780.5/8–2653
No. 148
The Acting Secretary of Defense
(Kyes) to
the Secretary of State
secret
Washington, August 26, 1953.
Dear Mr. Secretary: This is in reply to
your letter of 26 June 19531 concerning
planning for the defense of the Middle East in which you requested
Defense Department views as to what form of Middle East planning
arrangements we should now seek to establish under existing
circumstances.
Your letter pointed out that, whereas the policy of the United States
Government has been to proceed with planning arrangements on the
assumption that Arab cooperation would be won and a Middle East
Defense Organization established at a later date, the Department of
State is now convinced of the improbability of effecting
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Middle East defense
arrangements, which would include the Arab States, until there has
been a significant political improvement in the region.
There is enclosed for your information a copy of a memorandum from
the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated 11 August 1953 which states, in
substance, that planning for the defense of the Middle East is
continuing both within the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, and that such planning arrangements
are acceptable for the immediate future. The Department of Defense
concurs in these views.
Sincerely yours,
[Attachment]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)
secret
Washington, 11 August
1953.
Subject:
- Defense Arrangements for the Middle East.
- 1.
- As requested in your memorandum dated 15 July 1953,2 subject as above, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff submit herewith their comments and recommendations
with respect to the letter from the Secretary of State,
dated 26 June 1953,3 concerning
defense arrangements for the Middle East.
- 2.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to hold the view that
allied planning for the defense of the Middle East should
proceed regardless of whether a Middle East Defense
Organization (MEDO) with
Arab states participating is brought to fruition. However,
since this view was last confirmed in our memorandum for the
Secretary of Defense dated 29 July 1952,4 subject:
“Middle East Defense Organization,” the trend of events in
the Middle East has caused the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
modify their views as to the arrangement under which such
planning could best be accomplished, taking into account
political as well as military factors.
- 3.
- Specific reference is had to the stalemate in the U.K.
Egypt negotiations concerning the Suez base issue and the
effect of that situation on the Egyptian attitude toward
MEDO, the lack of
progress toward a settlement of the Arab–Israeli problem,
and the
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absence of
any encouraging results from the exploratory approaches made
to individual Arab states other than Egypt. Additionally,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff have taken cognizance of the
current view of the Department of State that it would not
now be desirable openly to establish an exclusively Western
planning arrangement for Middle East defense in the face of
Arab opposition, as expressed in the Department of State
letter to which these comments are addressed.
- 4.
- Recognizing the changed conditions in the Middle East, and
that “The United States should… Develop secretly plans for
the defense of the area with the United Kingdom, Turkey, and
such others as may be desirable” (Subparagraph 16a, page 8,
of NSC 155/1),5 studies looking to informal and
unpublicized planning with respect to the Middle East have
been in progress for some time. These studies have taken two
forms: discussions through NATO by subordinate commanders of Commander in
Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe and through U.S.
commanders in the area with representatives of the United
Kingdom, Turkey, and other interested powers; and unilateral
U.S. planning studies in anticipation of possible
integration of U.S. plans with those of the United Kingdom,
Turkey, and others, as deemed desirable. At the present time
these efforts are not sufficiently far advanced to enable
the Joint Chiefs of Staff either to indicate the extent to
which our plans should be integrated with those of the
United Kingdom, Turkey, and possibly others, or to make
recommendations concerning the appropriate channels for such
integration of plans. Nevertheless, in order to indicate the
status of present efforts with respect to planning
concerning the Middle East, the following are noted:
- a.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff are now engaged in
exploratory studies relating to various aspects of
Middle East defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have
previously advised the British Chiefs of Staff that,
when these studies are sufficiently developed, they
will be approached in regard to conducting U.S.-U.K.
planning studies both on the overall defense of the
Middle East as well as the defense of such limited
areas as may be necessary to permit continued
exploitation of petroleum of one oil complex
determined to be the most economically defensible in
terms of force requirements.
- b.
- As indicated in the penultimate paragraph of the
Department of State letter dated 26 June, informal
and unpublicized studies in furtherance of planning
for the defense of the Middle East area have in fact
been initiated in NATO through a series of conferences
under the aegis of the Commander in Chief, Allied
Forces, Southern Europe. In the latest of these
conferences representatives of the Commander, Allied
Land Forces, Southeastern Europe; the
[Page 412]
Commander in
Chief, Middle East Land Forces (British), and the
Turkish General Staff met at Izmir, Turkey, from 18
to 23 May 1953.6 Further
conferences in this series, including one with
representatives of the Commander, Allied Air Forces,
Southern Europe; the Commander in Chief, Middle East
Air Forces, and the Turkish General Staff, are
planned. The objective of these meetings is to
provide the participating commands with information
necessary to initiate preparation of detailed
coordinated plans for the defense of Eastern and
Southeastern Turkey and the Middle East.
- c.
- In an effort to avoid conflicts in planning for
the use of Middle East facilities during the last
two years U.S. military representatives have
coordinated operating requirements in the North
Africa–Middle East area with the British, and to
some degree with the French. As a result of your
memorandum of 8 June 1953, subject: “British,
French, and American Military Operating Requirements
in the Middle East and Mediterranean Areas,”6 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have
approved U.S. requirements, and authority has been
granted to hold further coordinating conferences
with both the British and the French. Further
conferences with representatives of these countries
are being scheduled.
- 5.
- From a military point of view, the need for a MEDO in which all of the Arab
states of the Middle East willingly participate has in no
way diminished. Defense planning for the Middle East cannot
be fully effective until there can be formulated a single
combined plan for the employment of all indigenous forces in
conjunction with forces contributed by the Western powers
for defense of that strategically important area. However,
as an interim measure pending the consummation of a MEDO or other suitable
structure within which the equipping, training, and
employment of all Middle East defense forces may be fully
integrated, and having regard for the political factors
involved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the
present arrangements for Middle East Defense Planning are
acceptable for the immediate future and are the most
suitable that are feasible of achievement at this
time.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
F. F. Everest
Lieutenant General, USAF Director, Joint
Staff
