  • Honorable John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
  • Ambassador Berry
  • Mr. Philip Ireland
• Iraq
  • Dr. Fadhil al Jamali, President of the Chamber of Deputies

Dr. Jamali informed the Secretary that the basic problems between Iraq and the United States had been inherited from the past. The first was the continuance of colonialism, as in North Africa. The second one was Palestine, where Israel had been established without regard to human rights. He hoped that the US would be able to alter its policy in regard to both of these countries.

Legacies had also been left by the colonial policy of Great Britain in Egypt and Iraq. These were being gradually corrected. He declared that in time the military bases in each of these countries must be evacuated and returned to the Egyptians and Iraqis for safe-guarding.

In regard to Palestine, he said that the UN resolutions had not been just but with the passage of time they had been accepted by the Arabs. Arab leaders, however, could not, in deference to public opinion, accept less than the UN resolution concerning Palestine as a basis of peace with Israel. Internationalization of Jerusalem was essential because it was the sacred city of three religions and of all the races of mankind. The basis of division regarding frontiers must be those set up by the UN resolutions of 1947 or their equivalent. If territorial and boundary adjustments took place in accordance with the resolution of 1947, such adjustment would solve two-thirds of the refugee problem.

Jamali then turned to North Africa, in the discussion of which he became somewhat heated. The treatment of North Africa was a typical case of colonialism and imperialism. He criticized the US for backing France in its colonialism. The US might be giving good counsel to the French Government but in view of recent French actions, it was difficult to prove this fact in public opinion. He urged that the US openly oppose France in order to prevent the nationalists of North Africa from turning to communism. It was impossible to fight communism without an appeal to public opinion.

Dr. Jamali stated that opposition to communism in Iraq was based on ideological factors, but unless such ideological factors were strongly reinforced, they would form no obstacle to communism. Dr. Jamali then returned to the question of bases in Egypt and Iraq. He declared that the bases must be given back to the people and the Iraqis and Egyptians given help to maintain them. He believed in common defense and he thought that most Iraqis also believed in it.

In regard to Iraq’s defense, he stated that money from oil should be spent on development, not on military expansion. Yet since military expansion was essential, Iraq should be helped by the US in its own interest. He declared that America had neglected Iraq. It had given assistance to Saudi Arabia, to Pakistan, to Iran, but had always skipped over Iraq. Iraq had the greatest potentialities of any Arab country. He wanted something substantially American in this country. America should come forward with substantial and real assistance in establishing technical schools and other projects for the development of Iraq.

The Secretary stated that he appreciated Dr. Jamali’s exposé to which he had no time to make a reply except on the matter of our relationships with France and Great Britain. Dr. Jamali had implied that the US was in complete partnership with the colonial policy of France and Great Britain. He wished, in reply, to state emphatically that this was not so. Privately and behind the scenes influence was being constantly brought to bear on these governments to moderate their policy. The policy of the US was against open clash, hence there had been no pushing of these questions in the UN. He urged Dr. Jamali not to push the questions of North Africa openly or in the UN since it would only serve communist strategy of creating division among the western powers. Only our enemies could profit by such maneuvers.

Dr. Jamali replied that unless some action was taken before the next General Assembly, the West would be faced by a combined bloc of Arab-Asian powers to force the North Africa question out in the open. To this the Secretary again replied to do so would be playing the communist game. Dr. Jamali said that if he were given assurance that something would be done within one, two or even three years, he could restrain action, but without such assurance he was certain matters would come to a head at the next session.

1. This conversation took place at the office of the President of the Chamber of Deputies.