Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

780.5/11–1654: Telegram

No. 238
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State¹

top secret

London, November 16, 1954—6 p.m.

2364. From lengthy discussion at Foreign Office of Iranian defense problem (Deptel 2657)² following clarification British attitude emerges:

1. British expects Shah on his forthcoming visit to US and UK to raise problem of association of Iran in regional defense planning in Middle East and for their part will reply that they hope eventually Iran will join some regional defense pact or organization.

2. HMG believes it clearly in UK interest (and also US interest) to secure any improvement in Iranian armed forces that may be possible but until Iran’s financial position improves substantially, UK believes US and UK should continue advising Iranians develop their armed forces on modest lines, from economic and practical point of view (paragraph 1 Embassy telegram 2200).³

3. At same time British recognize (a) prestige value which Shah, and Iranians generally, attach to military equipment and (b) need for an efficient and contented army, from regime’s standpoint.

4. Therefore, problem in British opinion resolves itself into presenting advice to Shah in as palatable form as possible and keeping Shah and army happy about such progress as they are making.

5. While convinced economic progress in Iran should precede any substantial expansion of Iranian armed forces British do not believe economic progress should necessarily precede a diplomatic move such as adherence to a regional defense pact if Iran should decide to do so.

6. In HMG opinion, however, a diplomatic move this sort should not be such as (a) provoke Soviet action under Iranian-Soviet treaty of 1921, or (b) public opinion in Iran or (c) raise any hopes UK will commit any British forces to Iran which Foreign Office stresses HMG will not do. Foreign Office realizes presentation of foregoing to Shah will be difficult process and Shah will ask many searching questions. Foreign Office also very conscious of dilemma posed by problem of neither discouraging nor encouraging Shah too much. When Shah asks specifically what role Iranian armed forces are to play in regional defense British will indicate this primarily military problem which will be taken under consideration (here British have in mind US–UK military talks mentioned paragraph 2 Deptel 2657).⁴ Foreign Office, however, is strongly of opinion in advance of such military talks and of Shah’s visit, US and UK chief of staff should confer in order coordinate US–UK replies to Shah. British joint chiefs have recently communicated with US chiefs in this regard.

Re last sentence Deptel 2657 Foreign Office confirms HMG not contemplating any definite decisions during course of discussions with Shah in London.

Foreign Office fully concurs in Department’s view that US and UK should lend some encouragement to, but not bring pressure on Shah (last two sentences paragraph 1 Deptel 2657). British also share views expressed Tehran’s 1016 November 4 [3],⁵ to Department which we have discussed with Foreign Office.

It is evident to Embassy after full discussion of foregoing problem with Foreign Office that British realize they may not be able satisfy Shah; that they realize advice they plan give Shah under (1) above may run counter to caveat under (6), particularly in view Soviet-Iranian Treaty; and that consequently they feel they will not be in position make very effective reply when he asks, as he may well, why Iran should run obvious risk inherent in joining “northern tier” regional security arrangement, especially when an arrangement such as present Turkish-Pakistan pact is of purely consultative character.

Aldrich

1. Repeated to Tehran.
2. Supra.
3. Not printed, but see footnote 2, supra.
4. A meeting between representatives of the JCS, British, and Turkish Chiefs of Staff had been tentatively planned for December, to be followed by bilateral U.S. British talks on limited Middle East defense problems of mutual concern. Neither conference was to discuss political aspects of Middle East defense, but it was considered possible that the Iranian situation might come up at the latter talks.
5. Document 235.