Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Guatemala

84. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, January 23, 1954.

SUBJECT

• General Concept of Discussions With [name not declassified] Preparing Him for Forthcoming Calligeris Meeting

I. This memo is prepared for approval C/P PBSUCCESS prior to subject conference, as being the general basis of planning now being conducted within the project in the KUHOOK field. It is slanted toward setting [name not declassified] in an advantageous position insofar as his forthcoming meeting with Calligeris is concerned and will be followed up in [name not declassified]-Calligeris meeting and Calligeris–Seekford–Cadick discussions to follow.

II. Factors Determining the Considered Plan of Action:

A. Former Calligeris planning has been considered carefully, and with the following exceptions the main context of PBSUCCESS thinking adheres as nearly as possible to Calligeris’ prior concept:

1. It is considered that extreme care must be taken to avoid putting all our assets into any situation, the compromise of which would seriously deplete the forces of the movement. For that reason an attempt is being made to make the entry of outside forces nearer to an infiltration type entry than that of regular forces grouped along main communication routes. Compartmentation of units is sought, also.

2. For the same reason, the approach to Puerto Barrios is being considered land-approach to prevent the obvious containment and easy destruction of Calligeris forces in the event recent notification of “leaks” to the opposition are more complete than realized (an entirely possible situation).

3. With a realization that to allow this movement to become a prolonged civil war would present major complications in addition to allowing opposition to strengthen its tactical situation while ours bogged down, it is considered that each possible strongpoint of the opposition should be accounted for simultaneously rather than piecemeal.

4. Utility of bombing tactics to neutralize any strongpoint has been eliminated, even as a psychological factor, in view of the fact that the very concept of the movement is that of release of persons from oppression and all actions must allow this discontented element to participate in the overthrow of oppression or at least aid by sympathy. Our tactics must veer away from terrorism of this faction and veer towards inviting participation.

5. Techniques of partisan warfare will be applied in the tested and proven manner to best support more conventional military tactics. This technique of combining the two types of tactics has proven itself in reducing the number of personnel and the magnitude of support necessary to overwhelm superior forces many times in history.

6. Techniques in logistics are being applied to eliminate the massive logistical problem and its limitations to mobility and actions of normal military tactics.

7. Communications has been brought to a maximum of dependability.

8. Utilization of all potential personnel, some of which though now unknown, will through organization become “the thousand bee-stings which kill the tiger” which Mao Tse Tung so successfully utilized to overthrow superior forces.

B. Realization that there can be no failure, both from [name not declassified]–Calligeris’ standpoint and ours, and that aside from known opposition tactics and precautionary measures the third factor of being up against trained Communist tacticians in the field of security, staybehind, subversion, intrigue, etc., all of us involved must overplan, overprepare, and be prepared to “drive the tack with the sledge-hammer” in the event the tack turns out to be a railroad spike.

II. [sic] Framework of General Planning:

A. The key targets under consideration, those felt necessarily to be controlled to completely insure total success are:

• Guatemala garrisons, air facilities, commo, (Guatemala City)
• Puerto Barrios port, air facilities, commo, and garrison
• Jutiapa garrison, commo, and air facilities
• Zacapa garrison, commo, and air facilities
• Mazatenango, Quezaltenango and Quiche garrisons, commo and air facilities
• Coban air facilities, commo and garrison
• San Jose garrison and port facilities and commo

B. The ideal would be simultaneous containment and seizure of control of each key target using known and physically directed shock troops with supporting partisans in each instance.

C. In all actuality, once the entire assets of Calligeris are brought to the surface and evaluated and assigned missions, the approach to each target will be different but will follow one of the following patterns:

1. Strike the feasible targets with shock troops and inner organization, while having pre-developed the others to a point of self-seizure and eventual pre-planned assembly with shock troops and resulting recruits from other targets.

2. Strike the feasible targets as above, and develop the feasible targets to a point of self-seizure, and block the remaining targets through spotting of saboteur teams along routes of egress from the remaining targets, and through organization of block areas in which small equipped and directed units harass and retard any desired military movement until effective consolidation can be attained at our strong points.

3. In all eventualities target sab teams at commo at each target, existing military air facilities, and at any possible transportation tie-up situation. In all eventualities utilize all partisan units possible to be formed at any point in Guatemala where a single Calligeris man can be located.

III. Existing Basis of Planning:

A. The key to the country’s survival is Guatemala City. The lifeline (so long as Honduras, El Salvador, and Mexico remain reluctant to support the present Guatemalan regime) is the port at Puerto Barrios. Jutiapa, Zacapa, and Coban should be controlled before penetration beyond them to prevent reorganization behind our movement and eventual entrapment. San Jose should be controlled as a possible substitute for Puerto Barrios, an encirclement of Guatemala City, and as a port of entry for our movement in eventual employment of prolonged hostilities. Mazatenango, Quezaltenango, and Quiche pose distance and logistical problems plus a personnel drain, plus remoteness which calls for possibilities of the block manner of containment, that causes us to search for self-seizure and block procedures which will control the situation until consolidation of other gains is completed.

C. [sic] Roughly, pending receipt of intelligence expected as a result of Cadick–Seekford–Calligeris meetings (it should be brought out constantly that all planning at this stage is based on rumor and that total KUHOOK known assets, the reliability of which is unknown, consists of eleven trainees for KUHOOK plus four trainees for KUCLUB) it is felt that inner organization of the Guatemala complex will be the main source for immediate, physical seizure of control. It is estimated that sufficient shock troops could not be assembled outside the country to accomplish the job. If discussion with Calligeris proves that the inner assets in the Guatemala City area are sufficient to attempt (with high percentage of success chance) striking at Guatemala City instantaneously and in concurrence with seizure of Puerto Barrios, Zacapa, Jutiapa and San Jose, the major portion of available forces will be directed at Guatemala City, utilizing the organization of inner assets and surrounding areas at the other sites to obtain control (control here means physical control, without assurance of which, Guatemala City should be put on a secondary basis chronologically speaking and men released in our planning to insure this physical control).

D. Preliminary reports on our assets plus distance and element-of-surprise factors may well dictate a course which calls for setting up Guatemala City inner organization to the point where if a move is made by the Guatemala Central Command to move a partial force toward Zacapa, Jutiapa, Puerto Barrios, or Coban or San Jose, the inner organization would make its bid while partisan organization around Guatemala City retarded, harassed and generally set up the partial force for annihilation by the Zacapa, Jutiapa, Puerto Barrios, Coban, and San Jose forces. The idea of being capable of taking over if Guatemala City forces are depleted can be promoted to the point where the Guatemala City Command will be detained, at least partially. Sab action against air facilities and commo will be executed simultaneous with D-day, with possible K-team action at the same time against key figures. All other assets within the inner organization would remain covert, their plan calling for action on depletion of Central Command forces designed to take control or recall the committed troops, or for action once Calligeris’ Zacapa, Jutiapa, Coban, and Puerto Barrios and San Jose forces were consolidated.

E. It is contemplated that the terrain and distance situation along with professed Calligeris assets and reported opposition OB, would allow shock troops to be applied against Jutiapa, Zacapa, and Puerto Barrios. These shock troops would travel in small compact units utilizing back trails and prohibitive terrain to maintain non-detection insomuch as possible, and relying on mobility and concealment to disguise location if detection unavoidable. On D-Day these three forces would be in respective positions, the exact nature of which to be determined following more extensive terrain and intelligence studies. Present figures available, unevaluated, report the following situation, personnel-wise, some of which will be cleared up following a discussion with Calligeris:

• Zacapa … opposition consists of 6 officers, 94 enlisted Guardia; 38 officers, 601 enlisted Military
• 111 Calligeris assets—200 within Zacapa (no indication Military status), 500 various localities approx
• Jutiapa … opposition consists of 14 officers, 199 enlisted Guardia
• Calligeris assets—300 within Jutiapa; 300 various localities approx
• Puerto Barrios opposition—28 Officers, 283 enlisted Military
• Calligeris assets—450 overall vicinity
• Coban … Opposition (not extracting Calligeris assets reportedly strong) 4 Officers, 64 enlisted Guardia; 23 Officers, 295 men Military
• Calligeris assets—2000 reported combination Military and surrounding populace
• San Jose … Opposition—2 Officers, 28 enlisted Guardia; 15 Officers, 208 enlisted Mil.
• Calligeris assets—2000 (reported by Seekford in preliminary discussions)

F. While the above does not in any way constitute a reliable estimate of the situation it does give us a basis for planning and confirmation or rejection of portions of the knowledge should be possible following the forthcoming meetings. Tentatively, the basis of thinking allows for Zacapa shock troops to seize control and move out to approx 14°53’long 90°lat. to form assembly with Coban forces moving down parallel to the Coban–Salama–Morazan highway. It is tentatively planned to seize control of Coban through reported Calligeris’ assets within the Garrison and augment that force with pledged populace (reported) moving through Salama on the journey to the assembly. On assembly, and in line with the existing situation a movement towards Guatemala by this force could be commenced.

Jutiapa seizure would be affected in the same manner from a compartmented staging base just across the Salvador border. Upon completion of this seizure it would turn parallel to the main highway to a point some five miles east of Laguna de Amatitlan to join with forces from San Jose and turn towards Guatemala City. The seizure of San Jose would be dependent on the facts learned from the coming Calligeris meeting as to the true identity of the 2,000 reported personnel in the area.

G. Due to distance, logistical problems and need to utilize personnel at the foregoing projects the ideal will be to organize Mazatenango, Quezaltenango and Quiche to the pint of self-seizure. A study of personnel of those garrisons may disclose gimmicks with which we can force key military figures to employ a Latin-type retardation, insuring that these forces do not enter into the tactical picture in time to alter it. The probable situation will be a series of retardation events set up by organization of the area between these three sites and Guatemala City designed to delay reinforcement from these three sites until consolidation of the other targets as completed.

H. Contingency plans should account for 1. employment of Guatemala forces to the aid of our initial targets (which contingency has been generally considered in the above paragraphs). 2. Retirement of Guatemalan forces to Quezaltenango as has been reported to be the Guatemalan plan. In this latter event it is now being considered most feasible to complete the capitulation of Guatemala City set up against returned activities from the Quezaltenango area and complete solid reorganization before turning to the Quezaltenango problem. After solid organization it would be considered within our capabilities to take the forces at Quezaltenango by straight attack. 3. Another contingency would be for Guatemala City to prepare for a state of siege in which case reorganization following seizure of the initial targets could be carried out while insuring isolation of Guatemala City from re-supply or reinforcement.

IV. Communication:

A. Communications men now commencing training will produce two types of radio operators. One type is to be called resident R/Os and will be placed in the vicinity of target sites, as yet unselected points, for the purpose of reporting last minute changes in OB. Once the tactical situation opens up, we will revert to tactical R/Os who have previously been married to specific shock troop units. Until the tactical situation opens up Commo will be processed through outside (LINC). It is expected agent-to-Calligeris service will be a 6-hour process. Once the tactical situation opens up arrangements have been made for unit-to-Calligeris-to-unit-info LINC service. The messages will be sent in code due to the dependability of the RS-1 set to be used on this operation. Resident R/Os will have their radios delivered to them once they are in position. Tactical R/Os are expected to be paired and will carry RS-1s in packs.

V. Logistics:

A. The logistical support has been broken down into three categories: 1. Weather-proofed kits of approximately 50 lbs. weight, the contents of which are grouped to service partisans, saboteurs and R/Os. Approximately 12 March the total of these kits will arrive by plane at fields near the staging areas for distribution as needed. The sum total of equipment to be packaged is outlined.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 5. No classification marking.