29. Memorandum From Jacob R. Seekford to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King)1

Report No. 10


  • New Plans of Calligeris as Result of Loss of Arms Support by the Group
On 27 October Seekford again outlined for Calligeris the reasons why the Group was forced to withdraw its arms support, namely, that the U.S. State Department had withdrawn the export permit as a result of the indiscrete approaches to the Department by Generals Somoza and Trujillo.
Calligeris replied to this essentially as follows:
The actions of Generals Somoza and Trujillo were ill-considered. I can appreciate the reaction of the U.S. government on this matter in view of its commitments and agreements with other governments. The U.S. government could follow no other course of action.
I cannot, at this time, visit Somoza or Trujillo because of security reasons, however I shall send a letter to each by one of my most trusted officers. In my letter I shall request an explanation of their action and ask each to indicate his degree of willingness to support me under these new circumstances.
At this moment we are watching many months of hard work vanish. We shall be forced to rebuild almost from the beginning. As strongly as I feel about this I must say that I have suffered defeat before. We must continue fighting.
Before embarking on a new course of action it will be necessary to review the entire problem. My most immediate concern is my existing organization and the means by which I can maintain it intact. It is going to be a serious problem and will require more than money.
A series of conferences among the leaders in my organization will be necessary. I would appreciate it greatly if you (Seekford) and Hindmarsh could meet with [name not declassified] in Mexico City within the next week or so in order to begin the laying of new plans.

In considering new sources of arms and money I cannot, at this time, say what course of action I will take, other than write the Generals, until I have had a chance to study the matter.

[Page 47]

I would prefer to continue working with the two Generals as they are already aware of my general plans and for security reasons I prefer not to bring new persons in unless absolutely necessary. If however they will not help to the degree necessary then I shall be obliged to develop other contacts, i.e. Venezuela, Cuba, and Mexico, in that order.


Last week the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Military Attaché in Mexico visited me here. He expressed interest in my cause. He stated that he believed arms were available in Mexico and that he would aid me in getting them.2 He asked if I would have one of my officers call on him in Mexico City in the near future.

A few days ago the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Ambassador called on me and asked if I would outline for him my general financial and arms requirements in a report which he could carry back to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. He stated that he believed the report would be well received. The ambassador is due to return to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] about the 1st of November.
  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 134, Folder 6. No classification marking. A typed note at the top of the page reads: “Date of Info: 27 October 1952.”
  2. Field Comment:

    Calligeris did not go into too great detail on this. I gathered however that the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] MA would be instrumental in helping him locate and secure arms and nothing more. [Footnote in the source text.]