Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, “NSC 155 Memoranda”

No. 221
Paper Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board¹

top secret

Washington, July 29, 1954.

Progress Report on NSC 155/1 United States Objectives and Policies With Respect to the Near East

(Policy approved by the President July 11, 1953)

a. summary of major actions

Major factors limiting the ability of the U.S. to carry out the courses of action specified were the deterioration of the Arab–Israel situation, and the difficulties encountered by the UN in dealing with the problem; lack of progress in resolving disputes between the Arab states and the U.K. and France; and the growing activity of the USSR. Major accomplishments include the Turkish-Pakistan Pact, the military assistance agreement with Iraq, implementation of the U.S. policy of impartiality between the Arab states and Israel, and progress toward securing acceptance of a unified plan for the development of the Jordan River system.

The conclusion of grant military aid agreements with Iraq and Pakistan, as well as U.S. support of the Turkey–Pakistan Mutual Assistance Pact, have been initial contributions to the development of a politico-military climate favorable to the eventual development of a regional defense organization including Western and Middle East powers. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed on objectives for the defense of the Middle East and subsequently have proposed to the British Chief of Staff that it would be profitable at this time to make military planning studies for the defense of the Middle East with the U.K. and Turkey. The Military Services of the United States and the United Kingdom have coordinated their operating requirements in Egypt, Aden and Jordan.

USIA operates in Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. Budget and strategic considerations have decided against the operation of programs in the other countries.

b. policy considerations

In the light of operating experience, these policies in general remain valid; but a draft supplement has been submitted by the Department of State to the NSC treating in greater detail the Arab–Israel problem.

c. emerging problems and future actions

Two major emerging problems which either singly or in combination demand firmer and more decisive measures to control the situation are: (1) increased USSR activity in the area, and particularly Soviet support of the Arab position versus Israel; and (2) growing Arab–Israel tensions carrying with them real danger of an outbreak of open fighting. Special attention may also be necessary to the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the Suez Base, and the general deterioration of our relations with Saudi Arabia, particularly the Onassis Agreement.

The immediate objectives of the USSR in the area are to create chaos and to nullify the influence of the Western powers. The recent vetoes cast in the Security Council against resolutions to which the Arabs objected provided the USSR with an effective and inexpensive means of improving its position. Should the USSR consistently support the Arabs in the United Nations, the effectiveness of that organization in dealing with the Arab–Israel problem will be reduced further. Other examples of USSR activity include trade agreements, industrial fairs, stepped up propaganda activities, public statements favorable to the Arabs, and the recent strike at the Aramco installations at Dhahran in which evidence suggests the Communists had a hand.

The recent deterioration in Saudi Arabia-United States relations, while perhaps of a temporary nature, would, if the process were protracted, raise the question whether the Saudi Government intends to renew in 1956 our Air Force Base rights at Dhahran. The increasing demand for money, complicated by misuse and bad administration of funds, will result in redoubling of efforts by the Saudi Government to squeeze Aramco or to come to arrangements with third parties at Aramco’s expense. The determination of the courses which should be followed to check and reverse this deterioration in our relations involves the questions of our attitude toward the Onassis Agreement and of the effect on Saudi Arabia of current United States policies towards other states of the area. A thorough study by the Department of State of this matter is in process.

The United States will be required to determine the most appropriate manner in which to pay for military base and other similar rights in the area. A similar problem exists in regard to our bases in North Africa. At present, no direct payment is made for the only base in the Middle East area, the Air Force Base at Dhahran. It is questionable whether paying for base rights by extending economic aid is the most desirable means of concluding future agreements from the point of view of either relations with the states involved or presentation of appropriation requests to the Congress. With respect to Saudi Arabia, the late King² preferred not to demand direct payment for base rights in the belief that this would reflect on the dignity of Saudi Arabia and would prevent him from maintaining the fiction that in reality the United States has no base right, but is merely acting as an agent for Saudi Arabia in the operation of a landing field. The late King expected “payments” in terms of general political support by the United States Government.

The United States may find it desirable to urge the United Kingdom to station a portion of the combat forces withdrawn from the Suez Base after an agreement with Egypt in other locations in the Near East which are strategically effective.

In return for continued support of such United Kingdom positions in the area as may be consistent with United States principles and policy objectives, the United States may be required to find means of obtaining greater United Kingdom support of United States political, military and economic objectives in the Near East.

The Saudi Arab Agreement with the A. S. Onassis interests to form a maritime company for shipment of Saudi Arabian oil directly threatens U.S. interests. In addition to the adverse effect on American companies, the future operation of U.S. Government-owned tankers now carrying oil for the U.S. Navy may well be jeopardized. The ultimate solution of this and similar problems is necessarily bound up with future developments in U.S.-Saudi Arab relations.

1. The source text is part of the record copy of a National Security Council document entitled “Progress Report on United States Objectives and Policies With Respect to the Near East by the Operations Coordinating Board,” dated July 30, 1954. Included in the document is a July 30 memorandum by George A. Morgan, Acting Executive Officer of the OCB, to the Executive Officer of the National Security Council, transmitting the report. The Morgan memorandum stated that the report was approved by the Operations Coordinating Board on July 28. It also noted that the amended version of NSC 155/1 had been circulated as NSC 5428 and assigned to the OCB, and that subsequent progress reports would be concerned with the implementation of NSC 5428. Also attached to the Progress Report was an annex entitled “Detailed Development of Major Actions,” not printed.

   Another copy of the report, found in the OCB files, was attached to a memorandum, dated Sept. 29, 1954, from Staats to the OCB. The memorandum stated that the report was noted and discussed by the NSC on Sept. 2, 1954, in NSC Action No. 1211. (OCB files, lot 62 D 430, “Near East, 1954–5”) The Record of Actions by the National Security Council at its 212th meeting on Sept. 2, merely notes that the NSC noted and discussed the Progress Report. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “Record of Actions by the NSC, 1954”)

2. Abdul Aziz ibn Saud.