Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

S/S–NSCfiles, lot 63 D 351, “NSC 155 Memoranda”

No. 219
Statement of Policy by the National Security Council¹

top secret

Washington, July 23, 1954.

NSC 5428

United States Objectives and Policies With Respect to the Near East^*

general considerations

1. The Near East is of great strategic, political and economic importance to the free world. The area contains the greatest petroleum resources in the world; essential locations for strategic military bases in any world conflict against Communism; the Suez Canal; and natural defensive barriers. It also contains Holy Places of the Christian, Jewish, and Moslem worlds, and thereby exerts religious and cultural influences affecting people everywhere. The security interests of the United States would be critically endangered if the Near East should fall under Soviet influence or control.

2. Current conditions and trends in the Near East are inimical to Western interests. During recent years the prestige and position of the West have declined. The nations of the Near East are determined to assert their independence and are suspicious of outside interest in their affairs. In particular, the influence of the United Kingdom has been weakened, with distrust and hatred replacing the former colonial subservience. France is also disliked and distrusted because of her refusal to free Morocco and Tunisia and because of her former role as a mandate power in Syria and Lebanon. Some of the distrust of the United Kingdom and France has devolved upon the United States, as an ally of both. Even more important, the Arab nations are incensed by what they believe to be our pro-Israel policy. In addition, acute political and economic instability; military weakness; widespread unrest, Arab–Israel tensions, the UK controversies with Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia; the French North African problem; and the Soviet activity are also unfavorable to the West.

3. In the Near East the current danger to the security of the free world arises not so much from the threat of direct Soviet military attack as from a continuation of the present unfavorable trends. Unless these trends are reversed, the Near East may well be lost to the West within the next few years.

4. Efforts to prevent the loss of the Near East will require increasing responsibility, initiative, and leadership by the United States in the area. Even though British and French influence in the Near East has declined, the UK retains substantial interest, experience, and security positions, so that the United States will need to act in concert with the United Kingdom to the greatest extent practicable, while reserving the right to act with others (e.g., France and Turkey) or alone. It is important to the settlement of outstanding political disputes that the United States convince the Arab states that it is capable of acting independently of other Western states and of Israel.

5. The rate of economic growth and distribution of its benefits are among the important factors affecting internal stability, popular and leadership attitudes toward the Free World and Communism, and the maintenance of governments free of Communist control or influence. It is in U.S. interests to help guide the social and economic pressures for revolutionary change into channels leading to healthy economic growth while maintaining and improving political stability.²

6. a. An increase in military training and strength in the Near East would help to induce internal stability and political orientation towards the West, and may instill in the local peoples confidence in their ability to help protect themselves.

b. The best prospect for creating an indigenous regional defense arrangement in the Near East lies in the concept of the “northern tier”, which would include Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. The Turkish-Pakistan Pact is the first step in this direction.^† Greater strength may be obtained in the initial stages by limiting the defense arrangements to the four states named. The concept has aroused resentment on the part of certain Arab states, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia, but may provoke a desirable pull away from the negative Arab League.

c. The immediate effects of a regional defense arrangement may be expected to be primarily political and psychological rather than military. Such a grouping should strengthen Western-oriented elements and tend to bring about greater awareness of the Soviet threat and greater willingness to cooperate both regionally and with the West. However, it would not, in itself, materially affect the internal weaknesses which have thus far undermined Near East strength and stability.

d. Militarily, a regional defense arrangement together with U.S. military aid programs, may permit the eventual significant reduction of the requirement for outside ground forces. However, achievement of even this limited goal would be a long and costly operation, and effective Near East defense will continue to depend for the foreseeable future on substantial Western force contributions.

e. The indigenous nature of the organization is an essential feature. The creation of strength and self-reliance, regardless of whether any formal link to the West is established at this time, will be an important impediment to Soviet cold-war activities, including subversion. Until progress can be made in settling present disputes between the British, French and Arabs and until Arab resentment toward the West arising from the creation of Israel can be reduced, there is little possibility of including both the Arab states and the West (except Turkey) in a formal defense organization.

f. Adherence of Iraq and Iran will require an improvement in the political climate in these states. In addition, the support of the British will be an important factor in determining the success of the “northern tier” concept. Efforts should be made to overcome the doubts now held by the UK, particularly regarding the inclusion of Iran.

g. U.S. military equipment available to strengthen the area should be channeled primarily to the “northern tier” states, and when appropriate to Egypt, which offer the best prospect of creating real strength. A large flaccid grouping, each member of which receives a nominal amount of military aid, will provide neither military strength nor political attraction.

h. Military aid plans must take into account the economic capabilities of the states receiving such aid. A rapid military build-up, even in selected countries, might have damaging economic and political effects.

i. Inclusion of Israel at this time would result in Arab refusal to cooperate. Moreover, U.S. arming of the Arabs and efforts toward a regional grouping would continue to arouse sharp Israel opposition and increase Arab–Israel tensions. Because of the present preponderance of Israel’s military strength, arms aid to the Arab states would not materially change the power relationship for a considerable period, but adequate safeguards are desirable to prevent misuse in the future and justified concern by Israel. If these dangers can be met, successful development of the security arrangements should in the long run exert a helpful effect on the Arab–Israel problems.³

objectives

7. Availability to the United States and its allies of the resources, the strategic positions, and the passage rights of the area, and the denial of such resources and strategic positions to the Soviet bloc.

8. Stable, viable, friendly governments in the area, capable of withstanding communist-inspired subversion from within, and willing to resist communist aggression.

9. Settlement of major issues between the Arab states and Israel as a foundation for establishing peace and order in the area.

10. Reversal of the anti-American trends of Arab opinion.

11. Prevention of the extension of Soviet influence in the area.

12. Wider recognition in the free world of the legitimate aspirations of the countries in the area to be recognized as, and have the status of, sovereign states, and wider recognition by such countries of their responsibility toward the area and toward the free world generally.

general courses of actions

13. The United States should:

a. Assume an increased share of responsibility toward the area, acting in concert with the United Kingdom to the greatest extent practicable, but reserving the right to act with others or alone.

b. Capitalize on such elements of strength as remain to the British in the area by such support of United Kingdom positions as may be consistent with U.S. principles and policy objectives.

c. Win the Arab states to a belief that we sympathize with their legitimate aspirations and respect their interests.

d. Increase its efforts to achieve a settlement of the political differences among the states of the area, and between them and the Western nations.

e. Seek to guide the revolutionary and nationalistic pressures throughout the area into orderly channels not antagonistic to the West, rather than attempt merely to preserve the status quo.

f. Stimulate measures of self-help, encourage the expansion of private investment, and provide somewhat increased economic and technical assistance.

g. Render limited military assistance.

h. Encourage the development of indigenous regional defense arrangements which will increase the stability and strengthen the security of the area. Be prepared eventually to participate in such arrangements, when the political climate in the area makes this practicable.⁴

i. Support leadership groups which offer the best prospect of orderly progress towards free world objectives. Seek to increase the participation of intellectuals in Western-oriented activities.

j. Make clear to the nations in the area the basically hostile intentions of the Soviet regime.

k. Strengthen cultural, educational and information programs.

. . . . . . .

specific courses of action

14. a. Saudi Arabia. The United States should strengthen its special position with respect to Saudi Arabia to an extent compatible with general U.S. policies in the area.

b. The United States should take all appropriate measures to bring about the cancellation of the agreement between the Saudi Arabian Government and Onassis for the transport of Saudi Arabian-produced oil and, in any case, to make the agreement ineffective.⁵

15. Arab–Israel Tension^‡

16. Egypt. The United States should:

a. In concert with the United Kingdom and Egypt, seek an early negotiated settlement of the Suez Canal base and related defense questions. Such a settlement should provide for withdrawal of British forces, but under conditions to insure the continued maintenance of the base and its availability to the Western Powers in the event of hostilities or grave threat thereof.

b. Take such steps, and secure the necessary commitments, as to best insure that the Suez Canal remains open to international trade.

c. As progress in reaching an Anglo-Egyptian settlement warrants, extend economic and military assistance to Egypt.

17. Area Defense. The U.S. should:

a. Develop secretly plans for the defense of the area with the UK, Turkey, and such others as may be desirable.

b. Conduct secret military-political conversations in the near future with the UK regarding development of the “northern tier” concept as an indigenous movement, not linked formally at this time with the Western Powers or with Western defense organizations except through the participation of Turkey.

c. Encourage when appropriate the adherence of Iraq and Iran to the Turkish-Pakistan Pact, avoiding pressure but endeavoring to create political conditions which will make adherence possible and attractive.

d. Associate Egypt with the defense arrangements should she so request, and make clear to her that the “northern tier” concept does not derogate from the importance the U.S. attaches to strengthening Egypt. Neither encourage nor discourage other Arab states from asking to participate in regional security arrangements. In order to avoid creating harmful friction, treat sympathetically any overtures made, but bear in mind the importance of maintaining the indigenous nature of the organization and the desirability of concentrating available U.S. military assistance. Pending the settlement of Arab–Israel tensions, refrain from supporting requests from Israel to join such defense arrangements.

e. Continue military aid to the states forming the “northern tier” (Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq) and undertake military assistance to Egypt when developments regarding the Suez Base warrant it. Render military assistance at an appropriate later date to other Arab states depending on (1) their willingness to contribute to regional defense arrangements, (2) the effectiveness for such assistance in creating political and military strength, (3) the status of the Arab–Israel conflict. In addition, military assistance may be provided where it may be necessary to further specific U.S. security interests such as transit and base rights. Control the scope, character and phasing of military assistance to minimize the possibility of its use for aggressive purposes; and furnish military aid only after receiving appropriate guarantees against its use for aggression. Consider the politico-economic situation in plans for military build-up which might require appropriate measures to prevent damaging political and economic effects.

f. When politically feasible, seek to obtain transit and base rights where required within the area, and, upon the threat of and during general hostilities, the right to operate forces in the territories of the various nations of the area.

g. If formal U.S. commitments with respect to the regional defense arrangements, or association of the arrangement with other defense organizations of the Western Powers, should appear desirable, appropriate proposals should be submitted for Council consideration.⁶

18. Economic Aid. The United States should:

a. Give somewhat increased economic aid so as to provide a base for necessary economic development, encourage the concept of self-help and mutual cooperation, and contribute to the settlement of disputes in the area. Maintain flexibility in the use of available funds on a regional basis so as to take advantage of changing developments in an unstable area.

b. Encourage Near Eastern governments to recognize that the bulk of the capital required for their economic development can best be supplied by private enterprise and public banking facilities, and that their own self-interest requires the creation of a climate which will attract private investment.

c. Continue to provide limited financial assistance towards the settlement of the Arab refugee problem.

d. Continue limited technical assistance with emphasis on increased food production, and better health, education, communications, and transportation. Encourage private foundations and industry to provide technical assistance for the same purposes.

e. Encourage the wise use by each country of its oil royalties to promote a more stable and viable economy. In this regard, consideration should be given to the establishment of an area-wide development fund, in which the West would participate, and through which states having no oil resources might benefit from those who have.

f. Progressively reduce the amount of economic aid furnished to Israel, so as to bring it in to impartial relationship to aid to others in the area.

[Attachment]

Supplementary Statement of Policy on the Arab–Israel Problem

general considerations

During the past year tensions have increased between the Arab states and Israel, and the Soviet Union has stepped up its activities in the Near East. The point has been reached where new means should be sought to alleviate the situation, not only because of the seriousness of the Arab–Israel problem per se, but in order to preclude the danger of the loss of the Near East by the West.

2. A definitive peace between the Arab states and Israel should continue to be the ultimate objective of the U.S., but it is unrealistic to hope for a permanent settlement in the early future because of presently irreconcilable basic attitudes. The U.S. approach should be gradual and practical.

3. On the Arab side, small-scale infiltration persists on the part of individuals and small groups acting on their own responsibility. There is no evidence of organized military activity by the Arab states acting in concert or by any individual Arab state. On the other hand, the Israel Government, concerned at the failure of its efforts to secure peace on the basis of the status quo, appears to be following a deliberate policy of reprisals based on the theory that matters will have to be made worse before they become better. Divided counsels exist within Israel over how far the risk of open warfare should be carried, and danger exists that Israel’s present tactics will lead to open fighting either by accident or through deliberate resort to preventive war.

4. Each side is fearful that the other possesses aggressive intentions. The Arabs doubt that the U.S., UK and France will act to restrain Israel and read with foreboding of Israel efforts to stimulate immigration. Israel is alarmed at the recent steps indicative of the U.S. impartial attitude, which Israel interprets as a change from traditional U.S. friendship. Her concern is intensified by the U.S. program of arms aid to the Arabs, which she fears may diminish her present military superiority, and encourage an eventual Arab attack.

5. Reduction of border tensions and effective assurances to both sides against aggression are prerequisites to progress towards a peaceful settlement. These tasks are beyond the capacity of the parties acting by themselves. Despite continued U.S. support, the UN alone also appears incapable of coping with the problem in view of its loss of prestige in the area and in the face of current Soviet obstructionism. Therefore, the U.S. Government, in association with other powers, is impelled to assume responsibility in developing solutions and ensuring their implementation. The measures taken should be commensurate in scope and firmness with the seriousness of the problem, and should serve: (1) to deter Israel from embarking upon aggression as a preventive measure while she has military superiority; (2) to allay the fears of Israel with respect to the possibility of Arab aggression following a program of arms aid to the Arab countries; (3) to deter the Arab countries from giving serious consideration to aggressive actions against Israel following the receipt of arms. Much of the effectiveness of these measures as a deterrent depends on the extent to which the U.S. is prepared to declare itself openly.

6. To accomplish its objective of bringing the Near East behind the Iron Curtain the USSR is striving to create chaos and to nullify the influence of the Western Powers. Recently concluded trade agreements, industrial fairs, public announcements, and, particularly, actions in the UN, reflect the increased USSR attention to the area. Continuation of the present trend toward consistent and open championship of the Arabs would give the USSR an effective and inexpensive means of improving its position in the area. Should a further deterioration of the security situation occur, the resulting unrest would provide the USSR with manifold opportunities for improving its position. Should Israeli aggression occur and the Western Powers fail to restore the situation, a decisive movement of the area away from the West and possibly into the Soviet sphere of influence must be anticipated.

7. Collaboration with the UK in developing and implementing area policies is important. Although UK influence has declined, Britain retains substantial interests and assets. Of particular significance is the Anglo-Jordanian Defense Treaty, under which Britain has informed Israel she will act in case of any Israel attack on Jordan. While France may be expected to provide little effective help, her association in the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950 suggests assigning her a nominal role if possible without impairing the measures we regard as necessary. Turkey, a member of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, might play a useful role but here effectiveness would be counter-balanced in part by Arab suspicions of Turkish aspirations in the Near East.

8. Progress on the Arab–Israel problem would affect significantly the willingness of states in the area to participate in indigenous collective security arrangements for defense against Soviet aggression. Concomitant development of security arrangements should ultimately serve to place the Arab–Israel question in its proper perspective and diminish the predominant preoccupation of the Arab states with Israel.

objectives

(Supplementary to those in the basic paper)

9. a. To deter an armed attack by Israel or by the Arab states, and if an armed attack should occur to force the attacking state to relinquish any territory seized.

b. To reduce current Arab–Israel tensions and promote an eventual clear-cut peace between the Arab states and Israel.

c. To alleviate the Arab refugee problem.

courses of action⁷

. . . . . . .

14. Pursue actively, both directly and through the UN, measures to establish tranquility along the Arab–Israel armistice line, working in collaboration to the extent desirable and feasible with the UK and France.

15. Use U.S. influence to secure Arab–Israel boundary settlements, whch may include some concessions by Israel.

16. Cooperate in seeking a fair settlement of the status of Jerusalem and the Holy Places in Palestine, acceptable to the states directly involved and to most nations of the free world.

17. Maintain both the fact and appearance of impartial friendship with the Arab states and Israel, avoiding preferential treatment of any state and demonstrating equal interest in the well-being of each.

18. Seek by all appropriate means to secure an agreed and equitable division of the waters of the Jordan river system between Israel and the interested Arab states and the establishment of an international control authority. Take such steps as may be feasible to ensure that neither party prejudices the allocation of the available waters by an international control authority. Link the development of the Jordan Valley to Arab refugee resettlement to the maximum extent practicable.

19. With respect to Israel:

a. Take such measures as are feasible to convince the Israelis, and their U.S. supporters, of the inadvisability, from the standpoint of Israel’s national interests, (1) of trying to win a better situation in the Near East by force; (2) of resuming large-scale Jewish immigration into Israel; (3) of doctrines implying an intent to dominate the Near East.

b. While progressively reducing the amount of economic aid furnished to Israel, so as to bring it into impartial relationship to aid to others in the area, exert pressure on Israel to adopt the financial measures necessary for progressing as rapidly as possible toward a self-sustaining economy, and continue to assist Israel toward viability.

c. Continue to urge Israel to accept a limited number of Arab refugees and to work out promptly arrangements for the release of blocked Arab funds and for the payment of reasonable compensation to the Arab refugees at an appropriate time, preferably in connection with actual resettlement or repatriation.

20. With respect to the Arab states:

a. Attempt to move forward as rapidly as is practicable on the Arab refugee problem by such means as resettlement in the Arab states or outside the Near East. To the extent feasible, work through the UN Relief Works Agency.

b. Continue economic and technical aid in conformity with paras. 17 [18]–a, c, and d of the above general policy statement on the Near East, emphasizing projects facilitating the resettlement of Arab refugees.

c. Extend military aid in conformity with par. 16 [17]–e of the above general policy statement on the Near East. Inform the Arab states that the U.S. may state publicly that their assurances against aggression are applicable to all countries, including Israel.

d. Work for eventual elimination of the Arab economic boycott of Israel; resist Arab efforts to impose a secondary boycott on U.S. trade with Israel; continue support for the Security Council resolution calling for removal of Egyptian restrictions on Suez Canal traffic to Israel; help to restore normal commercial intercourse, and surface and air transportation between Israel and the Arab states.

e. Make clear to the Arabs that we cannot accept their negative attitude toward proposals involving recognition of the existence of Israel and their refusal to consider the possibility of an eventual settlement. While reminding the Arabs that peace is the ultimate objective, exercise caution lest stress on this goal prevent Arab acceptance of the necessary intermediate steps.

21. In addition to the foregoing, use political, economic, and psychological measures to bring about in the long run a progressive reduction in tension between the Arab states and Israel leading to conditions under which ultimate peace may be secured.

1. A note by Executive Secretary of the NSC Lay stating that the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget had adopted NSC 5428 at the 207th meeting of the NSC on July 22, is not printed. The note further stated that the President directed the implementation of NSC 5428 by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government and designated the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

   NSC 5428 was composed of the statement of policy in NSC 155/1 (Document 145) and the statement of policy supplementary to NSC 155/1 contained in a memorandum for the NSC from Lay, dated July 6 (S/P–NSC(Memoranda), lot 61 D 167 “Near East (NSC 5428)”); amended by the Council in NSC Action No. 1184, July 22 (S/S–NSCfiles, lot 66 D 95, “Record of Actions by the NSC, 1954)”. Neither the July 6 memorandum nor NSC Action No. 1184 is printed, but their substance is indicated in footnotes below.

   A Financial Appendix, an NSC Staff Study, and a map of the Middle East were enclosed with the source text; none is printed.

2. Includes Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Israel, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, the Arabian Peninsula Sheikdoms. Iran, the subject of a separate policy statement (NSC 5402), is not included. This paper takes into account the importance of Turkey and Pakistan to the Near East, particularly as regards defense of the area, but does not attempt full coverage of U.S. policies toward Turkey and Pakistan, which are included in other NSC reports (NSC 5402, NSC 109, and NSC 5409). [Footnote in the source text.]

2. Paragraph 5 was recommended in the July 6 memorandum for the NSC from the Executive Secretary and added in the final text.

   The July 6 memorandum had four parts. The cover sheet was the actual memorandum by Lay for the NSC, and there were three enclosures to it. The first two enclosures, the Proposed Amendments to the Statement of Policy in NSC 155/1 and a Supplementary Statement of Policy on the Arab–Israel Problem had been prepared by the NSC Planning Board on the basis of an initial draft by the Department of State. The third enclosure, Proposed Amendments to the Staff Study in NSC 155/1, was not attached to the July 6 memorandum found in Department of State files. There was a copy attached to another memorandum by Lay to the NSC Planning Board, dated June 29. (S/P–NSC (Memoranda), lot 61 D 167, “Near East (NSC 5428)”).

3. The key security provisions of the Pact are:

   • Article 2. “The contracting parties will consult on international matters of mutual interest and, taking into account international requirements and conditions, cooperate between themselves to the maximum extent.”
   • Article 4. “The consultation and cooperation between the contracting parties in the field of defense shall cover the following points:

     A. Exchange of information for the purpose of deriving benefit jointly from technical experience and progress.

     B. Endeavors to meet, as far as possible, the requirements of the parties in the production of arms and ammunition.

     C. Studies and determination of the ways and extent of cooperation which might be effected between them in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, should an unprovoked attack occur against them from outside.” [Footnote in the source text.]

3. This entire section 6, paragraphs a to i, was recommended in the July 6 memorandum and added in the final text.

4. All of paragraphs h, k, and 1, and the second sentence of paragraph i, were recommended in the July 6 memorandum.

   A memorandum by Dorsey to Byroade, July 8, entitled Supplement and Amendments to NSC 155/1, stated that paragraph 1 had been added at the request of the CIA, and that it was a standard paragraph now appearing in NSC papers. (S/P–NSC (Memoranda), lot 61 D 167, Near East (NSC 5428)).

5. Two versions of this paragraph were included in the July 6 memorandum. The substitute draft proposed by the Department of State read: “The United States should continue to take steps to insure that the lifting and transport of Saudi Arabian oil for the United States armed forces by ships controlled or owned by the United States Government will remain unaffected by any restrictive agreement the Saudi Arabian Government may make for the shipment of Saudi Arabian oil.” The draft proposed by the Department of Defense read: “The United States should obtain assurances from the Saudi Arabian Government that no agreement concluded by that government for the transport of Saudi Arabian-produced oil will interfere in any way with present or future arrangements for lifting of oil for the U.S. Armed Forces in ships controlled or owned by the U.S. Government.” The paragraph in the source text is that adopted in NSC Action No. 1184 on July 22.
6. A detailed, supplementary statement of policy on the Arab–Israeli problem is attached. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. This entire section 17, paragraphs a to g, was a revision of the original, proposed in the July 6 memorandum. Following this section in the July 6 memorandum was a note stating that the paragraphs in NSC 5402 on Iran and NSC 5409 on South Asia dealing with the security of the area did not conflict with this statement of policy and required no change.
7. Although the source text is dated July 23, 1954, each page from paragraphs 10–21 of the Supplementary Statement bears the notation, “Revised 11/2/55”. Paragraphs 14–21 of the source text are, however, identical to paragraphs 14–21 of NSC 5428 as approved July 23, 1954, with the exception of two paragraph references in paragraph 20, which were incorrect on the text approved July 23, 1954. The text of paragraphs 14–21 here printed is the text approved July 23, 1954. (JCS files)