163. Memorandum From [name not declassified] of the Central Intelligence Agency to the Deputy Chief of Plans and the Chief of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency1
Washington, May 24, 1954.
- Consolidation of New Guatemalan Regime
- The task of consolidating the new Guatemalan regime falls into two
- Duties devolving on the Guatemalans. This is currently being discussed with [name not declassified] and will be covered in a later memorandum.
- Duties devolving upon ODYOKE. These form the subject of the present memorandum.
- The duties devolving upon ODYOKE
- Diplomatic recognition of the new government. ODACID must clearly take the lead in recognizing the new government, not only because other Hemisphere nations expect it, but also because such early recognition will capitalize most effectively on the overt moves that ODYOKE has made against the Guatemalan Communists. Early recognition by ODACID could do much to re-affirm ODYOKE leadership in the Hemisphere. (The cover and deception requirements of covert action should be satisfied by other means and should not be allowed to hamper early overt recognition.) Action: ODACID.
- Economic and technical assistance. There should not be extension of American economic aid and technical assistance to Guatemala alone; this could be interpreted by other Central American and Hemisphere countries as “rewarding” a recently Communist and aggressive nation, [Page 299]without corresponding help to nations that never were Communist. There should be an overall economic aid and technical assistance program for all Central America, as recommended in LINC 2885.2 Action: ODACID and FOA.
- Coordination of UFCO Action. Immediate conversations should be initiated with the UFCO, with a view toward coordinating ODACID and UFCO action in the consolidation period. Specifically, UFCO should be advised that ODACID will not support UFCO requests with diplomatic notes during the early months of the new government; while it was necessary and proper for ODACID to support UFCO against a Communist government, it will be improper for ODACID to make the same demands of an anti-Communist government. Likewise, UFCO should be asked not to mortgage the political viability of the new regime by pressing its claims too soon. Rather, as JMBLUG has recommended, UFCO should await the call of the new government to a joint parley in view of the influence that pro-UFCO elements and individuals will have in the new government ([name not declassified], SUPERIOR, etc.) the UFCO should be able to await and join in such a parley with equanimity. It may be advisable for the parley to agree to turn over the Guatemalan-UFCO dispute to an impartial commission, chosen by the parties to the dispute. It may also be advisable for the new government to levy promptly the increased taxes that the UFCO has declared itself willing to pay; then the issue of compensation for expropriated land can be masked by the tax “victory” of the new government; compensation might actually be made in the form of taxes lower than they would be otherwise. Action: ODACID.
- Labor leadership. The AFL, either acting through the ORIT or independently, should be urged to send immediately a highly qualified team of labor instructors to assist anti-Communist Guatemalan labor leaders in the purging and re-organization of both urban and rural unions. These instructors should be men willing and able to cooperate with the Catholic Church in Guatemala. Action: ODACID–KUBARK.
- Special Security Commission. A special team of qualified personnel should be dispatched to Guatemala, on request from the new government, to assist the new government in the detection and elimination of all Communists and pro-Communists from positions of influence in Guatemala. This mission should have its costs shared between the two governments. Action: ODACID to secure the request from the new Guatemalan government, KUBARK to prepare and dispatch the team.
[name not declassified]